



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

361. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)

Washington, July 26, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose--Phase I. Top Secret.

Mr. Martin: Attached is the combined report on Phase I./1/ Mr. Johnson has a copy.

/1/See Document 360.

I do not find Lansdale's covering memo particularly enlightening. The comments of DOD and the other agencies on the "four courses of action" are worth noting. You will be interested to read that DOD would like to see the Monroe Doctrine re-affirmed.

I think the essence of the positions lies in the following:

1. CIA believes that if assurances were given of US intervention, a revolt could be mounted by late 1963, but would be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not supported by substantial military force. No mention is made of the nature or magnitude of the revolt.
2. Defense states it needs eighteen (or perhaps twelve) days of preparation, although some units might be available in as soon as five days.
3. State believes it needs a virtual civil war situation in Cuba before intervention in Cuba with US military force might be considered politically feasible.

These three conditions do not appear to be easily reconciled.

Bob

362. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, July 31, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-3162. Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that 11 copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert

Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Murrow/Wilson. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Contingency Plan

Transmitted herewith is a copy of "United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)," which is submitted for your consideration. The plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This plan was developed as a result of reports in mid-June 1962 that the Cuban people were about to revolt against the Castro-Communist regime, without U.S. sponsorship, and the desire expressed by the Special Group that the U.S. be ready for such a contingency. The DOD/JCS representative was tasked by me to develop a plan with the assistance of Operation Mongoose representatives from participating departments and agencies. The DOD/JCS representative did so, and the attached plan is the result.

Attachment

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

REFERENCE

Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962/1/

/1/Document 347.

TASK AGENCIES

Department of State

Department of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

US Information Agency

1. Situation.

a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba.

b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force.

c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where:

(1) The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime;

(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and;

(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).

d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.

e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipment of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Officer of the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan.

(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary, but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail. In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.

(3) US Military Reaction.

(a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties.

(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. *[8 lines of source text not declassified]*

(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:

(a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated at such time as essential military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to resist and to reduce risk to US units initially deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss of life.

(b) Phase II. Following the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be primarily concerned with the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban government friendly to the US. US military efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Military operations essential for the elimination of small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will continue. Major US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Defense will cease at the time the Department of State assumes responsibility for civil administration of Cuba.

b. Department of Defense Operations.

(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans.

(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba.

(3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability.

(a) *[12-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]*

(b) *[6 lines of source text not declassified]*

[1 paragraph (7-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations.

c. Department of State Operations.

(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States action in as broad a multilateral context as possible.

(a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

(b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force.

(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin American nations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces.

(d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available.

(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments.

(f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance.

(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies.

(h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stress-ing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement.

(2) Phase II--(Post Invasion)

(a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.

(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.

(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.

(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.

d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations.

(1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.

(2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.

(3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement,^{/2/} whether it is implemented or not.

^{/2/}Not found.

(4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans.

(5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations.

(6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

e. United States Information Agency Operations.

(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.

(2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:

(a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.

(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.

(3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:

(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.

(b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid and complete defeat.

(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.

(e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.

(f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

f. Department of the Treasury

Department of Justice

Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Department of Agriculture

Federal Aviation Agency

Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

- a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and
- b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.

- a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.
- b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
- c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
- d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.
- e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

363. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 85-2-62

Washington, August 1, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by McCone, was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on August 1, except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA/1/

/1/This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21

March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document 315.]

The Problem

To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

Conclusions

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10)

B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11)

C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-19)

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (Paras. 22-23)

E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and industrial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (Paras. 30-35)

F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, however, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regime's massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41)

G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (Paras. 42-51)

H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there

and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. (Paras. 52-59)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the Estimate. For text, see the Supplement.]

364. Paper by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)

Washington, August 1, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone, Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Lansdale.

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR MONGOOSE MEETING,

10 AUGUST 1962/1/

/1/See Document 371.

A. Consideration of special NIE on Cuba./2/

Responsible Agency: CIA

/2/Document 363.

*B. Discussion of the effects of the existence of the Castro Government during the past year on the United States, Latin America, and the USSR.

Responsible Agency: State

C. Explanation of the distinction between the four proposed courses of action./3/ *Responsible Agency:* General Lansdale

/3/See Document 360.

*D. Discussion of a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action.

Responsible Agency: General Lansdale

E. Pros and Cons of the precommitment proposed in Course C.

Responsible Agency: State, Defense, USIA

*F. Consequences of military intervention to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction.

Responsible Agency: DOD, JCS

G. Future courses of action to be recommended to higher authority.

Responsible Agency: All

*It is requested the responsible agencies for the topics marked with asterisks above circulate papers to the members of the Special Group (Augmented) by 8 August.

MDT/4/

/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

365. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, August 6, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose

"Gusano Libre," Symbol of Cuban Resistance

1. The term "Gusano" (worm) was first applied by Fidel Castro to counter-revolutionaries. Since then it has been used proudly as a symbol by the opposition to the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. CIA plans a coordinated campaign to popularize, exploit and encourage the use of "Gusano Libre" as the symbol of resistance to the Cuban regime. So as to give the impression that adoption of the symbol is a spontaneous internal development and not an exile one, CIA controlled outlets will refer to instances of use of the symbol inside Cuba rather than calling on Cubans to adopt the symbol.

2. We intend to use the occasion of the next "Voice of Free Cuba" submarine operation planned for mid-August 1962 to announce that the "Gusano Libre" has become the symbol of popular resistance against the Castro regime, calling upon the people of Cuba to show their defiance of the government by scrawling this symbol in public places. The "Gusano Libre" campaign will expand upon this broadcast.

3. In order to give meaning to the symbol a declaration of principles will be announced./1/ The declaration will cover such points as what the "Gusano Libre" stands for:

/1/A marginal note at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "This declaration will not be made."

- a. Defeat of Castroism and Communism.
- b. Establishment of a truly democratic government based on the Constitution of 1940.
- c. A system of agrarian reform carried out under provisions of fair compensation to former land owners.
- d. The private ownership of property.
- e. A free trade union movement with the right of the worker to engage in collective bargaining with his employer.
- f. A minimum wage law, unemployment compensation, a social security system which ensures workers the prospects of a tranquil retirement.
- g. Social justice in which every individual has the right to obtain an education and work.

4. The general declarations will be followed by more specific pronouncements as to what the "Gusano Libre" stands for and says. In addition to publicizing "El Gusano Libre" through the use of radios, newspapers, and mailing operations, actions will be taken to provide the people in Cuba with pictures of "El Gusano Libre" as well as instructions on how to draw "El Gusano Libre" on walls and other public places. A small bulletin titled "El Gusano Libre" will be prepared for inside distribution. Gusano Libre pins, armbands, seals, pencils, balloons, etc. can also be produced for inside distribution via mail, legal travelers and propaganda balloons.

5. Once the "Gusano Libre" symbol is established "Gusano Libre" actions will be broadened to include such targets as the G-2 and Soviet/Satellite personalities.

6. Much of the "Gusano Libre" propaganda cartoons, and related material is already developed and will be put into production and distributed following the "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcast announcing the adoption of the "Gusano Libre" as the symbol of Cuban Resistance.

William K. Harvey/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

366. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey)

Washington, August 6, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Noform; Special Handling.

SUBJECT

CIA Draft Operational Plan B+/1/

/1/See Document 367.

As requested by you in our meeting Monday afternoon, I have read your draft operational plan. In reading it in the light of making recommendations to higher authority, I found little basis to say that these were either additional or possible within the context of contributing to the mission as stated. The policy level must have proposals which have been assessed as do-able in the current state of foreign affairs and likely to contribute to the desired goal.

Rather than go down point by point and page by page, let me point out three items you list as appropriate possibilities:

a. III A 1, paragraph 1 on page 2: Helping State with use of OAS for Mongoose goals. In the first place, you know that State sees little hope of further use of OAS for our goals, so why be "pie-in-the-sky"? One of our original aims, as you know, was to activate operations from individual Latin American countries. [*I line of source text not declassified*] Why is this not proposed as desirable and do-able?

b. Item III B 3 on page 2: You note an economic blow by causing the diversion of Cuban resources from production. If it is possible, why isn't this being done now? It needs no new policy approval to my knowledge.

c. IV B on page 6: You suggest that raising the noise level is needed for you to generate strikes inside Cuba. Can CIA actually hope to generate such strikes? I recall discussions on this very point when you felt that it was impossible to get to the action groups, such as labor unions, to obtain such results. [*2-1/2 lines of source text not*

declassified] If we have no assets inside Cuba, then why is this now called a possibility?

For my use, the most helpful thing as I make proposals to higher authority would be to have you initial each of the items in your paper which you, as the DCI's representative in this field, believe is really possible (do-able and sensible). I would appreciate such an indication from you by noon today, since I plan to pull together the team proposals this afternoon, for your further comments and suggestions./2/

/2/On August 7 Lansdale sent a handwritten note to McGeorge Bundy relating to the Mongoose planning exercise in which he wrote, in part: "It's no easy thing to make the big organizations come up with practical answers, although I'll keep trying." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62)

367. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, August 8, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Stepped Up Course B

You requested a paper on "a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action."

Course B was described in our 25 July team review of Operation Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. policy. It read: "b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." The major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines,/1/ which kept our actions "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area."

/1/Document 314.

As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from participating departments and agencies.

The papers from each representative are attached. The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are essentially reflective of companion roles to CIA's covert activities. USIA has added a "think piece" on anticipated world-wide psychological reaction to a stepped up Course B.

Considerations

In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the

Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regime's security forces attempt to crush the revolt. The CIA operational people, who would implement a stepped up Course B as Phase II of Operation Mongoose, do not believe this course of action by itself would bring the overthrow of the regime in Cuba; they believe that the use of U.S. military force in the final stage must be anticipated, for success.

At the close of the attached CIA section on "covert activities," there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions (including propaganda balloons and establishing a medium-wave Radio Free Cuba), training Cubans on U.S. bases, some operational use of Guantanamo, and more flexibility in the composition of paramilitary groups (selection of Cubans in U.S. forces and strengthening with non-Cubans).

In the "covert activities" section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.

My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

Attachment/2/

Washington, August 7, 1962.

/2/Top Secret; Sensitive.

COVERT ACTIVITIES

William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

I. Situation:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action "b" in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962./3/

/3/Document 360.

B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62./4/

/4/Document 363.

C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:

1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless

this assumption is made.)

2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force.

3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a "time table" basis.

II. Mission:

"Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment"

III. Tasks:

A. Political:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro.
2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.
5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage.

B. Economic:

1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.
2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics.
3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.
4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor acts of sabotage.

C. Resistance:

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population.
2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.
3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance

cells and in potential resistance areas.

4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising.
5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.
6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc.
7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising.

D. Psychological:

1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere.

E. Intelligence:

1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:
 - a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
 - b. Activities of Cuban G-2.
 - c. Soviet activities in Cuba.
 - d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
 - e. Militia morale.
 - f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.

IV. Implementation:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

A. Intelligence (FI):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized:

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.
2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.
3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.

4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

B. Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in "high noise level" types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:

1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required.
2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.
3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews.
4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required.
5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy.
6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.
7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

C. Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated "black teams" can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide "the spark of hope." Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential:

1. Commando/Raider Teams--Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected

pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four-months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel.

2. Urban Resistance Cells--Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting, casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any major uprising.) A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals.

3. Rural Resistance Cells--Three to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors.

4. Guerrilla--Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) "hit and run" guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time.

5. Cuban Exile Forces--The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Fight" under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the "Cuban Freedom Fighter" groups. Additional policy approval is required.

6. Infiltration/Exfiltration--The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including:

- a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability.
- b. Submarines and other naval craft.
- c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

V. Support Required From Other Agencies:

A. From Department of Defense:

1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support.

a. Site A--commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 100 men.

b. Site B--Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

c. Site C--Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support:

a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher.

b. Submarine radio broadcasts--"Voice of Free Cuba".

c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now.

d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station.

e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects.

3. Air Support:

a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase.

b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements.

4. Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. Policy Approvals Required:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program:

- A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance.
- B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba.
- C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching.
- D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping.
- E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeting against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.
- F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.
- G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated.
- H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities.
- I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews.
- J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of "Cuban Freedom Fighters."
- K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. Estimated Cost to CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600.

B. Estimated Budget:

Fiscal Year 1963--\$40,000,000

Fiscal Year 1964--\$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis)

Attachment/5/

Washington, August 7, 1962.

/5/Top Secret.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may be in this unstable situation provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however, we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly in operations, the success of which may be doubtful.

The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the exercise of all feasible political, economic and psychological pressures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to make the Castro Government's survival more difficult and to isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.

Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall of the Castro Government whenever it reasonably appeared that the benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for the free world.

A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)/6/

/6/The note is at the end of Hurwitch's paper.

It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, however, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans in Cuba who are not under U.S. control; supply of sabotage materiel and instructions as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control; and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life. Terroristic acts of sabotage should be ruled out.

A second area of covert activities which might contribute to the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.

There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B, with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:

Political

A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.

Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the "Hemisphere versus Cuba" impression.

Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could place on public display sharp division among the OAS member states and could serve to weaken the inter-American system.

B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people.

Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where successful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Government.

Disadvantage: If overdone, such a campaign could result in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S.

C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.

Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Disadvantage: Most Latin American nations do not have legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with respect to travel to Cuba could create serious local political problems.

D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro-communist elements.

E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.

F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.

Advantage: This action, where successful, would exacerbate Cuba's already precarious foreign exchange position and further reduce its ability to purchase vital equipment in the free world.

Disadvantage: In some instances, Cuban exports are less expensive than are similar products from alternate sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation for which funds are not currently available.

H. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Added note on sabotage

Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment: for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts

should not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result. Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.

Attachment/7/

Washington, August 7, 1962.

/7/Top Secret.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks:

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime.
2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to "isolate" Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

a. Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIA's new view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castro's capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

b. Balloon deliveries. This capability under CIA direction has been discussed at a meeting of the Special Group and not acted upon. If activated, USIA would participate in the preparation of the propaganda material.

c. Aircraft deliveries. Also a CIA project. USIA would participate in the preparation of propaganda material.

d. Smuggling of printed materials. As the U.S. capability within Cuba increases, there is an improving possibility of making propaganda material available to the population. The desirability of this would have to be first determined on the basis of security to the personnel involved. An increase of printed material exposing weaknesses of the Castro regime would be desirable, and USIA would participate in the preparation of that material.

e. The greatest possible circulation to the "worm" (gusano libre) theme within Cuba should be implemented. This is a CIA project. However if it gains momentum, USIA will be able to pick it up for VOA exploitation into Cuba and the rest of Latin America.

f. We would continue to attempt to find a suitable musical theme that might stir the resistance forces in Cuba.

2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America.

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year '62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year '63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented:

1) Radio. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America.

2) Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up.

3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted.

4) Television. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America. The Agency has done one TV "Special" on Castro, and has acquired others from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could do a puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos.

5) Books. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America. Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme.

6) Refugees. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on). We could more fully exploit the Negro defectors.

Following are some possibilities for new programming:

1. Contract for anti-Castro supplements to be printed and placed regularly in Latin American newspapers.

2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees. Program content can be worked into the performance, or there could be a statement on the Cuban plight at intermission.

3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on one theme--perhaps the executions--to be sent around Latin America.

4. Develop a speakers' bureau throughout Latin America to send lecturers before all types of groups. Provide these lecturers with anti-Castro giveaway materials and film slides.

5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro themes, and get them displayed in key

locations all over Latin America.

It is USIA's view that the most effective information program in Latin America must have a position theme. That is why the majority of our output is still devoted to support of the Alliance for Progress. Our anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated to a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support material for the Alliance for Progress.

Advantages of Stepped-Up Course B:

- a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways.
- b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro factions.
- c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin America to the Castro/Communist regime.

Disadvantages:

- a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious of "intervention."
- b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of exposure of the program.

Anticipated Reaction to Stepped-Up Course B

World reaction to a heightened propaganda-political action campaign against Castro would be significantly influenced by (a) the pace of the intensification, (b) the degree of overt identification with the U.S., and (c) the intensity of the Soviet propaganda response.

Assuming such a campaign were skillfully handled, however, we believe public reaction abroad would not be damaging to U.S. interests in any significant degree.

Latin America

There has been increasing disenchantment with Castro throughout Latin America since early 1961. There would not be widespread negative reaction if our campaign were closely identified with a Cuban liberation movement and directed solely at Cuba, not throughout the area generally.

An overt, clearly U.S.-inspired campaign would bring varied reactions. Mexico, with its legalistic, moralistic approach to Castro, might react strongly to any implied violation of Cuban sovereignty. The press, however, would be less critical than the government. Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and possibly Ecuador, would deplore our action. Again, however, the press and public would be less critical than their governments.

Argentina is less predictable; probably the present regime would be less critical than Frondizi would be.

Governmental and public opinion of the smaller countries in and near the Caribbean would be with us. They feel the heat from Castro most, and are most eager to see him out of the way. In this category are Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and to a lesser degree Panama, Nicaragua and Salvador. Colombia would be sympathetic to us. The Betancourt regime in Venezuela is, of course, openly anti-Castro; there would be hostility on the far left, however.

Western Europe

Assuming no sudden or dramatic moves which might alarm a war-wary public opinion, European reaction would be mostly sympathetic. The U.K., Germany, the Benelux, and center and right-wing elements in France and Italy would be particularly sympathetic. Enthusiasm would be restrained by the fact that European nations have benefited economically by the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. They would dislike losing the market, which would be inevitable to some degree if Castro fell.

Spain and Portugal, which feel a Latin affinity with Cuba no matter who is in power there, would be critical despite their lack of ideological sympathy with Castro. Public opinion in Sweden and Austria might be moderately critical on moral grounds. The anti-Communist Finnish public would be favorable, though the government would straddle.

Communists and fellow-travelers would be sharply critical. It is unlikely, however, that they would stage demonstrations or make much noise except perhaps in Italy.

Canada

Canada, which has profited economically by U.S.-Cuban estrangement, would be critical, pegging its criticism on lofty moral grounds.

Eastern Europe-Communist China

The Communist Bloc and Yugoslavia would, of course, be sharply critical. There might be mass meetings; possibly some "demonstrations" outside American embassies. There would be an intensification of pro-Castro, anti-U.S. propaganda, and probably new assurances of Soviet support to Castro in the event of hostilities.

Near East and South Asia

The most serious repercussions in this area would be in India where Krishna Menon and his ilk would publicly condemn the U.S. and exploit the situation as further justification for their general anti-American line and the MIG purchases.

The extent of Indian reaction would depend in large measure on the intensity of the Soviet reaction. If the latter were sufficiently severe, U.S.-Indian relations could be damaged.

Reaction in Ceylon and Iraq would be similar to that of India.

There would be criticism by the pro-Nasser press in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, but the UAR Government--pleased with its improved relations with the U.S.--probably would remain silent. The Pakistani press, unhappy about our aid to India, might use Cuban developments as a peg for attacks on the U.S. despite their lack of ideological sympathy for Castro.

What little reaction might develop in Greece, Turkey and Iran would be mostly favorable.

Africa

Africa, like India, is particularly sensitive to any heating up of the Cold War. If Moscow's response is particularly vigorous, African political and opinion leaders are likely to become more skittish with a resulting slowdown in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Africa.

The hostile neutrals (Casablanca Powers) would lead the negative reaction. It is unlikely we would suffer much except in Guinea (where Sekou Toure's disillusionment with the Communists might be slowed) and Ghana. Even

in these countries, however, it is not probable that U.S. interests would be seriously damaged.

The independent and pro-Western nations (Monrovia Powers) would be neutral or quietly sympathetic except in the case of Nigeria where we might expect some hostility.

Far East

Except for the Philippines, Far Eastern nations have little interest in Cuba. The Philippines, with their historic and cultural ties with Cuba, would take note of events but not unsympathetically; they don't like Castro. Little notice would be taken in neutral Cambodia and Burma. The Sukarno regime might criticize us, but the Indonesian public would be indifferent. Communists and fellow-travelers might stage demonstrations in Indonesia and Japan, but with little effect.

Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam would, of course, exploit the situation in their broadcasting, but the impact would be little different than that caused by their current anti-U.S. propaganda.

Attachment/8/

Washington, August 7, 1962.

/8/Top Secret.

MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose.
2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use US military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made.
 - a. With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne/amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life.
 - b. A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this plan the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within 8 hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed 3 days later with a build up of the full scale effort to follow.
 - c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability.
 - d. We are continuing our efforts to reduce reaction time through plans for the prepositioning of forces and materiel. In this connection, we have developed a Cover and Deception Plan which permits a certain amount of prepositioning under the guise of training exercises and places US forces involved in an advantageous position

without endangering security to an unacceptable degree.

368. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Craig) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, August 8, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; NoFORN; Special Handling. On August 8 Lansdale sent a copy of this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under a covering note that indicated it was a paper to be discussed at an August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba

1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts.

2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment).

a. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

b. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. Major units involved in the initial assault include: Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

d. Principal equipment includes:

(1) Army--Artillery units and armor (including about 275 tanks)

(2) Marines--[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

(3) Navy--[2 lines of source text not declassified]

(4) Air Force--[2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Level of National Mobilization Required.

a. Army--None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations.

b. Navy--For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping.

c. Air Force--In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time, [2 lines of source text not declassified] however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day.

d. Marines--None.

e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands.

4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React--The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] days. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits.

a. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] It is estimated that the Army Airborne two division force would be available for other operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] after withdrawal from Cuba. Substantial Army forces from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counter guerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness.

b. [5 lines of source text not declassified] It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. About [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capability will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacific [1 line of source text not declassified]. In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTs ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the operation.

c. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed.

e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air Force forces brought into the area for this operation. Therefore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is anticipated.

5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction.

a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention.

b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.

c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States. All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation.

d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviets continue to provide the

Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities.

6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation.

- a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an effective friendly Cuban government.
- b. Following the establishment of essential military control of the island, a substantial US military commitment may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time. Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and order and the conduct of counter guerrilla operations.
- c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above, it is planned that the post assault military presence initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required. This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy period of providing military assistance is anticipated.

369. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, August 8, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 14 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Four copies were kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Medium-Wave Broadcasting to Cuba

At a meeting with the operational representatives of Operation Mongoose, 1 August, General Taylor and the Attorney General asked about the possibility of strong medium-wave broadcasts into Cuba. In response, Don Wilson of USIA has sent me some thoughtful studies on this subject, after collaboration with State and CIA at the operating level, and noting an earlier memorandum from Ed Murrow about broadcasts from the U.S. (which Mr. Murrow discussed with the Special Group). These studies are attached,/1/ for your information.

/1/Not printed.

The conclusions reached are:

- a. Medium-wave broadcasts from stations in the U.S. are a possibility for short term tactical purposes. They would be illegal in terms of international agreement and could bring serious reprisals (Cuban interference with medium-wave broadcasts over wide areas of the United States).
- b. Although it was believed that Swan Island broadcasts could be strengthened and possibly undergo a character change (becoming similar to Radio Free Europe) to gain Cuban listeners, further study concludes that no new medium-wave capability should be developed from Radio Swan (difficult and expensive logistic problems, coupled with April 1961 reputation).
- c. A thousand kilowatt transmitter is in storage in the U.S. It is estimated that it would take about 15 months, at

a cost of about \$8 million, to install a transmitter of this power as rapidly as possible.

d. Ten locations around the Caribbean were studied as possible sites for a powerful transmitter, considering technical and political feasibility. Venezuela ranked first politically, tenth for technical reasons. The Dominican Republic would appear to present the best prospects from a political standpoint and ranks second technically. The political feasibility of establishing a transmitter on foreign soil in the other locations studied appears remote.

e. Cuba could negate our medium-wave effort, if Castro so desired, by using surplus transmitters in Cuba to broadcast locally on the same frequency. (It is more difficult to jam short-wave broadcasts, due to the capability for simultaneous broadcasts on multiple frequencies.)

370. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, August 10, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret. The drafter of this paper is not identified on the source text. It is evident from internal evidence, however, that it was prepared in the Department of State. The only representatives of the Department of State who were privy to Mongoose planning were Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Martin, Goodwin, and Hurwitch. Since Rusk and Johnson are cited in the third person in the text, the paper was apparently drafted by Ball, Goodwin, Martin, or Hurwitch. The style suggests that of Hurwitch and the paper was probably sent to Martin.

THOUGHTS FOR 2:30 MEETING/1/

/1/Reference is to the August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented); see Document 371.

1. Dirty Tricks

I believe the Agency is under the impression that under present policy, it is not permitted to engage in such. This is not my reading of present policy. Although the Secretary indicated he thought he ought not to mention this subject, I think the question should be clarified--along the lines of Alex's distinction on sabotage, with the Agency given a free hand on the irritant, harassment type. In this connection, the Agency is prone to select individual exiles whom it controls and exclusively supply them with sabotage materiel. Control, security, and a sense of professionalism probably account for this practice. I should think that for this low-level type of sabotage, every exile group (except the Batistianos) that we have reason to believe has followers in Cuba, should be given a supply of materiel and turned loose. I should be inclined to give priority to the CRC but certainly not a monopoly.

2. Secretary's Approach

If the Secretary's suggested approach is adopted, we could undertake, together with the Agency, a careful scrutiny of all the "new" communists in the ORI directorate (who outnumber the veteran communists) in an effort to determine who among them have significant influence on Castro. Perhaps in working with Manolo Ray and other MRP leaders (the MRP is virtually the 26th July in exile) methods of approach to the selected directorate members could be evolved. This would of course have to be very discreet, with cut-outs, etc. I am not sanguine about success, but see this as an additional approach to those discussed yesterday./2/

/2/Secretary Rusk met off-the-record with Goodwin, Hurwitch, and Martin on August 9 at 5:11 p.m. to discuss the August 10 2:30 meeting. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

If the Secretary's approach is adopted, I should think we would continue operations at about the present level: actions short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt. In this connection, the question of resistance

symbols and declarations arises. The Agency is pushing ahead with its "Gusano Libre" theme (see attached).^{/3/} I doubt whether "worms of the world unite" will cause people to revolt; I should put it in the nuisance category at this stage. However, as indicated in the attached paper, the program may escalate considerably, and it is extremely difficult to know where to draw the line. The "Gusano Libre" theme will be carried on the submarine radio next week, and Castro's 26th of July declaration that overthrow of the despotism is legitimate will be quoted. I have approved the script, primarily on the basis that this radio broadcast has little listenership as yet.

^{/3/}Not found attached. An apparent reference to Document 365.

3. Soviet Base in Cuba

General Lansdale called this morning to inquire whether we had done a paper on policy toward the establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba. I told him not yet. He may bring this up. You will recall that it was decided that the possibility was too remote to waste time on. General Craig was supposed to bring in new evidence. The only "evidence" that General Lansdale circulated is the photostated intelligence report^{/4/} in the attached package. Paragraph 3 of the report speaks of a rumored submarine base.

^{/4/}Not found attached.

371. Editorial Note

On August 10, 1962, a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) was held in Secretary Rusk's conference room in the Department of State. The meeting was chaired by Secretary Rusk and attended by Secretary of Defense McNamara, as well as the regular members of the Special Group (Augmented). The agenda for the meeting was circulated by General Taylor on August 1; see Document 364. Only fragmentary records of the discussion at this key meeting have been found. According to a chronology of the positions McCone took concerning Cuba, prepared for him on October 21, McCone maintained at the meeting that the Soviet Union had in Cuba an asset of such importance that "the Soviets will not let Cuba fail." To prevent such a failure McCone expected that the Soviet Union would supplement economic, technical, and conventional military aid with medium-range ballistic missiles, which they would justify by reference to U.S. missile bases in Italy and Turkey. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers) McCone confirmed that aspect of the discussion in a memorandum for the record he prepared on October 31, 1963. (Ibid.)

Memoranda prepared by McCone and William Harvey also indicate that the issue of the assassination of Cuban political leaders came up during the discussion. According to an August 14 memorandum from Harvey to Richard Helms, the issue was raised during the meeting by McNamara. Harvey recorded: "It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record." Harvey added that he took careful notes on the comments made at the meeting on this issue, "and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Ibid.) See the Supplement. On April 14, 1967, McCone sent a memorandum from his retirement to Helms, who had become Director of Central Intelligence, in which he wrote of the discussion at the August 10 meeting: "I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." McCone added that immediately after the meeting, he called on McNamara and reemphasized his position on the issue. He noted that McNamara "heartily agreed." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers)

Harvey's August 14 memorandum to Helms bears out McCone's recollection that it was the sense of the meeting that no discussion of the assassination of Cuban leaders should be put in writing. Harvey wrote that in light of the discussion at the August 10 meeting, he called General Lansdale's office and pointed out the "inadmissibility and stupidity" of including the words "including liquidation of leaders" in an August 13 memorandum discussing

Alternate Course B that Lansdale circulated to Harvey and other action officers for Operation Mongoose. Harvey noted that he had strongly urged that the phrase be deleted from all existing copies of the memorandum. Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, with the requested excision, is printed as Document 372.

372. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, August 13, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling. General Benjamin Harris replaced General Craig as Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose following Craig's reassignment.

MEMORANDUM FOR

William Harvey, CIA

Robert Hurwitch, State

Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense

Don Wilson, USIA

SUBJECT

Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)"/1/ will be used as the starting basis.

/1/An apparent reference to the CIA attachment to Document 367.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*, Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

373. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, August 13, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Alternate Course B

REFERENCE

Your memorandum--August 13, 1962/1/

/1/Document 372.

I--Statement of Objectives:

A. The ultimate objective of the United States with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro Government and its replacement by one which shares the objectives of the free world.

B. As steps toward the ultimate objective, the following intermediate objectives have been established for Phase II (which should be attained as rapidly as feasibility, prudence and a comparatively low noise level dictate):

(1) Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.

(2) Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.

(3) Maintain maximum [moderate]/2/ economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. [Conduct limited, secure, viable covert resistance and action operations.]

/2/Bracketed portions contain original Agency language. Unbracketed language (except for item 6) reflect the Agency's interpretation of the sense of the policy meeting. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

(4) Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.

(5) Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban/Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

[Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuba leadership, or split in Cuban-Bloc relationships.]

(6) Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade.

II--Comments and Courses of Action:

A. "Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations."

(1) State would carry out those actions described in the Department's contribution to General Lansdale's August 8, 1962 memorandum./3/

/3/Document 367.

(2) As an additional means of isolation, covert attempts to interfere with important Cubans who travel in the Hemisphere might be undertaken. Specific policy approval in each instance would be required.

B. "Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere."

(1) Emphasis should be placed upon discreditation in the Hemisphere as part of the isolation process. The more we succeed in discrediting the Castro Government in the Hemisphere, the less likely are we to experience adverse reaction in the Hemisphere to the regime's disappearance. Inside Cuba, the people will support or oppose the regime, primarily depending upon actual conditions, not upon United States or exile propaganda. To the extent we can covertly effect deterioration of conditions and/or stimulate overt acts of opposition, however, such actions would serve to discredit the regime both in Cuba and abroad.

C. "Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuban economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources."

(1) The two main Cuban exports to the USSR are sugar and nickel. Disruption of the sugar industry (for internal reasons as well) and the Nicaro nickel plant should, therefore, be among the high priority targets. Policy approval would be required for each sabotage operation.

(2) Sabotage materiel should be made available to any Cuban exile group (except Batistianos) that has assets inside Cuba and desires such materiel. Although the CRC should be given priority, it should not be given a monopoly. General policy approval would be required.

D. "Maintain maximum coverage of intelligence requirements with respect to Cuba."

No comment.

E. "Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising."

(1) A thorough study of the backgrounds of the ORI Directorate members who were formerly with the 26th of July should be undertaken to determine who among them have the most influence on Castro. Through the MRP leaders (who probably retain some influence among the 26th of July leaders) we should seek to influence selected ORI Directorate members toward splitting Cuba from the Bloc.

(2) We would investigate the possibility of enlisting the assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.

F. "Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade."

State would initiate a plan for this contingency.

374. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, August 14, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale.

SUBJECT

Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, the Operational Representatives have worked out the attached outline of an Alternative Course B, for your consideration. More detailed planning can be undertaken when guidelines are firmed for future activities.

Attachment

ALTERNATE COURSE B

I. Objectives

National objectives for the purpose of this planning are assumed to be:

- a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.
- b. Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.
- c. Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.
- d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.
- e. Take steps to inspire splits in Cuban leadership or split in Cuban/Bloc relationships.
- f. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

II. Mission

The mission will be to accomplish the above objectives as rapidly as feasible through a balanced program of overt and covert activities. Accomplishment probably will raise the noise level above that in Phase I of Operation Mongoose. It should be recognized that the activities described in this outline are not in themselves designed to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime.

III. Activities

A. Intelligence

Tasks

Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government.
2. Activities of Cuban G-2.

3. Soviet activities in Cuba.
4. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
5. Military and militia order of battle and morale.
6. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the "power centers" in the Cuban government.
7. Economic.
8. Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Implementation

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized.

1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.
2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.
3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information.
4. Expansion of communications intelligence coverage particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets.

B. Political

Tasks

1. Continue and intensify active OAS and Latin American country support for the containment and undermining of Castro/Communist regime.
2. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3. Support the CRC and such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.
4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.
5. Investigate the possibility of enlisting assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.

Implementation

1. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republic's initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises.
2. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate

solidarity with the Cuban people.

3. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba.
4. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro/Communist elements.
5. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-Communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development.
6. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

C. Economic

Tasks

1. Encourage minor acts of sabotage throughout Cuba.
2. To the extent practicable, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes.
3. Conduct selected sabotage principally of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such.
4. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports.
5. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Implementation

1. Use covert psychological media to induce mass Cuban undertakings in minor sabotage (nails in road, sugar in gas tanks).
2. Commando/Sabotage Teams: A pool of 20 to 50 most carefully selected men highly trained in commando-sabotage tactics should be maintained. From this group, especially constituted sabotage teams will be selected for specific sabotage assignments per para. III.C.3 above. Except for occasional specialized training (such as possibly parachute), all spotting, recruiting and training can be done by CIA facilities.

D. Psychological

Tasks

1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.
2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

Implementation

Operations on these objectives will be divided first into two general categories--overt, i.e., those activities which are attributed or attributable to the U.S. Government and which are the primary responsibility of the U.S.

Information Agency; and covert, those activities which cannot or should not be attributed to the U.S. Government and which would thus be under the primary control of the Central Intelligence Agency. These two categories must be subdivided according to whether the operations are primarily directed at target groups within Cuba or at groups outside Cuba, either in the hemisphere or elsewhere.

Concerning operations in all these categories care should be exercised to avoid overplaying purely psychological or informational operations. Information programs can be effective only so long as they accompany and support political and/or material action. They should never be allowed to become substitutes for action and they should not anticipate or prejudice policy.

It is also important to avoid over-emphasis on the purely anti-Castro or anti-Communist aspect of the program. Wholly negative programs of any sort do not wear well with any audience. The Alliance for Progress as the real promise of fulfillment of the aspirations of the common people of the Americas must remain as the keystone of our general Latin American information policy. And a positive approach must also be included in a substantial portion of our materials pointed directly at the Cuban people. This should include material which will provide a basis for reassurance and hope for a new Cuba after the fall of Castro, a Cuba which will truly provide for a realization of the reforms and a fulfillment of the aspirations which motivated the Cuban revolution.

Note: USIA concurs with CIA's conclusion that the expense of establishing and operating a medium-wave broadcasting facility is not justified under the present plan. As previously pointed out, the facility would cost approximately 8 million dollars and take 15 months to build and there are very serious obstacles (notably an extensive Cuban jamming capability) to its success. State and USIA recommend that CIA continue the Swan Island operation at its present level.

Overt--To Cuba:

Short wave radio must continue as our principal medium of communication with the Cuban people. Nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish with three hours specifically beamed at the Cuban audience will continue to be the basis of this. In December USIA's new Greenville facility will be operational with a resulting substantial increase in signal strength. Programs will continue to be built around hard news and commentary, dramatic, historical, sports, and agricultural features and Cuban local happenings, particularly items not carried in the Castro/Communist media. All of these programs carry in some form or other material supporting our objectives.

Particular attention is recommended to a project to plan a well spaced series of moderate statements by U.S. officials and other U.S. non-official spokesmen which would support policy objectives of developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba without leading to over-optimism or too inflated hopes.

At the same time carefully documented programs on the failures of the Castro/Communist system must be stepped up to help maintain a firm and material subjective basis for disaffection among the Cuban people.

Strong emphasis will also be given to programming which points up negative reactions to, or repudiation of the Castro/Communist regime in other parts of the hemisphere.

Once the "gusano libre" theme has been established through Cuban or other non-U.S. assets, USIA programming could give it special and continuing play, maintaining, of course, strong emphasis on its Cuban origin.

Overt--To the hemisphere and other free world targets:

All media can and will be utilized in support of Operation Mongoose, although USIA has very difficult budgetary problems. Monetary support from other USG sources might well be necessary for full implementation of some of these projects.

Specific program adjustments made in support of Mongoose include:

1) Radio

There will be increased production and distribution of packaged programs particularly soap operas and commentaries stressing anti-Castro themes.

2) Cartoon Books

USIA's six book series (5 million copies) has been widely distributed and accepted. More could be projected with special stress on Mongoose themes with a minimum delay. Funds here also might be a limiting factor. The new ones would not necessarily be factual but rather the "thriller-killer" type with a Cuban background.

3) Photo-novels

This is unique to Latin America. It is a book utilizing specially-posed photographs with captions to tell a fictional story. A medium of particular importance in reaching the adult, blue-collar worker and housewife neo- and semi-literate groups, this is a field which we have not yet entered. Development of a USIA potential in this field is under consideration and anti-Castro materials would have a priority in any production.

4) Motion Pictures

An animated film on the failures of Cuban land reform has been produced and distributed and two more films on children and labor are now in the pipeline. Contingent on the availability of funds, further productions of this nature could be arranged. More emphasis can be given to providing film clips on Mongoose themes to indigenous newsreels.

5) TV

A medium of rapidly growing importance in Latin America's urban areas which we have not utilized too widely yet in support of Mongoose objectives. USIA has access to some excellent producers of commercial puppet shows (such as the producer of the Wilkins Coffee commercials) and satirical anti-Castro materials could be easily developed for area use. Further exploitation of the Cuban refugee talent available in the Miami area could also be arranged.

6) Books

Larger scale editions of books already used and of other similar materials might be arranged in order to provide rebuttals to the pro-Castro volumes already circulating widely in the area. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development of books by non-U.S. authors.

7) Exhibits

This is one field we have not developed well in support of our Cuban exhibits. USIA could develop and produce quantity paper exhibits of a two-dimensional nature which could be widely distributed in Latin America.

Covert

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized:

- 1) Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution.
- 2) Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and performance of the Castro regime.
- 3) Expose the encroachment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism.
- 4) Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers.
- 5) Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.

The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan:

- 1) Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for communicating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas.
- 2) Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers.
- 3) Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. (CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA)
- 4) Continue and expand the "Voice of Free Cuba" submarine deception broadcasts in collaboration with the Navy.

E. Paramilitary

Tasks

1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance in the general population.
2. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.
3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas.
4. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

Implementation

The program will aim primarily for the development of controlled intelligence sources and small resistance cells for use in the event of any significant uprising. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining individuals or "black teams" in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method been devised by which infiltrates can become "legalized." Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original infiltrates. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent

material, and the Cuban population's willingness to support infiltrates. To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support are considered essential:

1. Urban Cells: Two- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. Primarily, these cells will be intelligence producers. A second mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrates can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.
2. Rural Cells: Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrates can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals.
3. Commando/Sabotage Teams: (Described in the Economic section above.)

F. Military

1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks.
2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capability as required.

IV. Policy Implications

The policy implications of the activities outlined above include:

- A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and USIA questioned).
- B. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration.
- C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews.
- D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications.
- E. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing or planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantanamo.) State and Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal.
- F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.

375. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)

Washington, August 15, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Martin passed this memorandum to Johnson on August 15, under cover of a note in which he stated that it might prove useful background information for the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) scheduled for August 16. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Observations on Operational Potential with respect to Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize my impressions gained from discussions in the Operations Group of what we can reasonably expect might be accomplished covertly in Cuba under Course B or any other course which is conditioned upon a comparatively low noise level.

Propaganda Media

Radio to date has proved of limited value. Short-wave does not reach many people because of shortage of receivers. Medium-wave broadcasting from Swan Island has a small audience, due in part to the low power of the facility. CIA recommends that these broadcasts cease. USIA and we prefer that they continue. None feel that the investment entailed in a more powerful facility would be justified. Enlargement of the Swan Island facility or establishment of a new powerful facility elsewhere would, of course, attract a great deal of attention. The submarine radio will probably improve somewhat, although its approximate 25 mile range is a basic limitation.

Dissemination of propaganda to Cuba through the open mails is underway and will probably improve, unless the Cuban Government's censorship tightens.

Infiltration of Cubans with some propaganda materiel is accomplished, although the maritime operations appear to be increasingly difficult. I have inquired about the possibility of infiltrating small portable presses for underground publications--CIA says that they are looking into this possibility.

Other means of communication, i.e., dropping propaganda from balloons or aircraft would probably be attributed to the U.S. rather noisily.

Conclusion

Our means of communicating with the Cuban people are limited and will probably remain so.

Sabotage

The limited state of communications directly affects the success of sabotage operations. Reports indicate that some, apparently very limited, nuisance sabotage (sugar in gas tanks, etc.) does occur. Our ability to persuade the Cuban people to engage in more widespread activities of this nature is handicapped by our limited ability to communicate and the difficulty in landing and distributing sabotage materiel, such as plastic explosives, incendiary fountain pens and similar devices. The Agency's reaction to turning such materiel over to exile groups that are known to have organized resistance groups in Cuba (as stated in the NIE)/1/ is: whenever a reasonable plan is presented by an exile group, the Agency has provided such assistance and is prepared to continue to do so. A complicating factor appears to be that unless such materiel remains under Agency control until the last minute, its existence in the hands of exiles becomes known to the FBI which then, apparently, becomes unhappy. Further, the Agency is fearful that supplying materiel to selected exile groups in blanket fashion and not based on exile plans which the Agency approves, may result in the sabotage of major installations, thereby raising the noise level considerably above that which the Agency understands to be desirable, since the U.S. would be charged by the Cuban and Bloc Governments with complicity and responsibility.

Conclusion:

A significant amount of sabotage in Cuba during the next year appears unlikely, unless approval is given for the destruction of major installations by carefully selected and trained Cuban teams infiltrated for such purpose and for the noise level to be raised substantially.

Air and Sea Support of Infiltrated Teams

While maritime means, including the use of submarines if necessary, would continue to be the primary means of infiltration/exfiltration/re-supply, occasions may arise where re-supply can only be accomplished effectively by air and with U.S. citizen crews. Teams that have moved inland may find that only with considerable danger can they reach the coast again for re-supply. Agency experience with Cuban pilots on air re-supply missions has not been good (they are not accurate) and U.S. citizen personnel may have to be used.

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

376. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence's Executive Assistant (Elder) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, August 15, 1962.

[Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. 3 pages of source text (including 2-page attached memorandum) not declassified.]

377. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey)

Washington, August 16, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Noform; Special Handling; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Taylor, Bundy, and Hurwitch. Lansdale sent a handwritten covering note with the copy to Bundy, in which he wrote: "I am really pressing on this one, because I feel we have been settling for an institutional answer which may not be justified. I will need your very strong support in this, if we are to get the fresh and full try that is demanded. If appropriate, a word to John McCone would be timely, since his management officers will be keys to the new effort." (Ibid.) An attached typewritten August 17 note, drafter unknown, reads: "General Taylor asked that action be withheld on this until further word from him." (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Actions by Cuban Refugees

At the Special Group (Augmented) meeting this afternoon, it was specified that the program for Phase II of Operation Mongoose should afford full attention to the desirability of the Cubans liberating Cuba with our help. This is distinguished from the concept of our employing the Cubans in programs where we are seeking to liberate Cuba. Mr. Bundy requested that this field of effort be made a part of the guidelines for Phase II.

This desire on the part of the policy level will require consideration of a new orientation to some degree from the existing approach to the Cuban refugees, as I see it. I suggest that you designate your deputy, Mr. Bruce Cheever, to be responsible for action by CIA on this. This will require an imaginative and bold approach to the whole concept of the management, use, and potential values in the Cuban exiles in the U.S. and other countries. State, Defense, and USIA, along with myself, will afford a top priority to Mr. Cheever if he is assigned this responsibility.

Please advise me on this as a priority matter.

378. Memorandum of Meeting

Washington, August 16, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only.
Prepared by McCone.

MEMORANDUM ON MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP,

AUGMENTED, TO DISCUSS MONGOOSE--16 AUGUST 1962

1. General Lansdale presented his paper of 15 August/1/ expressing the caveats that the program (a) did not place us in a position to take advantage of internal uprisings and (b) the program made no reference to the use of third country assets. The paper was approved subject to the submission by General Lansdale of detailed actions.

/1/Reference is to the memorandum Lansdale circulated to the Special Group (Augmented) on August 14, Document 374.

2. The meeting was generally unsatisfactory from my standpoint. In the first place, the reservations of General Lansdale seem to indicate a difference between Lansdale and CIA growing out of the position that I took on his Plan B Augmented. Secondly, the policy implications were not acted upon: strong opposition to utilization of Guantanamo was expressed by Lemnitzer, and McCone stated that he too was concerned about the use of Guantanamo and he felt that the operation should be planned so that Guantanamo would not be used. Bundy expressed strong reservations concerning use of Navy submarines and some reservations concerning overflights. Alexis Johnson questioned the level of sabotage operations, Taylor favoring approval by the Group of each important sabotage action and Johnson favoring modest rather than violent acts of sabotage. McCone stated that proposal involved substantial sabotage actions and that the Lansdale Task Force should be permitted to proceed without further reference to the Special Group. DCI stated he did not feel we could sit in judgment on each sabotage operation and expect Lansdale with his supporting staff of 500 or 1,000 people to work effectively. Bundy brought up the question of the "noise level". McCone stated that operations anticipated would raise the noise level very substantially and there would be a very considerable attribution. In general the meeting was unsatisfactory, lacked both purpose and direction and left me with a feeling that very considerable reservation exists as to just where we are going with Operation Mongoose.

Action: A detailed plan of operation specifying the acts of sabotage, planned infiltrations, propaganda effort, etc., should be presented by Lansdale at the earliest moment. Any differences between Lansdale and CIA should be straightened out by Harvey with the assistance of Helms or others. McCone should discuss this subject privately with the Attorney General.

3. The attached memorandum to the President and the guidelines on Phase II, dated August 16th,/2/ was approved with only modest modification.

John A. McCone/3/

Director

/2/The memorandum and guidelines were sent to the President on August 17; see Document 380.

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

379. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) and the Acting Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Smith) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, August 17, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1762. Secret. Copies were sent to Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson.

SUBJECT

Operation Mongoose--The Soviet Stake in Cuba

For your information, set out below is the substance of a memorandum dated 15 August 1962 prepared by the Board of National Estimates for the information and assistance of the DCI.

The Soviet Stake in Cuba

1. The USSR's primary stake in Cuba is political. The Soviets regard Castro's revolution, and his subsequent alignment with the Communists, as one of the most telling blows to the prestige of the US which has occurred in the entire postwar period. In their eyes, it is a compelling demonstration of a major thesis which they are urging upon the underdeveloped countries everywhere: that the "colonial" peoples can throw off the "imperialist yoke" and, with the indispensable help of the USSR, successfully maintain their independence against their former masters.
2. In specific application to Latin America, the Soviets value the Cuban example as showing:
 - a. That a small but dedicated revolutionary group, with the sympathy and support of the oppressed masses, can prevail against the military power of a ruthless dictatorship supported by the Yankee imperialists.
 - b. That the Bloc will provide such a revolutionary regime with the economic aid required to offset anticipated US economic warfare and to develop the country.
 - c. That Soviet support, and especially Soviet missile power, will deter the US from military intervention to overthrow the revolutionaries.
 - d. That Latin American radicals can safely cooperate with local Communists, who will facilitate the securing of Soviet support without insisting upon seizing the leadership of the revolution for themselves.
3. Cuba is also of value to the USSR as an operational base from which the revolution in Latin America can be furthered by propaganda, the indoctrination and training of militants, gun-running, and other clandestine operations. For the Soviets, however, this use is incidental and auxiliary to the political impact of the Cuban revolutionary example.
4. With the passage of time, the Soviet stake in Cuba has come to be defensive as well as offensive. The USSR's prestige has become involved with Castro's fortunes, and Moscow's political commitment to the survival and success of the Cuban revolution is deepening. In the past year the Soviets have reluctantly acquiesced in several moves--Castro's proclamation that he is a Communist, his attack upon Moscow-oriented Communists seeking to undermine his leadership--which have considerably reduced their freedom of maneuver. They have done this in large part because they are not prepared to accept the setback to their policies which would result from a breach with Castro.

5. Cuba could be used by the USSR as a military base from which to threaten the US. With the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities, however, installations on Cuba would add little to the weight of attack which the Soviets could direct against the US. The USSR's chief motive for the establishment of, for example, a medium-range missile base on Cuba would therefore be to deter an anticipated US military intervention against Castro.

6. The USSR almost certainly recognizes, however, that such an undertaking would be as likely to provoke as to deter American intervention. Further, the Soviets would either have to share control of such a base with the Cubans, in which case the risks of war would pass beyond their exclusive control, or affront Cuban sovereignty by denying Havana any role at all. Most important of all, by such an act the Soviets would firmly commit themselves to the military protection of Cuba, a step which they have thus far refrained from taking and which, we believe, they will continue to avoid. In this connection, it is notable that Soviet military aid to Cuba, while heavy, has thus far been confined to the development of essentially defensive capabilities.

7. In sum, we believe that the Soviets' stake in Castro, composed of both the great hopes they place in his revolution and the heavy loss of prestige which they would suffer upon its downfall, is high. They would probably be willing to accept further assertions of Cuban independence, and to increase the scale of their aid if this were necessary to insure the viability of the Castro regime. If its existence were threatened, the Soviets would deploy all the political weapons at their command in its defense. But we think it highly unlikely that they would undertake actions on Cuba's behalf which, in their view, involved any considerable risk of war with the US. Instead, we believe that they would try to make the regime's downfall as costly as possible, in political terms, to the US, and at the same time seek to repair their prestige rapidly with some visible triumph elsewhere in the world.

For the Board of National Estimates:

Abbot Smith/1/

Acting Chairman

William K. Harvey

/1/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

380. Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 17, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were circulated by Taylor to Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone, Robert Kennedy, Lemnitzer, Bundy, Murrow, and Lansdale. In a brief covering memorandum, dated August 20 and attached to this memorandum and accompanying guidelines in the Kennedy Library, Taylor wrote: "The attached papers were read and approved by higher authority [President Kennedy] today, 20 August 1962, and are transmitted to you for information." (Ibid.)

The Special Group (Augmented) has reviewed the results achieved in Phase I (March to August, 1962) of the Mongoose program. The priority objective in this period was the acquisition of hard intelligence bearing on the internal situation, accompanied by political, economic and covert actions short of those calculated to inspire a revolt in the target area.

The responsible agencies have worked vigorously to accomplish this objective, generating the largest intelligence effort directed at any Soviet Bloc country and attacking the target country broadly across the political, economic and psychological fronts. However, in spite of some progress in intelligence collection, the Special Group

(Augmented) does not feel that the information obtained has been adequate to assess accurately the internal conditions. Nevertheless, from what we know we perceive no likelihood of an overthrow of the government by internal means and without the direct use of U.S. military force.

As we look ahead in the Mongoose program, we have considered several alternative courses of action. We have ruled out those which would commit us to deliberate military intervention although we recognize that an unanticipated revolt might at any time force a decision for or against the support of such a revolt by U.S. forces. For the coming period, we favor a somewhat more aggressive program than the one carried on in Phase I, wherein we continue to press for intelligence, attempt to hurt the local regime as much as possible on the economic front and work further to discredit the regime locally and abroad.

We have approved an outline plan drawn up under the direction of General Lansdale, which is designed to carry out this concept. General Lansdale will work with the Special Group (Augmented) as he has during Phase I, submitting to us for approval schedules of specific actions based on the outline plan. While we believe that this new course of action will create added difficulties for the regime and will increase the visibility of its failures, there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthrow of the regime from within. Also, the "noise level" of Mongoose operations will probably rise in the course of the new phase and there will always be the chance that the participation of some U.S. citizens may become known. However, the Special Group (Augmented) considers that these are tolerable risks which they will seek to control by close attention to the implementation of the program.

Attached hereto are revised guidelines for Phase II which, with your concurrence, we propose to promulgate for the guidance of General Lansdale and his associates.

Maxwell D. Taylor/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original.

Attachment

GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION MONGOOSE, PHASE II

(August 1, 1962 until_____)

Terminal date to be set later

1. While retaining as its eventual objective the overthrow of the target government, the objective of the Mongoose program during Phase II will be the further containment, undermining and discrediting of the target regime while isolating it from other Hemisphere nations.
2. In view of the growing weakness of the economy of the country, special efforts will be directed at accentuating the difficulties in this sector, and at increasing the demands on Bloc resources. Sabotage will be employed for this purpose on a selective basis.
3. Continued priority will be given to the intelligence collection program, with renewed emphasis on the establishment of viable agent assets inside the target country.
4. Efforts will be increased to inspire frictions and schisms both within the target regime and between its leaders and the Bloc.
5. Consideration will be given to assisting Cuban exile groups and other Latin American governments to perform actions and operations in support of the Mongoose program.

6. It is recognized that this program may cause the "noise level" to rise; however, the importance of maintaining non-attributability remains unchanged.

7. While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must be prepared to exploit it should one unexpectedly occur. The JCS will maintain plans for U.S. military intervention.

8. General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations during Phase II, following the procedures which have been worked out during Phase I.

381. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Attorney General Kennedy

Washington, August 21, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret.

On August 14th I had a long discussion with Mr. Donovan concerning the ransom of Cuban prisoners. Donovan advised that he had made contact with the Cuban delegate to the UN and had received a response from a Castro confidant that Castro would receive him, Donovan, in Havana at any time.

Donovan is prepared to go to Havana in the interests of: (a) Reducing the Castro asking price now set at \$62,000,000, and (b) Determining whether all or a substantial part of the final price can be paid for in food and medicine.

Donovan will not go to Havana unless he has an indication of the United States Government position in this matter, as he feels that there is a very definite risk involved in this negotiation if he is not prepared to "come to terms" if a final negotiation appears possible. The dangers, in his mind, are that Castro will probably attack him, and more particularly the United States Government, for a lack of sincerity, and this will have a most serious damaging effect on the Cuban community in Miami and elsewhere in the United States.

In a telephone call this morning Donovan stated that Castro has indicated that he, Donovan, must be in Havana prior to August 30th; that he is prepared to go if the above conditions are met, and that he would be available in Washington for a discussion with Mr. Hurwitch of State and the Attorney General on Thursday morning, August 23rd.

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

382. Memorandum for the File

Washington, August 21, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone.

DISCUSSION IN SECRETARY RUSK'S OFFICE AT 12 O'CLOCK,

21 AUGUST 1962

IN ATTENDANCE

Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, DCI, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT

Cuba

McCone stated that the purpose of the meeting was to again review the situation in Cuba in light of the most recent intelligence findings.

DCI recalled that in the August 10th Meeting he had reported such information as was then available on the accelerated Soviet supply of personnel and materiel to Cuba. However, information available to the Agency since August 10th indicated that the extent of the Soviet supply operations was much greater than had been reported on August 10th; furthermore, there were indications that construction work was undertaken by Soviet personnel, technicians with newly delivered Soviet equipment and while the nature of the construction was not known, it was probably either highly sophisticated electronic installations or COMINT and ELINT and possible electro-countermeasure efforts or missile sites, probably ground-to-air.

DCI then stated that on August 10th in discussing the arguments for and against the so-called stepped-up Plan B, or alternatively the modified Plan B, he had stated that if it was decided to accept the modified Plan B and such a course is pursued, it is the opinion of the DCI that continuing Soviet aid and technical assistance will present the United States with a more formidable problem in the future than it now confronts or has confronted in the past. McCone then stated that conclusive evidence indicated such a stepped-up Soviet effort.

DCI then read 21 August paper entitled, "Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba"/1/ as prepared by DD/I. He then referred to 21 August paper of the Office of National Estimates, subject, "Soviet View of the Cuban Economy"/2/ emphasizing the conclusion that under energetic Soviet direction, the potential of the Cuban agricultural, industrial and natural resources could be so developed that the economy would be reasonably viable and over a decade might even earn sufficiently from export surpluses to repay credits and advances already made to Cuba by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CIA's conclusion that Soviet economists in analyzing Cuba would conclude that in supporting Cuba the Soviets were not involving themselves with a permanent liability; furthermore, there was an opportunity of creating a viable and reasonably prosperous economy which, while not a showcase, would always be an annoyance to the United States and a model for all dissident groups in Latin America.

/1/Printed as an attachment to Document 383.

/2/Not found.

DCI then referred to the 15th August paper of the Board of National Estimates, subject, "The Soviet Stake in Cuba"/3/ and read the summary of this paper which is in numbered paragraph 7, page 3.

/3/Document 379.

In support of the above DCI then briefly reviewed a chronology of unevaluated reports on recent Soviet military aid to Cuba, 21 August, and noted my reference to maps; location of the reported activities.

There was general agreement that the situation was critical and that the most dynamic action was indicated.

There was discussion of various courses of action open to us in case the Soviets place MRBM missiles on Cuban territory. There was also discussion of blockades of Soviet and Bloc shipping into Cuba or alternatively a total blockade of Cuba.

Throughout these discussions, it was abundantly clear that in the minds of State, and Mr. Bundy, speaking for the White House, there is a very definite inter-relationship between Cuba and other trouble spots, such as Berlin. It was felt that a blockade of Cuba would automatically bring about a blockade of Berlin; that drastic action on a missile site or other military installation of the Soviets in Cuba would bring about similar action by the Soviets with respect to our bases and numerous missile sites, particularly Turkey and southern Italy. Also, there is a reluctance, as previously, to the commitment of military forces because of the task involved and also because of retaliatory actions of the Soviets elsewhere throughout the world.

McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime. McCone pointed out that all of these things could be done. Efforts to date with agent teams had been disappointing. Sabotage activities were planned on a priority basis and in all probability, we would witness more failures than successes. To date we had experienced a very tight internal security situation and probably this would become more so in the future.

The Attorney General queried the meeting as to what other aggressive steps could be taken, questioning the feasibility of provoking an action against Guantanamo which would permit us to retaliate, or involving a third country in some way.

It was Mr. Bundy's opinion that all overt actions would involve serious consequences throughout the world and therefore our operations must be covert at this time, although we should expect a high degree of attribution.

The meeting was inconclusive with respect to any particular course of action. It was felt that the President should be informed on the evolving situation and the DCI agreed to brief him at the Meeting on Wednesday, August 22nd at 6 o'clock.

We further agreed that the entire matter should be reviewed with the President by Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and McCone. Mr. Bundy undertook to arrange for this meeting following the Special Meeting scheduled for ten o'clock on Thursday, August 23rd.

Following this discussion, there was a brief discussion of the Donovan matter as covered in DCI's memorandum to Rusk and the Attorney General, copy of which is attached./4/ It was agreed that Mr. Hurwitch would meet with Mr. Donovan on Thursday, together with the Attorney General, and determine the extent of the commitment we would make for the government which would permit Mr. Donovan to engage in the prisoner release negotiations. DCI made it abundantly clear that the existing commitments to Committees of the Congress prevented CIA from using covert resources for this purpose.

/4/Document 381.

McCone stated that in view of these commitments to the Congress he did not feel that he should meet with Mr. Donovan. Furthermore, McCone stated that he felt that if a reasonable deal could be made for the release of the prisoners, the Committees of Congress would change the view expressed a year ago at the time of the tractor negotiation.

JAM

383. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 22, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret.

The attached paper sums up the evidence which suggests a striking change in Soviet policy toward Cuba.

Until recently, it had been supposed that the USSR regarded Cuba as a poor field for investment, presumably on the ground that it was too vulnerable to the U.S.

Raul Castro visited Moscow a few weeks ago. No communique was issued, and our intelligence people concluded that his mission had failed. It now appears that Raul succeeded and that the USSR may have decided to make a major investment in Cuba.

Any military construction will probably be defensive in function; a launching pad directed against the U.S. would be too blatant a provocation. Probably they want to listen in on Canaveral--or to shoot down a U-2.

Mr. McCone is going to take this up with the President this afternoon.

Arthur

Attachment

Current Intelligence Memorandum

OCI No. 3047/62

Washington, August 22, 1962.

SUBJECT

Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba

1. Intelligence on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargoes to Cuba since late July and that some form of military construction is underway at several locations in Cuba by Soviet bloc personnel who arrived on some of these ships and are utilizing material delivered by the vessels. During the period at least 1,500 passengers have debarked from four ships under security conditions suggesting that their mission is related to the construction and military activity; another 1,500 arrived during the period and were greeted with considerable publicity as economic specialists and students. Some still unconfirmed reports suggest that recently arrived Soviet bloc personnel number as many as 5,000. The speed and magnitude of this influx of bloc personnel and equipment into a non-bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities; clearly something new and different is taking place. As yet limited evidence suggests that present activities may include the augmentation of Cuba's air defense system, possibly including the establishment of surface-to-air missile sites or the setting up of facilities for electronic and communications intelligence.

2. As many as 20 Soviet vessels may have already arrived in Cuba since late July with military cargoes. Five more Soviet vessels have left Black Sea ports under conditions suggesting that they are en route to Cuba with additional military equipment. Most reports on these shipments have referred to large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications and radar vans, trucks of many varieties, mobile generator units, tracked and wheeled prime movers, cranes, trailers, and fuel tanks. Eyewitnesses who saw the material being transported from the port areas report that much of the transportation was done at night and even that town street lights were turned off as the convoys passed through.

3. Personnel who arrived on the four Soviet passenger vessels--each of which has a normal passenger capacity of 340, though one of them declared 365 passengers when leaving the Black Sea--have been described variously by Cubans who have seen them. Most agree that they were obviously non-Cuban in appearance and were dressed in civilian clothing. A number of independent sources report that the foreign personnel were dressed in dirty, dusty, slept-in, red-checkered shirts and faded blue trousers. The foreign personnel unloaded the vessels themselves; usually Cuban militiamen have been charged with this work even when it was a military cargo. There is no hard evidence that any of these people are in combat military units. There is strong evidence that their mission is related to unidentified military construction.

4. At least a dozen refugees from the area of Matanzas have reported independently on military construction at two sites near that north coast city. Two and possibly more ships arrived in the port of Matanzas and unloaded cargoes under tight security precautions. Cargoes were taken to at least two general areas where construction is underway. Initial construction, according to one of the eyewitnesses, involved the grading and leveling of a naturally level portion of the western slope of a hill by Soviet personnel using heavy equipment. This was taking place at a site just east of Matanzas at a place called El Bongo. Other sources confirmed that material was leaving the docks in the direction of El Bongo. Another source, who left Cuba more recently, reported that by 4 August foreign personnel were assembling what appeared to be a prefabricated curved-roofed structure at El Bongo. The other site of construction activity near Matanzas is apparently just across the provincial border in Havana province at Santa Cruz del Norte, near the former Hershey sugar mill. In this place, too, construction activity initially involved the leveling of a portion of a hill near the coast. Cuban residents had been cleared from the area.

5. There are as yet no confirmed reports of construction activity underway in other parts of Cuba. However, there is considerable reason to presume that such activity is underway or is to be initiated shortly in a number of other locations in Cuba, ranging from Oriente province in the east to Pinar del Rio in the west. A refugee from the port of Antilla in Oriente province reported that a Soviet ship unloaded in late July at nearby Nicaro. The material unloaded, including electronic vans, tracked prime movers, and trailers, was moved through Antilla toward the Peninsula de Ramon, an area where he reported construction work had been underway for some time. Another ship is reported to have discharged a similar cargo as well as foreign personnel in the port of Casilda, in southern Las Villas province. In northern Las Villas, Cayo Esquivel, an island off the coast, has reportedly been evacuated. In the area just south of Havana city, we have numerous independent reports that a number of farms have been evacuated and that the boys' reformatory at nearby Torrens has been converted for living quarters for numbers of foreign personnel. Information from individuals who live near the reformatory indicate that the numerous Soviet personnel who moved in early this month wore "casual, dirty, civilian clothes." Other reports indicate that quantities of equipment such as has been reported elsewhere have been seen on the confiscated farms near the reformatory. Other reports from other parts of the island indicate that Cuban families have been evacuated from an island near Mariel, the port in Pinar del Rio province where much of the equipment was unloaded, and from a farming area near Guatana, Pinar del Rio province.

6. What the construction activity involves is not yet known. The activity in the Matanzas area could be the initial phases of construction of a SAM-equipped air defense system, erection of electronic and communications intelligence facilities aimed at Canaveral and other US installations, or an ECM system aimed at US space, missile, and/or other operational electronic systems. The kinds of equipment described could fit with any of these objectives; the evidence thus far, as well as Soviet practice in other countries receiving bloc military assistance, would suggest, at least tentatively, construction of an air defense system based on the Guideline missile. Information to confirm or refute this should become available within a week.

7. The step-up in military shipments and the construction activity once again provide strong evidence of the magnitude of the USSR's support for the Castro regime. Together with the extraordinary Soviet bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in recent months, these developments amount to the most extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the USSR.

384. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, August 22, 1962.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

385. Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy

Washington, August 23, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. On August 22 McCone briefed President Kennedy on the meeting in Rusk's office on the previous day; see Document 382. The President expressed concern about developments in Cuba and agreed that policy considerations growing out of those developments would be discussed at the meeting at the White House scheduled for August 23. (Ibid.)

ATTENDED BY

Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor, Messrs. Bundy, McCone

SUBJECT

Cuba

1. McCone advised that President had been briefed on the Cuban situation but added the information given [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Rusk advocated informing Canadians and all NATO allies of growing seriousness of situation; also advocated removal of restrictions on use of Guantanamo by the Lansdale group.

Action: This point not cleared and should be pursued as strongly opposed by Chiefs.

2. The President requested a continuing analysis of the number and type of Soviet and Oriental personnel imported into Cuba; quantity and type of equipment and its probable use; all construction--particularly anxious to know whether construction involving SAM sites might differ from the ground sites. McCone stated we probably could not differentiate between surface-to-air and 350 mile ground-to-ground offensive missiles. McNamara observed portable ground missiles could not be located under any circumstances.

Action: DDCI should have Board of National Estimates working continuously on this analysis.

3. President requested analysis of the danger to the United States and the effect on Latin America of missile installations.

Action: DDCI should arrange for preparation of such estimates.

4. President raised the question of whether we should make a statement in advance of our position, should the Soviets install missiles and the alternative actions open to us in such event. In the course of the discussion, apparent many in the room related action in Cuba to Soviet actions in Turkey, Greece, Berlin, Far East and elsewhere. McCone questioned value of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. McNamara agreed they were useless but difficult politically to remove them.

Action: He agreed to study this possibility.

5. President raised question of what we could do against Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Could we take them out by air or would a ground offensive be necessary or alternatively could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla effort.

6. President raised question of what we should do in Cuba if Soviets precipitated a Berlin crisis. This is the alternative to the proposition of what Soviets would do in Berlin if we moved in Cuba.

7. During the conversation I raised substance of my plan of action as outlined in the attached paper. There was no disagreement that we must solve the Cuban problem. However, we should not start the political action and propaganda effort now until we had decided on the policy of following through to the complete solution of the Cuban problem.

8. After the meeting in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy, I stated that I felt Cuba was our most serious problem; [4 lines of source text not declassified]. I also added, in my opinion, Cuba was the key to all of Latin America; if Cuba succeeds, we can expect most of Latin America to fall.

John A. McCone/1/

/1/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Attachment

Memorandum

Washington, August 21, 1962.

Proposed plan of action for Cuba in the light of:

(a) The arrival of four to five thousand Soviet/Bloc technicians and possibly military personnel during July-August.

(b) Arrival of many ship loads of equipment and materiel during July and August.

(c) The conclusion that stepped up plan (b) will not, in the opinion of the National Board of Estimates, accomplish the stated purpose of overthrowing Castro from within, and moreover will be attributable to the United States and cause loss of face by the United States, and

(d) Modified plan (b) will contribute importantly to our intelligence gathering and will impede Castro regime's economic progress but will not be sufficient to frustrate the regime's progress in view of the evidences of substantial Soviet technical assistance.

The above all lead to the conclusion that with the passage of time, it is possible there will evolve in Cuba a stronger rather than a weaker Castro dominated communist state, fully oriented to Moscow, to serve on the one hand as a model for similar actions by disciplined groups throughout Latin America, and on the other as a bridgehead for Soviet subversive activities in Central and South America. Being dominated by Moscow, such a Cuba would also serve as a possible location for MRBMs, for COMINT and ELINT facilities targeted against United States activities, most particularly Canaveral, and finally as an ECM station which might adversely affect our space and missile work.

Therefore it seems to me a more aggressive action is indicated than any heretofore considered, and should be patterned along the following lines:

(1) An immediate continuing aggressive political action designed to awaken and alarm all of Latin America and all of the free world as to the extreme dangers inherent in the present Cuban situation.

Appropriate actions should be taken through domestic and foreign press media to inform and alarm the people, through the United Nations, through the Organization of American States and its subcommittees, by contact with each free world country at the level of head of state, foreign minister and ambassador, and through semi-public or private organizations such as labor, church, farm cooperatives, youth groups, et cetera.

(2) [5 lines of source text not declassified]

(3) The instantaneous commitment of sufficient armed forces to occupy the country, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish in Cuba a peaceful country which will be a member of the community of American states.

It is possible, though in my opinion improbable, that actions taken under (1) above would in themselves be sufficient to cause destruction of the Castro regime from dissension and disaffections within the regime itself which would obviate steps (2) or (3).

Alternatively, actions under (1) above might cause internal strife of sufficient proportion to prompt the action outlined under (3) above with no further provocation.

Concurrently with this plan, we should go forward with all possible activities called for under plan (b).

J.A.M./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

386. National Security Action Memorandum No. 181

Washington, August 23, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A).
Top Secret; Sensitive. A typewritten note at the top of the source text reads: "Individual items to be reproduced for further assignment only by personal decision of addressees--full reproduction prohibited."

TO

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

Attorney General

Acting Director, CIA

General Taylor

The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba.

1. What action can be taken to get Jupiter missiles out of Turkey? (Action: Department of Defense)
2. What information should be made available in the U.S. and abroad with respect to these new bloc activities in Cuba? (Action: Department of State, in consultation with USIA and CIA)
3. There should be an organized effort to bring home to governments of our NATO allies in particular the meaning of this new evidence of Castro's subservience to the Soviets, and the urgency of action on their part to limit their economic cooperation with Cuba. (Action: Department of State)
4. The line of activity projected for Operation Mongoose Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action: General Taylor)
5. An analysis should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S. (Action: White House, in consultation with Department of State, Department of Defense, and CIA)
6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the U.S. would not tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the U.S. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense with respect to the study in item 7 below)
7. A study should be made of the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S. What would be the pros and cons, for example, of pinpoint attack, general counter-force attack, and outright invasion? (Action: Department of Defense)
8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond Mongoose B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense)

To facilitate coordination of these efforts, I should like to receive an immediate report from action Departments indicating which officer of the Department will be directly responsible for items in which action is assigned to that Department. Insofar as practicable, except for item 1, item 3, and item 5, these assignments should be made from among senior officers already informed of Mongoose.

There will be a further meeting with the President about September 1 to review progress on all these items. In the event of important new information, an earlier meeting will be called.

The President emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions.

McGeorge Bundy

387. Memorandum of Conversation

Ottawa, August 24, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2462. Secret. Drafted by Ivan B. White and approved in S on August 28. Secretary Rusk was in Ottawa August 24-26 for meetings with Canadian officials.

SUBJECT

Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker

Secretary of State for External Affairs Green

Defence Minister Harkness

Secretary of State Rusk

United States Charge d'Affaires ad interim White

The Secretary opened the conversation on Cuba by saying that the United States Government greatly appreciated the assistance given by Canada in prohibiting trans-shipments of United States goods to Cuba and in its prohibition of shipments of strategic materials. This performance had not been emulated by the other NATO countries. In view of the fact that it was important to put Castro into a position where he has before him clear alternatives, NATO as a whole should be interested in helping with the Cuban problem. The assistance of Canada in developing a more positive attitude within the NATO group would be greatly appreciated by the United States.

In discussing the recent unusual movement of Soviet ships to Cuba, the Secretary said that four of the vessels carried an estimated 340 Soviet personnel each who were disembarked secretly; that it was thought that some of these were for the purpose of assisting in agriculture and some were connected with military installations. Prime Minister Diefenbaker inquired as to the nature of the installations. The Secretary replied that not enough time had elapsed for an intelligence appraisal, but it was known that radar equipment and other communications intelligence equipment were involved. Substantial areas had been cleared of all Cuban personnel. With reference to missile sites, it would be important to know whether they were ground to ground or ground to air. The Secretary pointed out that in United States policy towards Cuba there were only two problems which were clearly non-negotiable: 1) the domination of Castro by the International Communist Movement and, 2) Cuban intervention in the affairs of countries in the Alliance for Progress area.

388. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, August 24, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret.

SUBJECT

Mr. Paul's Meeting with Dr. Jose Miro Cardona/1/

/1/Norman S. Paul was an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

At 4:00 p.m. this date, Mr. Paul met with Dr. Cardona to discuss certain matters relative to the enlistment of Cubans into the Armed Forces of the U.S. He considered this a most urgent problem, primarily because of the recent introduction into Cuba of at least 5,000 individuals whom he called soldiers. He was desirous of expediting this training to be completed within the next six months. He considered the latter time figure as very critical.

He desired increased recruiting of enlisted. He desired recruiting officers and recruiting offices to be placed in

New York City and Puerto Rico, and he wanted the officers school to be increased in numbers of officers attending. He wanted the length of the school to be reduced. I understood that eighteen weeks was the maximum length for the school, and that he desired to have 120 officers trained--divided 1/3 Army, 1/3 aviators and 1/3 to be miscellaneous young officers. He estimated that by increasing recruiting pressure that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 would join up.

Dr. Cardona was interested in being able to make a statement to the effect that Cubans are being trained by the Armed Forces to fight in Cuba. This type of statement would bring the recruits in. I understood him to be agreeable to a statement to the effect that the Cubans were being trained to fight communism anywhere. If the above former statement was not made, the program would not be satisfactory according to Dr. Cardona.

Mr. Paul provided the following information--that a new program to be announced within the next two or three weeks should increase the number of Cubans interested. Among other things, this program would permit Spanish speaking individuals to be enlisted, and that all instruction would be in Spanish. He advised that the standards were being lowered, and that more would be permitted to be trained in units. He further advised that additional recruiting offices would be opened in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and others. He told Dr. Cardona that he would look into the idea of opening one up in Puerto Rico. Mr. Paul indicated that he was not certain as to the exact number of officers being trained and did not commit himself or the Defense Department to the training of additional officers.

As a result of Dr. Cardona's meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Paul advises that Mr. Gilpatric desires that the implementation of the program be expedited.

Two items of interest were mentioned regarding the past program:

- (1) They noted that the recruiting offices were turning men down when they had more than one dependent.
- (2) Two Cubans had been sent to Germany for duty.

They were concerned about both of the above and both merit attention.

With regard to Dr. Cardona's desire to make a statement that Cubans are being trained to fight in Cuba, Mr. Paul stated that this was a matter that could not be decided by the Defense Department.

Dr. Cardona also stated, at the present time they have 125 pilots, mostly commercial, among the refugees. None of them are qualified in jets.

Mr. Paul prefaced his remarks at the outset of the meeting that the substance of his remarks were not for publication and were for Dr. Cardona's information only. He reiterated this comment in Mr. Gilpatric's office.

Melvin D. Henderson/2/

Military Assistant

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Henderson signed the original.

389. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Anderson) to the Department of State

Washington, August 24, 1962, 9:07 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2562. Secret; Priority. Also sent to ACSI, AFCIN, DIA, DIRNSA, CMC, CINCARIB, and CIA.

250207Z. Military activity and foreign personnel in Cuba.

1. Following received from COMNAVBASE GTMO:

A. Persistent reports from numerous sources indicates extensive military construction is in progress in restricted area defined below.

B. The restricted area is reported to extend in general from Gibara (UU820340), Tacajo (VU015055), Guaro (VT185870), to the coast just northeast of Sagua de Tanamo, Cayo Mambi (VT775915).

C. Numerous reports state that approximately 1000 Russian and Czech military personnel and technicians are constructing a rocket and/or missile site somewhere east of Banes (VU250189) between Playa de Puerto Rico (VU365155) and Lucrecia (VU384285).

D. All Cuban army/militia personnel have been withdrawn from this area (para. C) and only high ranking officials are permitted access.

E. Reports further indicate that between 1-4 Aug between 18-50 rockets and/or missiles described as being 20ft-21ft in length and 18 inch in diameter, red in color with yellow nose cones, were off loaded in Nicaro and transferred primarily over secondary roads to Puerto Rico (VU3518). The roads were heavily guarded by army/militia troops. In addition to the rockets/missiles off loaded--aluminum piping, train rails and angle iron were also part of ships cargo off loaded.

F. An undetermined number of Chinese and Soviet nationals performed entire off loading operation. Cuban nationals whether military or civilian were not allowed near the pier and dock facilities in Nicaro during the four day unloading operations.

G. The material was reported to be on two Soviet ships.

H. One report states that approx. 1000 armed personnel described as Orientals were disembarked at landing facilities in Nicaro during same period.

I. On 3 Aug 62, a large number of Orientals in civilian clothes and unarmed were observed at the railroad junction in vicinity of Guardo (VT191857). This group later described by Nicaro radio station broadcasts as rice workers from China to assist in the Cuban rice harvest. Comment: Personnel described in paragraph H could very likely be those indicated as civilian rice workers (para. I).

J. One report is that 2500 Russian military are billeted at Los Pacitos, just west of Lucrecia, they wear dark gray colored uniforms and can be seen frequently swimming in the nude at Punta Gorda beaches.

K. Eggs, meat, and milk are collected in the areas of Antilla, Banes and Puerto Rico to feed the Russian troops stationed at Los Pacitos. Comment: Additional info has been requested from all informants. The present reports are mixed, varied in details and lack precise location of the alleged site. Certain informants have stated that missiles were taken to Mayari Arriba, however, vast majority of informants indicate that the site or sites under construction is located in area mentioned paragraph C. Most reports state that the Chinese troops seen in this area were not disembarked at Nicaro, but disembarked at port in Bahia de Nipe. Therefore two groups--one the Chinese rice workers and the other an armed battalion could have arrived at different locations during same period. Considering reports from all sources involved an overall (B-3) evaluation is given to some extraordinary undertaking in which non-Cuban bloc personnel are engaged.

390. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Acting

Secretary of State Ball

RSB-149

Washington, August 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A). Secret; Noform. The source text is marked with a handwritten indication that it was sent to McGeorge Bundy.

SUBJECT

Soviet Military Shipments to Cuba

We have examined available evidence on the unusually heavy Soviet shipments to Cuba during the past month.

Conclusions

A large part, possibly half, of the shipments have involved military hardware and Soviet military technicians.

The most likely explanation of Moscow's stepped up military assistance is that it is designed to enhance the Cuban regime's defense capabilities against an external threat, and increase the effectiveness of the military establishment for possible internal use.

Because of the lead times involved, the Soviet deliveries to Cuba probably could not have been planned to coincide with the latest Berlin developments. Nevertheless the Soviets may now calculate that US attention to Berlin will be diluted by Soviet activity in Cuba, and that in an atmosphere of generally heightened tension pressures for Western concessions will be enhanced.

Size and Nature of the Shipments. Since the last week in July, in addition to the normal tanker and cargo vessel movements, it is estimated that Soviet ship arrivals to the present, plus ships now enroute, total at least 26 including 5 passenger ships. The shipments are known to contain both military and economic goods and personnel. But information is limited on exactly how the volume is divided between the two; the following breakdown is at best a rough guess based upon available intelligence and some observation by reliable sources.

About one dozen of the cargo ships are believed to be carrying military equipment--electronic equipment such as radar, motor transport, construction equipment, and tracked vehicles--some of which has been observed in Cuba. Information on construction sites in Cuba suggests that surface-to-air missiles may have been included in the military equipment delivered. But there is no hard evidence on this score.

Regarding the personnel on the five passenger ships, 1500 from one vessel landed at the Mariel naval base and are thought to be Bloc technicians and/or Cuban naval personnel returning from courses in the USSR. No breakdown is available. There is less certainty about the numbers and types of additional personnel that may have been debarked or are still on the way. A total of as high as 5,000 bloc personnel--both military and technical, though the proportions are unknown--may be involved.

The remainder of the Soviet shipments, roughly one-half, consist of deliveries--already behind schedule--of equipment and technical assistance personnel under aid and trade agreements.

In sum, while the exact quantities of Soviet material and personnel which have arrived in Cuba are not known, it appears almost certainly to be of such magnitude as to significantly increase Soviet direct military involvement in Cuba.

Soviet Motivation. The most likely Soviet motivation in providing military assistance and personnel to Cuba is to enhance the Cuban regime's defense capabilities against an external threat and increase the effectiveness of the military establishment for possible internal use. The Soviets doubtless recognize that the contributions this level of Soviet military presence makes to Cuban defense capabilities would be of scant aid to Cuba were the United States to decide upon direct military intervention to Cuba. However, by raising the Cuban defense capability the Soviets are raising the military effort required to intervene. Hence, they may calculate that by increasing Cuban defense capabilities in this way they are strengthening the deterrent factors which would enter into US consideration of possible military intervention. Moreover, the Soviets doubtless believe that their military assistance will serve to deter any intervention not overtly involving US forces.

The Soviets have acquired a growing stake in the survival of the Castro regime. After initial hesitations, they viewed the Cuban leader's consolidation of power with elation; and they have been unstinting in proclaiming the Cuban regime as a model for successful, Moscow-supported "national liberation-struggle." In so doing, they have become increasingly committed to the preservation and advancement of the Castro regime. Economic aid designed to keep the Castro regime afloat has been expanded by emergency shipments of consumer goods and the first signs of development projects. Even more important, the Soviets have officially endorsed Castro's claims to communist affiliation and now address him as "Comrade."

It is fairly certain that the Cuban regime fears more than anything else an attack by the US, or other forces strongly, if indirectly, supported by the US. Combined with this concern, and reinforcing it, is the difficult domestic situation presently confronting the Cuban leaders. Active support for the Castro regime has been estimated to include only about 20 percent of the population, with attitudes among the remaining four-fifths of the population ranging from apathy to passive and active resistance.

The Soviets may well share the Cuban regime's concern over external and internal threats to its security. They are certainly aware of the regime's domestic economic difficulties. In any event, they would find it difficult to deny Castro's requests for military-economic assistance even if they did not fully share his appraisal of the need. The scale of the current Soviet effort thus reflects the seriousness of the problem faced by the Castro regime, and is renewed proof of Moscow's determination to go to considerable lengths to assure that regime's survival.

It seems likely, at the same time, that the Soviets have undertaken a sizeable military buildup in Cuba with some reluctance. And they would probably like to minimize the extent of their military presence in Cuba. To establish a large and publicly acknowledged Soviet military presence in Cuba would have distinct disadvantages for the USSR.

First, and most important, it would heighten Moscow's commitment to underwrite the Cuban regime's security in circumstances unfavorable to the USSR. Second, it would heighten the threat to that regime's security by giving the US, alone or in conjunction with other American states, added motivation to move against the Castro regime.

It is probably because of these factors that Soviet support is being rendered in the relative absence of bluster and ballyhoo. Also the Soviets would presumably prefer not to be overly "provocative" toward the US. Likewise the Soviets would no doubt be concerned to restrain Castro, at least for some time to come, from direct provocations of the US or other countries. We believe that this restraint will apply also to possible Cuban designs on Guantanamo, though it would not exclude increased harassments and verbal attacks on the US presence there.

Relationship to Possible Moves Against Guantanamo. It continues to be unlikely that the Castro regime will make any direct military move against the Guantanamo Base. However, they may well adopt a more belligerent posture toward the US presence there. Since the beginning of July the Cuban press and other propaganda media have been giving new and extensive coverage to government allegations (over 100) of US air and sea incursions into Cuban territory and to alleged provocations by the US naval base at Guantanamo. The harassment of marine sentries at the base has increased in the same period.

There is a possibility that the regime intends this publicity as part of an overall campaign to impress world opinion with alleged US disregard for Cuban sovereignty. In addition to providing justification for the new Soviet aid and the further militarization of the island it may also be the principal point of attack in a combined Cuban-Bloc move aimed at Guantanamo at the next session of the UN General Assembly.

Cuba and Berlin. We doubt that the immediate timing of the Soviet deliveries to Cuba is specifically related to the latest Soviet moves in Berlin. Because of the lead time necessary to get such shipments en route, the decision to send them must have been made several months ago. We do, however, think that there may be a broad relationship: the Soviets may believe that US attention to Berlin will be diluted by evidence of Soviet activity in another sensitive region and they may calculate that in an atmosphere of generally heightened tension pressures for Western concessions can be stimulated.

We do not believe that the Soviets are toying with some form of quid pro quo gambit involving Western concessions in Berlin in exchange for curtailment of Soviet activities in Cuba. Moscow undoubtedly regards its positions in both these areas as sufficiently strong to make it unnecessary and undesirable to use one as a bargaining counter for the other. In short, Moscow probably believes it can reduce the Western position in Berlin while simultaneously strengthening its own position (and Castro's) in Cuba.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

391. Telegram 984 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, August 26, 1962, 11 a.m.

[Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2662. Secret; Niact. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

392. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (Cardona)

Washington, August 28, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 121-373.5. The letter was addressed to Dr. Cardona in Miami Beach, Florida.

Dear Dr. Cardona: It was a great pleasure to meet with you last Friday to discuss the Department of Defense program for the enlistment of Cuban refugees in the United States Armed Forces. As you know, we are anxious to provide opportunities for training and service to these men, many of whom have already distinguished themselves in the service of freedom.

I am writing now to confirm the steps we have taken to revamp our Cuban refugee program so that we shall be better able to take advantage of the skills of Cuban refugees.

As Mr. Paul told you, the new program for enlisted training, which should be announced within the next two or three weeks, will permit the recruitment of Spanish speaking individuals who will receive their basic training in the Spanish language and in units made up primarily, if not exclusively, of their fellow countrymen. We will be able to accept applications for this program in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and New Orleans, as well as in Miami, and we are looking into the possibility of accepting applications in Puerto Rico. Under the new program, the fact that a man has several dependents will not be a bar to enlistment, and applicants will be informed that their training will prepare them specifically for combat-type assignments.

You will recall that in the former program several enlistees claimed they had understood they were being recruited for action against Cuba, although they had been clearly informed to the contrary by U.S. authorities. In order to avoid this kind of unfortunate misunderstanding, every applicant in the new program, as a part of his regular processing, will receive specific briefing on this point, explaining also that he will be given the same opportunity to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces as is provided U.S. citizens, including service overseas and, if necessary, in combat.

In the matter of training for former Cuban officers, we are, as you know, making plans for the assignment of twelve former officers to serv-ice schools. We are planning to provide these officers two consecutive 18-week training courses at Army and Air Force schools. At some future time we may want to consider increasing the number of such officer assignments.

I look forward to our continued cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Roswell Gilpatric

393. Extract From a Paper Sent to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, August 29, 1962.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

394. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball

Washington, August 29, 1962.

[Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

395. Editorial Note

Photographs obtained from a U-2 reconnaissance mission flown over Cuba on August 29, 1962, revealed that surface-to-air missile sites were under construction on the island. The photographs were interpreted on August 30, and Acting Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter conveyed the information on August 31 to McGeorge Bundy at the White House and General Lyman Lemnitzer at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to a memorandum prepared by Carter on September 7, President Kennedy called him on the afternoon of August 31 and instructed him to limit access to the information to a minimum. "The President said to put it back in the box and nail it tight." (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop)

396. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, August 30, 1962, 7:22 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 7/12/62-9/7/62. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hurwitch and Martin and cleared with EUR/SOV and EUR. Also sent to Paris as telegram 1301, to Bonn as telegram 590, and to Rome as telegram 470. Repeated to Copenhagen, Lisbon, Oslo, Athens, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Ankara, Moscow, and USRO.

1205. Since late July Soviet ship arrivals Cuba in addition normal tanker and cargo vessel movements are estimated total at least 26 including vessels now en route. Six passenger vessels have debarked and four more reported en route.

Cargo vessels known carried both military and economic goods, with high proportion former. Information to date indicates military goods consist large quantities transportation, electronic and construction equipment such as communications and radar vans, trucks, mobile generator units, tracked and wheeled prime movers, cranes,

trailers and fuel tanks. Possible limited quantity weapons. Such equipment points to probable establishment sophisticated communications and radar net, possibly surface to air missile sites and installations.

Passenger vessels arrived or now en route estimated will have carried some 5,500 passengers. At least about 1,500 are believed to be economic technicians. Composition remainder unknown but are thought to include additional civilian as well as large number military technicians (including possibly military construction and engineer crews). No evidence presence Bloc combat units. Since debarkations, equipment and personnel reported concentrated eight areas in Cuba primarily coastal regions. Construction activity of as yet undetermined nature underway some these areas.

While the US realizes that there have been earlier shipments of munitions to Cuba in substantial volume, accompanied by military technicians, and that there have been even larger bloc shipments of munitions to other countries (FYI--such as Indonesia--end FYI) nevertheless this sudden and major increase in movement of military goods and personnel to Cuba cannot help but arouse great apprehension throughout the Western Hemisphere. The volume of arrivals is exceedingly great for such a short period of time. The aggressive activities and intentions of the Castro regime backed by the Soviet bloc toward the countries of Latin America and particularly the small, relatively weak, countries of the Caribbean have been all too evident ever since Castro came to power in Cuba. Castro regime has built up and is supporting with money, literature, and extensive training in Cuba, including training in street and guerilla warfare, revolutionary elements who are a threat to democratic and peaceful governments.

Castro is an emotional, irresponsible and dynamic leader, faced with difficult domestic economic problems and increasing unrest at home, and equipped with what is now the strongest military force in the whole Caribbean area, and in some elements, in any Latin American country. US not concerned about utilization of this force in overt aggression. US would deal with that situation immediately within Hemisphere system. However, this amount military force in Castro hands creates psychological pressures and opens up possibilities for illicit trade or supply of arms for subversive elements. Thus such force is a power to be reckoned with in the struggles, increasingly vigorous, of Latin American political forces.

This renewed evidence of Soviet willingness to make sacrifices on behalf of Cuban strength is also significant of Soviet interest and willingness to invest scarce resources, not only in Cuba, but also in an attempt to expand its influence in other areas of Latin America. Cuba is in no position to pay for these items and will not be for some time to come. These deliveries therefore represent a significant Soviet policy decision to strengthen Cuba.

The US believes that its NATO allies with whom we are so closely engaged in other areas in combatting the spread of Soviet power will be concerned with this new development and will wish to join with us in examining what more can be done to limit the capacity of the Soviets and their agent, Castro, from further extending their power in the Western Hemisphere and to make it more difficult for the Communists to maintain their control of the future of Cuba. While it is in no sense an immediate prospect, a failure of Communism here where it has been so openly backed by the Soviets would represent a major loss of prestige with impacts far wider than the Western Hemisphere and of a nature which could only be beneficial to the interests of the free world.

Attention is called to the fact that Canada has managed quietly but effectively to maintain a close embargo over shipment of items to Cuba which originate in the US and over those which are under COCOM control. It is hoped that other NATO countries will reexamine their situation ensure that they are doing at least this much to avoid assisting and strengthening economic and military potential of Cuban regime.

It would also seem desirable to ensure that Castro is not able to meet his present needs by borrowing against future repayment prospects. These do not presently appear very great outside of his trade with Soviet bloc. For both commercial and political reasons it would seem desirable that we all continue to refrain from extending government credit for purchases by Cuba. FYI. It would also be helpful if at early stage special report by NATO countries on extension of credits to Cuba, as agreed in NAC, could be submitted. We recognize this has mainly

psychological significance but believe it would exercise certain pressure on countries re surveillance of trade with Cuba. End FYI.

The US recognizes that a more complex and difficult question is involved in the question of availability of ships to maintain the flow of goods to Cuba. Nevertheless we feel that it behooves the NATO countries in the light of these new moves to reexamine with care their position in order to determine if there is any way in which they can make it more difficult for the Soviets to meet the needs of their partner at the end of this long line of communications. Since the effectiveness of any such moves is greatly diminished in view of the surplus of ships available for charter, unless most of the principal maritime countries concur, this is perhaps a subject which might be discussed in an appropriate NATO forum.

Department desires action addressees drawing on foregoing inform host government at high level US concern over this most recent evidence of increased Soviet military involvement this Hemisphere and urge reexamination its policy toward Cuba. Department may send additional instructions this subject info addressee posts.

For USRO. You should discreetly and informally undertake parallel action with delegates of countries action addressees, and inform SecGen Stikker. Would also appreciate your personal assessment desirability and feasibility having subject introduced agenda one of upcoming NAC meetings.

Rusk

397. Memorandum Prepared by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carter

Washington, August 30, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. No classification marking.

1. Special Group Meeting--General Lemnitzer stated that Mr. McCone (sic)/1/ had called him and posed a possible requirement for low-level photography of critical Cuban targets. General Lemnitzer said that from the military point of view this was feasible, utilizing either RF 101 or F8U aircraft flown by US pilots from various bases or carriers in the Caribbean area. The use of Cuban pilots would involve a delay of some months due to the precise training required.

I pointed out that we are accused daily of overflights in any case and that the possibility of Cuban protests should not dissuade us from making these flights if they are necessary. It was pointed out that other types of photography, while useful in pinpointing critical targets, do not give sufficient detail for precise identification of certain types of equipment. After some discussion, the Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested that it be reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and information needs could be identified. (Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 30 August 1962)/2/

2. Also mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (Draft Rept. to PFIAB)/3/

/1/According to an undated memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence from Executive Director Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, it was Acting Director Carter who called General Lemnitzer on August 27 to discuss low-level photography over Cuba, not McCone. (Ibid., Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights)

/2/A copy of the minutes of this meeting is in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files.

/3/Not found.

398. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 31, 1962, 6 p.m.

//Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian's Office, Cable Files, Cuba, Jan.-Aug. 1962. Secret.

561. Department telegram 501./1/ In the absence unmistakable clear and official indication from US of seriousness with which unusually large shipments of heavy military goods is viewed, see no reason why Soviets should not continue increasingly provide such materials to Cuba. Preparations for present shipments must have been underway for long time and presumably were keyed to Soviet belief that American comments on the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine signified serious intent to mount full scale and overwhelming invasion. There is little doubt (viz Hungary) that in an equivalent situation the Soviet Union would have undertaken immediate measures to resolve the problem in terms of sheer force. Thus present shipments appear explainable apart from any intended psychological effect in the rest of Latin America.

/1/Telegram 1205 to London, Document 396, was repeated to Moscow as 501.

Soviet press play of so-called "cannonading" of Havana gives no indication that armament of attacking ships was no greater than 20MM capacity./2/ Soviet people therefore, should they learn of the extent of Soviet military materiel shipments, would have no reason to think Cuba is not, in fact, in danger of early all-out invasion.

/2/Reference is to an incident that occurred on the night of August 24, when two motorboats armed with .20 calibre guns and piloted by a group of young Cuban exiles penetrated Havana harbor to within a kilometer of shore and opened fire on several buildings in the Miramar section of the city for several minutes before escaping out to sea. Cuba protested the attack to the United Nations as an instance of U.S. -sponsored aggression. (Telegram 633 from USUN, August 30; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-3062) Within the senior levels of the Kennedy administration a debate developed involving President Kennedy, the Attorney General, and Under Secretary of State Ball, and others, over whether to arrest and prosecute the Cuban exiles involved after they returned to Florida. President Kennedy decided to issue a statement deploring such "spur-of-the-moment" raids as counter-productive, and warning against any future raids. Memoranda of a number of telephone conversations on August 25 involved in this debate are in the Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62.

Suggest desirability of early unpublicized demarche to Soviet Government--possibly Dobrynin would be best channel--expressing active and serious concern U.S. Government over penetrating Soviet military equipment accompanied by large numbers of at least technical personnel in area practically impinging on U.S. frontier. It might be indicated that our concern is necessarily based on what may be not entirely accurate information and that we would welcome a statement by the Soviet Government of the kinds of aid being given which would remove these doubts. In the absence of such clarification, we can only assume that the Soviet Government is, for reasons of its own, putting in the hands of what they as well as we know to be an unstable dictator, equipment which, if improperly used, could ignite a conflagration which would extend far beyond the Caribbean.

It would further appear helpful in our approach to allies for cooperation (reftel) if US itself had taken further direct step vis-a-vis USSR.

McSweeney

399. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, August 31, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive; NoFORN; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that 21 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Hurwitch, General Johnson, Harvey, and Wilson. Lansdale kept seven copies.

SUBJECT

Phase II, Operation Mongoose

Pursuant to your instructions, transmitted herewith is a proposed projection of actions to be undertaken as Phase II, Operation Mongoose. This projection incorporates the suggestions of the operations team designated by the major departments and agencies charged with Mongoose planning and implementation.

The format employed is responsive to the 16 August 1962 guidelines for Phase II, Operation Mongoose,^{1/} and to your comments at recent meetings. The projection is divided into each objective contained in the 16 August guidelines, and then lists proposed actions to attain that objective. The guideline objectives have been given short titles as follows:

^{1/}See Document 380.

- A. Discredit and isolate the regime
- B. Harass the economy
- C. Intensify intelligence collection
- D. Split regime leadership and relations with Bloc
- E. Assist Cuban exile groups and Latin American governments to take actions
- F. Be prepared to exploit a revolt

In preparing this projection of actions for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, an effort was made to restrict proposals to the "B plus" frame of reference provided and to assume that a broader frame of programming under the NSAM^{2/} would supplement Mongoose by separate planning.

^{2/}Reference is to NSAM No. 181, Document 386.

PHASE II

(1 August 1962 until ____)

Objective A: Discredit and Isolate the Regime

Political Activity: 1. Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the OAS Special Consultative Committee (SCCS), to establish controls over the travel of their nationals to Cuba. (State, with CIA support)

Purpose: To diminish travel by Latin American nationals to Cuba and to facilitate the collection of intelligence on persons travelling.

Considerations: Most Latin American nations have constitutional provisions regarding freedom of travel.

Political Activity: 2. Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the SCCS, to limit or prohibit entry of Cuban propaganda. (State, with CIA and USIA support)

Purpose: To diminish the influx of Cuban propaganda into Latin America.

Considerations: Many Latin American countries have legal bars against admitting foreign publications.

Political Activity: 3. Provide intelligence of arms smuggling from Cuba to other Hemisphere nations. (CIA, State, Defense)

Purpose: To obtain and exploit hard evidence of Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere.

Considerations: Commanders requested to develop and encourage Latins to develop alerting systems, to include anti-infiltration training.

Political Activity: 4. As opportune, initiate action or support another nation's initiative in the OAS with respect to countering the Communist regime in Cuba. (State, with CIA support)

Purpose: To maintain the multilateral hemispheric context of the Cuban problem.

Considerations: Deep division within the Hemisphere over the Cuban issue may be surfaced. As an example of this activity, the current Dominican initiative in the OAS should be supported and exploited.

Political Activity: 5. Continue the program of excluding Cuba from Hemisphere organizations. (State, with CIA support)

Purpose: To strengthen the isolation of Cuba.

Considerations: Possible exceptions, such as in public health, should be examined to determine U.S. national interest.

Political Activity: 6. Stimulate manifestations critical of the Castro/Communist regime by Latin American political, labor, religious, and student and other significant impact groups. (State, with CIA and USIA support)

Purpose: To demonstrate that Latin America has rejected Cuba as a model to be imitated.

Considerations: To be productive, such demonstrations should stem naturally out of Cuban events, as they happen. "Events" could include Cuban refugee publication of substantive facts on what is happening to students, workers, etc. inside Cuba.

Political Activity: 7. Encourage and exploit the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials, and delegates abroad. (CIA)

Purpose: To make utmost political use of revelations by Cuban "insiders."

Considerations: Although keeping defectors "in place" can be more valuable, it is not always so, and if they cannot be recruited in place, then exploiting the defection fully for propaganda is important. Note items 45 and 46.

Political Activity: 8. Keep friendly nations fully informed of the nature of the Castro/Communist regime and of U.S. policy with respect to it. (State, with CIA and USIA support)

Purpose: To provide for coordinated action.

Considerations:

Psychological Activity: 9. Beamed to Cuba, initiate a planned series of statements by U.S. and other free world official and non-official spokesmen which support developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba. (USIA, with State and CIA support)

Purpose: To maintain resistance morale within Cuba.

Considerations: Moderation must be the keynote. Some unfavorable comment from Cuban refugee groups should be expected, demanding a harder line.

Psychological Activity: 10. Continue Voice of America short-wave broadcasts to Cuba. (USIA)

Purpose: To maintain regular, overt communication with the Cuban people.

Considerations: The activity is based on nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish, with three hours daily specifically programmed for Cuba. Carefully documented programs of the failures of the Castro/Communist system will be increased, to maintain a subjective basis for Cuban disaffection. Emphasis will be given to repudiations of the Castro/ Communist regime elsewhere, particularly the Western Hemisphere.

Psychological Activity: 11. Continue U.S. broadcasting to the Western Hemisphere. (USIA)

Purpose: To keep the people of the Hemisphere awake to the Cuban situation.

Considerations: This activity now includes both VOA shortwave broadcasts. Renewed efforts will be made to enlist support from Inter-American Broadcasters Association members and other groups. "Soap operas" and special commentaries on anti-Castro themes will be included.

Psychological Activity: 12. Produce propaganda cartoon books. (USIA)

Purpose: To build and reinforce a negative image of Castro/Communism among youth, labor, and other groups in Latin America.

Considerations: Themes can be updated quickly (agrarian reform problems, prisoner treatment, Soviet technicians, guerrillas, etc). Final Congressional action on USIA's FY 63 budget will determine if additional funds will have to be sought.

Psychological Activity: 13. Produce photo-novels carrying the propaganda story. (USIA)

Purpose: Same as 12 above.

Considerations: An anti-Castro pilot model is under development. These novels would complement the cartoon books (in 12 above), particularly in urban working groups.

Psychological Activity: 14. Supply TV outlets in Latin America with materials. (USIA)

Purpose: Same as 12 above, plus impact on key leader audiences.

Considerations: In addition to supplying documentaries and news clips, a series of one-minute puppet shorts will

be tried. Commercial TV now covers all major cities in Latin America except Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, and La Paz, Bolivia.

Psychological Activity: 15. Produce short films for commercial outlets and impact groups in Latin America. (USIA)

Purpose: Same as 12 above.

Considerations: Government censorship of all films in Latin America presents a potential problem.

Psychological Activity: 16. Produce propaganda exhibits ("before" and "after") for public and organizational display. (USIA)

Purpose: Same as 12 above.

Considerations: Three such exhibits are now being developed. The first one contrasts Castro's promises with his actions. An electric motor turns the slats on a venetian blind exhibit, changing the picture.

Psychological Activity: 17. Publish books in Spanish and Portuguese, with distribution through commercial sales and presentation. (USIA and CIA)

Purpose: Same as 12 above, plus impact on intellectuals and other opinion leaders.

Considerations: Volume will depend in part on results of USIA's request for supplemental funds for the Latin American book program, now pending before Congress. Several new books are now in the pipeline.

Psychological Activity: 18. Special propaganda exploitation of U.S. information about the agricultural, labor, and public health situation in Cuba. (State, with CIA and USIA support)

Purpose: To make full use of the factual basis for propaganda actions exposing true conditions inside Cuba.

Considerations: Current research on Cuba by U.S. departments and agencies, outside Mongoose, should be maintained and then be passed into Mongoose channels for use in the project. This includes Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and the Public Health Service.

Psychological Activity: 19. Expand the delivery of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travellers, and controlled couriers. (CIA)

Purpose: To disaffect the Cuban people and to help maintain the will to resist.

Considerations: The "Gusano Libre" theme deserves much wider exploitation, since this is a theme created by resistance within Cuba itself.

Psychological Activity: 20. Develop specific proposal for use of balloons to deliver propaganda. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide a means of distributing propaganda inside Cuba.

Considerations: This distribution technique must appear as a genuine Cuban refugee project. It must consider risks of injuring population or being exploited along that line by the Castro/Communist regime to the detriment of Mongoose objectives.

Psychological Activity: 21. Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA)

Purpose: To make them disaffected with their role in Cuba.

Considerations:

Psychological Activity: 22. "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcasts from submarine. (CIA, with Defense support)

Purpose: To have a "voice" for resistance inside Cuba.

Considerations: The initial broadcasts indicated that this can be made into an effective medium, at small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, full use should be made of talents in the Cuban refugee community. CIA will coordinate this activity closely with State and USIA.

Psychological Activity: 23. Continue "Radio Americas" broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide an irritant to the Castro/Communist regime.

Considerations:

Psychological Activity: 24. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics. (State)

Purpose: To create increased awareness in Latin America of Cuban subversive activities.

Considerations: Documented evidence available or obtainable should be fully exploited for impact upon hemisphere and world opinion.

Psychological Activity: 25. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: To sow and increase distrust in Latin America of the Castro/Communist regime.

Considerations: This activity will be undertaken only on a spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives in the specific country.

Objective B: Harass the Economy

Activity: 26. Encourage the Cuban people, as appropriate, to engage in minor acts of sabotage. (CIA)

Purpose: To cause breakdowns of communications, power, and transport facilities; to reduce availability of raw materials; to encourage the spirit of resistance, even in a limited way.

Considerations: "Minor acts of sabotage" include such actions as excessive use of electricity or short-circuiting of telephone equipment, immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts, puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks), material spoilage, and crop burning.

All forms of media, non-US government attributable, will be used to get the message to the Cuban people; however, unless a method of mass distribution of leaflets is used, it is probable that this activity will be minor and spotty.

Activity: 27. Conduct selected major sabotage operations against key Cuban industries and public utilities, with priority attention being given to transportation, communication, power plants, and utilities. (CIA)

Purpose: To reduce available economic supplies and services.

Considerations: Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage will be conducted either by especially trained, carefully selected commando/ sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the operation and exfiltrated at the completion of the operation, or by internal assets if such can be developed with the necessary access to the target. The following are currently selected targets:

Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia

Texaco Refinery-Santiago

Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana

Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana

Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Matanzas

[1 line of source text not declassified]

Moa Bay Nickel Plant

Paper Mill--Cardenas

Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.

Activity: 28. Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity, provided this does not unduly affect food and medical supplies, or the Cuban people, as such. (CIA)

Purpose: To cripple Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime security forces.

Considerations: Things, not people, are the targets. This activity requires a capability to act quickly on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostly as shipments of products into or from Cuba. Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of shipment, using additives to spoil a commodity, fire or water damage, etc. A recent example was reported, post-action, on a shipment to the USSR.

Activity: 29. Inspire labor groups outside Cuba to obstruct free world trade with Cuba. (CIA and State)

Purpose: To force the use of more Bloc resources, including shipping.

Considerations: This is an activity mostly in third countries.

Activity: 30. Discourage free world trade with Cuba. (State, supported by CIA)

Purpose: To force the use of more Bloc resources, to deny Cuba hard currency earnings, and to hasten deterioration of Cuba's essentially free world equipped industrial plant.

Considerations: Most free world trading nations are opposed to imposing necessary trade controls. Importers

might be dissuaded from using Cuba as a source of supply, such as the example of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and other forms of economic warfare deserve hard consideration.

Activity: 31. Encourage the OAS Special Committee to recommend further trade measures against Cuba by Latin American countries. (State)

Purpose: To provide a basis for renewed pressures upon NATO to recommend trade controls to NATO members.

Considerations: OAS Special Committee action should be geared to SCCS reports or other developments in the Hemisphere which might provide a good basis for Special Committee action.

Activity: 32. Reduce production of export agricultural commodities in Cuba, by covert means. (CIA)

Purpose: To cripple Cuban commerce vital to the regime's domestic economic program.

Considerations: The main export commodities are sugar, tobacco, tropicals, and coffee. Activities would include [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified], hampering of harvests by work slow-downs, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill machinery, etc.

Activity: 33. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: To sabotage Cuba's transportation and defense capability.

Considerations: The operational difficulties in this activity are recognized. However, a priority alert for this is warranted.

Objective C: Intensify Intelligence Collection

Activity: 34. Spot, recruit, and train legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban Government Posts abroad. (CIA, supported by State and Defense)

Purpose: The purpose of all activities under this objective is to provide maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

- a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro Government.
- b. Soviet activities in Cuba including details of Soviet military personnel, units, locations, capabilities, et al.
- c. Activities of Cuban G-2.
- d. Military and militia order of battle and morale.
- e. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
- f. Focus of power and/or stress and strain among the "Power Centers" in the Cuban Government.
- g. Evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and recruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence requirements above, timely operational intelligence is vital to CIA current

operations.

Considerations: When possible they will be recruited and trained while visiting outside Cuba; however when necessary recruitment and training will be done inside Cuba either by established agents or by agents infiltrated especially for the task. Whether this is done unilaterally or jointly with a third country intelligence organization is determined on a case by case basis.

In some cases the travel as generated specifically by CIA; in other cases the travels can be utilized to meet intelligence requirements.

Activity: 35. Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense)

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations:

Activity: 36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense)

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations:

Activity: 37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support)

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations: The continuation of the refugee flow and the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locka will continue.

Activity: 38. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations: [6 lines of source text not declassified]

Activity: 39. Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support)

Purpose: [2 lines of source text not declassified] to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba.

Considerations: PAA requires financial assistance to continue this activity.

Activity: 40. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations: [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Activity: 41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA)

Purpose: To obtain intelligence and propaganda material.

Considerations: This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.

Activity: 42. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Activity: 43. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Purpose: See 34 above.

Considerations: [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Activity: 44. Establish program of periodic reports from U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere analyzing the effects of existence of the target area regime on host country. (State)

Purpose: To maintain a reasonably current estimate of the impact of the target area regime on the Hemisphere.

Considerations:

Objective D: Split Regime Leadership and Relations With Bloc

Activity: 45. Collect personality information on key Cuban individuals, their personalities, their attitudes, their associations, and their influences. (CIA and others)

Purpose: To identify channels to key individuals and to identify frictions between the individuals.

Considerations: This is a long term continuing program. The degree to which these channels can be developed depends on basic professional work plus the "breaks of the game." The exploitation of the channel or of any splits in the regime will be determined in the light of existing circumstances at the time the channel is effectively established or the split is detected.

Activity: 46. Develop channels of communications to selected key individual and "power centers" of the regime. (CIA)

Purpose: To permit exploitation of the key individuals.

Considerations:

Activity: 47. Conduct psychological and political action. (CIA and State)

Purpose: To attain the objective.

Considerations: Activity will include:

a. By public and private comment, to stimulate distrust and disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, by organized labor, youth and students, farmers.

b. [8 lines of source text not declassified]

c. Provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions.

Objective E: Assist Cuban Exile Groups and Latin American Governments to Undertake Actions

Activity: 48. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political activities of all Cuban exile groups and individuals offering useful impact inside Cuba and upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and USIA support)

Purpose: To encourage and maintain the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communist rule. To provide an articulate, meaningful symbol and voice of free Cuba to inform and influence public and official opinion outside Cuba.

Considerations: Major popular impact groups can be most effective in production and dissemination of propaganda that reports on the true state of Cuba's enslavement and misery under Communist dictatorship. Cubans speaking for Cuba are the most credible witnesses possible. Groups such as a "Free Cuban Judicial Committee" could publicize and openly prepare for eventual punishment of those committing "crimes against the people of Cuba." This program of support for exiles should consider exiles in hemisphere countries and Spain as well as those in the USA. As possible, the exiles should manage and lead in this effort, with U.S. assisting and advising.

Activity: 49. Provide covert support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC). (CIA)

Purpose: To provide a degree of cohesion within the exile community and to provide a cover and funding mechanism for the invasion survivors and prisoners. In addition some funding of constituent exile groups is handled thru CRC. To support and guide CRC propaganda activities directed at Latin America and Cuba itself.

Considerations: In spite of its many inadequacies, the CRC performs a variety of useful functions which, if it were to be disbanded, would have to be handled by possibly less efficient means.

Activity: 50. Encourage and support other governments in the hemisphere to undertake programs for Cuba along lines of our own effort. (State, CIA)

Purpose: To develop a multi-national program with common goals and timing, upon a separate-but-collective basis. To direct attention and effort toward initiative of Latin American countries instead of placing focus mainly on the U.S.

Considerations: This will require the highest order of overt and covert U.S. actions, to stir and support initiative in other national leaders. Reasonable but not prohibitive criteria for consultation and coordination is involved, with recognition that the U.S. is helping not employing the third nation efforts.

Objective F: Be Prepared To Exploit a Revolt

Activity: 51. Continue to develop and refine contingency plans. (Defense)

Purpose: To assure maximum readiness from the standpoint of military planning for military intervention if directed.

Considerations: These plans are well advanced.

Activity: 52. Continue planning with Defense and the various sub-commanders for the participation of others in military contingency plans for Cuba. (State, CIA and USIA)

Purpose: To provide support to the military in the event of execution of military contingency plans.

Considerations:

Activity: 53. Establish and maintain in being the necessary communication and crypto links between CIA and Defense, including various subcommands. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide the communication capability to support the military contingency plans.

Considerations: These links have been or are in the process of being established.

Activity: 54. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. (State, with support of others)

Purpose: To provide a focal point for anti-Castro resistance elements and to facilitate the transition of a post-Castro government in the event of a successful overthrow of Castro/Communism.

Considerations: This is a matter which will require continuing study and which may be subject to substantial change due to circumstances which exist at the time.

Activity: 55. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas of Cuba accessible to known resistance elements and in potential resistance areas. (CIA)

Purpose: To have available in Cuba a reserve of arms and ammunition.

Considerations: This will require extensive maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations. It is considered likely that Cuban maritime patrolling will be such that in the near future if the job is to be done, submarines must be used in lieu of surface craft.

Activity: 56. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba. (CIA)

Purpose: To provide controlled intelligence sources and to be available in the event of an uprising.

Considerations: Experience and continually tightening security controls have demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and monitoring individuals or "Black Teams" in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrates can become "legalized." Therefore, two to five man teams will be infiltrated to recruit and train small "legal" compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal" residents. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent material and the willingness of the Cuban population to support infiltrates. Increased Cuban defensive capabilities may require the utilization of submarines or aircraft as a means of infiltration and/or exfiltration in lieu of surface maritime facilities.

400. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, August 31, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A). Top Secret; Sensitive. Rostow added by hand the word "only" after Bundy's name at the top of the memorandum.

Initial questions raised by reading Cuba folder./1/

/1/It is not clear which papers were in the folder Rostow was reading.

1. It may be crucial to any set of moves that we make that we establish a clear legal basis for our action. This seems to me necessary because we will be inhibited from bringing to bear such forces as may be required at some stage, by our own inhibitions, unless such a basis exists. The optimum legal basis is not the raw Monroe Doctrine. I think we should look hard at the Rio Treaty and the Punta del Este resolutions which bear on indirect aggression.
2. A political basis within the hemisphere and within NATO is, to a degree, necessary; but if we have a legal basis satisfying to ourselves, a certain degree of unilateral, of "High Noon" action is probably acceptable.
3. As the papers note, it may be extremely important within the hemisphere to distinguish defensive from offensive installations, downplaying what has already apparently been delivered by references to Indonesia, Iraq, etc. The embarrassment here is mainly to our covert operations and therefore need not enter into the psychological impact of the deliveries.
4. As the paper suggests we should consider very seriously drawing a line which we would not only state publicly but to Moscow and Havana as well. This line should assert unacceptability to us of nuclear delivery capabilities within the hemisphere either on land or submarine-based. Here is where the legal foundation for our position is important. The Soviets may argue that we have emplaced nuclear weapons close to their borders. Our response should be that this hemisphere has set up its own regional security arrangements; that the U.S. is part of this hemisphere; and that we intend by our own force and with those allies who read the hemispheric documents as we do to enforce those regulations.
5. Against this background we should consider informing Moscow that among the actions we may take in response to any interference with Berlin access is a Cuban blockade. They have increased their pressure on us in Cuba, but they also have given hostages to fortune by this commitment. This is of course a deterrent with respect to Berlin, not a matter of Cuban policy itself.
6. In the light of these Soviet moves, we should be able to get NATO and the Latin Americans to reduce their trade with Cuba--and increase the Soviet bill for this operation; but only if we put much more diplomatic muscle into the effort than we have thus far.
7. The occasion is also propitious for our trying to tighten up from the relatively low level but still disruptive Cuban efforts at subversion in Latin America. As I understand it this effort now mainly consists in withdrawing training and reinfiltrating agents, disbursing money and disseminating propaganda. On a bilateral basis we should put more muscle into interfering with this game as well as underlining our willingness to bring the Punta del Este resolutions to bear./2/

/2/At the end of point 7, Rostow made the following handwritten addition: "i.e., those relating to indirect aggression." He also added, in his own hand, points 8. "Commando raids," and 9. "A Caribbean Security agreement?"

401. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy

Washington, August 31, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A).
Top Secret; Sensitive.

SUBJECT

Cuba

I attach at Tab A a first element in the reports on Cuba which will be coming in first thing next week. I have also started Walt Rostow on an intensive personal review of the problem and his thoughts will be available on Tuesday./1/ What Rostow and I both think as a first reaction is that we have two problems here which should be kept separate. The first is our reaction to the current step, and the second is our preparations to react against something which would require or make possible a major military operation against Cuba. The present actions in Cuba do not justify such action.

/1/September 4.

If this distinction is correct, we probably should make it plain during next week that while the activities in Cuba are further evidence of Castro's sell-out to the Soviets, they do not pose any new active threat to us or to the hemisphere. We should distinguish these activities from any form of aggressive action, or any activity which could aggressively threaten us or any other American state. We should make it plain that we know exactly what is going on and will continue to be able to watch it from inside and outside Cuba. We might also indicate that we expect the Cuban people to show their own opinion of this Soviet intrusion--and Walt suggests that Lansdale's operation might well be enlarged to include harassing actions by Cubans against bloc personnel.

Meanwhile, we should of course do what we can to intensify Castro's isolation from our allies. There is not a great deal to be done here, because trade is already very small and is limited mainly by Castro's own shortage of foreign exchange. Shipping is very hard to control because of the number of different flags under which there is excess cargo capacity, mainly managed by owners who would trade with anybody and passionately resist political guidance.

In the longer run, we need to clarify both here and abroad the grounds on which aggressive action or offensive capability would call us into action.

This is less a matter of the Monroe Doctrine than one of elemental national security. It is not the same as missiles in Turkey. It is like the Soviet attitude toward the Black Sea or the Baltic states. In domestic politics, again, we need to draw this same sharp distinction between what is now going on and what we would not tolerate. This will require a careful exposition from you, and it is the only reason for thinking that a press conference toward the end of next week may be important. I myself believe that if we make it clear that short of war we have done everything we can and that war is not justified by antiaircraft installations, we shall be on fairly solid ground.

McG. B./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

Tab A

Probable military, political, and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S.

1. Soviet missile possibilities in Cuba

The most probable present Soviet missile activity would be the introduction of SA-2 missiles. Preliminary but highly indicative photographic interpretation shows 7 sites which have all the earmarks of such installations in the early stages of construction. The SA-2 is a modern first-line antiaircraft missile, with an engagement range of 30 miles and a high reliability at altitudes from 2500 to 60,000 feet, and with limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. Missiles of this sort have been introduced in Indonesia and are on order by the UAR and Iraq.

The SA-2 is probably capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is no evidence that the Soviet government has ever provided nuclear warheads to any other state, on any terms. It seems unlikely that such a move is currently planned--but there is also little reason to suppose that the Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move could be controlled in the Soviet interest.

Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are surface-to-surface missiles of ranges varying from 150 miles to the 2,000 miles of the Soviet MRBM; such missiles would be of little value without nuclear warheads. Longer-range surface-to-surface missiles would require relatively substantial installations; shorter-range missiles of this sort could be introduced very quickly and mounted without elaborate construction.

As missile capabilities increase in the remainder of the 1960's, it will become progressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba lightweight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive power against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.

2. Military impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba

A. Surface-to-air missiles

If surface-to-air missiles are introduced in Cuba they will substantially increase Communist defensive capabilities there. Currently the Communist air defense depends largely on MIG's which are effective only against planes of medium speed and medium altitudes; additional air defense is also provided by antiaircraft artillery of uncertain effectiveness at low and medium altitudes. Extensive deployment of SA-2's would make reconnaissance overflight and other clandestine air operations difficult and dangerous and would substantially increase the problem of neutralizing air defense capabilities in the event of open conflict. There is no level of SA-2 deployment which would be able to withstand a determined U.S. attack.

SA-2 missiles would not require any significant redeployment of U.S. forces for defensive purposes, since neither these missiles nor the MIG's under their protection would carry any increased direct threat to the safety of the U.S. mainland. Operations at Guantanamo could be interdicted, except for low approaches and departures, but such action would be a strong ground for U.S. reprisal.

B. Surface-to-surface missiles

Surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads would constitute a very significant military threat to the continental U.S. Even short-range missiles would be able to reach important population centers and military installations, and missiles of longer range would give the Soviets a capability of attacking substantial numbers of our most important military installations. Such attacks would have very short warning times, and this capability would be a particular threat to SAC-manned aircraft which now rely on BMEWS warning. It appears probable that on military grounds alone, the establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

Surface-to-surface missiles without nuclear warheads would constitute no significant military threat to the U.S. On military grounds, indeed, it may be that the introduction of nuclear warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line than the introduction of any given class of missiles as such. But the covert introduction of nuclear warheads would be very hard to detect.

It is believed that attention should be given also to the possibility that the Soviets may attempt to establish a submarine missile base in Cuba. The Soviet submarine fleet is greatly hindered in its operations near the U.S. by the absence of forward bases. Cuban-based missile submarines would be most useful to the Soviets, and the nuclear missiles could be kept under tight Soviet control. The announcement that Soviet trawlers will use Cuban ports may mark a precedent-setting step to this more dangerous use.

3. Political and psychological impact of Soviet missile establishment in Cuba

There is no technical means of making an exact estimate on this subject. In the small group which has reviewed this problem in response to NSAM 181, the general opinion was that the political and psychological impact of any substantial Soviet-provided missile force will be great: in the United States, in Cuba itself, and in the rest of the Western hemisphere.

The Soviet Union, in making a decision to supply the Cubans with missiles of any sort, is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military foothold in the Western hemisphere. It can be argued that this claim was already staked when MIG's were delivered a year ago, and it is worth noting that the MIG's did not cause great disturbance to American or hemispheric opinion. But missiles are something else again, and we cannot expect that the public mind will serenely distinguish between anti-aircraft missiles and a direct threat of missile attack on the U.S.

Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administration's "softness" on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the missiles remain in place.

Nevertheless there will be a distinct difference in impact between missiles for defensive use against aircraft and missiles capable of use against the United States. The impact of anti-aircraft missiles would be less in the U.S. and in the hemisphere--and international acceptance of action against defensive installations would be lower than in the case of action against missiles posing a direct nuclear threat to the U.S.

In Latin America the psychological and political effect of missile installations in Cuba would be substantial, and it would not matter much which kind of missiles were installed. The missile sites would be seen as proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba, and in the absence of prompt and effective U.S. counteraction, it would be judged that Castro is here to stay. In the Caribbean this would lead to heavy pressure for more effective U.S. support against Castro's subversion; outside the area Latin American states would be more inclined than ever to accommodate to Cuba as she is. This divergence of reaction would accentuate existing inter-American strains.

Summary

In sum, the expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear warheads were arriving with them.

McGeorge Bundy/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

402. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President's Military Aide (Clifton)

Washington, September 1, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B).

Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only for General Clifton for the President. The attachments were apparently prepared for Gilpatric in DOD/ISA and responded to items numbered 1 and 6 in NSAM No. 181. (See Document 386.) The package also included a draft response, not printed, to item 5 in NSAM No. 181, which was redrafted with additional analysis by McGeorge Bundy and submitted to the President on August 31 in Document 401. A note attached to the source text indicates that President Kennedy saw the attached items.

Ted: Here is some stuff that Secretary Gilpatric had prepared specially. The Joint Chiefs responded directly to a Presidential request as transmitted through Secretary Gilpatric./1/ In my judgment, there is no urgency in showing the President this; however, he may ask for it, and I am accordingly sending it to you.

/1/See Document 403.

Carl

Attachment/2/

/2/Top Secret.

Item 1

[17 paragraphs (3-1/2 pages of source text) not declassified]

Item 6

"Advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the U.S. would not tolerate establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the U.S."

1. It should first be noted that the character of Soviet military aid to Cuba thus far does not indicate the building of Cuban military capabilities designed for attack on the U.S. The nature of arms and equipment being furnished to Cuba, so far as known at present, seems primarily aimed at improving defensive--particularly air defense--capabilities. The main line of propaganda accompanying Soviet Bloc military aid, to the extent that a definite line is discernible, focuses on Cuba's right to defend itself against "aggression" from an "imperialist" USA. With respect to nuclear weapons, it would mark a very significant change in Soviet policy to date if nuclear weapons were to be turned over to the Cubans, or even deployed to Cuba under Soviet custody.

2. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that Soviet policy may shift, and that the creation of a nuclear threat on the U.S. "doorstep" might appeal to the Soviets as an appropriate counter to U.S. deployment of an alleged nuclear threat close to the Bloc periphery.

3. Final judgment on a proposed warning statement by the U.S. would seem to call for better evidence than presently available that a recognizable nuclear threat to the U.S. is being fashioned in Cuba. Pending evidence that elements of such a threat are coming into being, the pros and cons of a warning statement are discussed below.

4. Advantages

a. A strong U.S. statement warning against the establishment of nuclear-capable forces in Cuba would serve clear notice to the Soviets that we are reaching the limits of patience on their military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. To the extent that the Soviets are probing to see how far they can go, a firm commitment of U.S. prestige to stopping the build-up of a nuclear military threat in Cuba could cause the Soviets to weigh the risks of provoking us into action in a part of the world where we hold all the geographic advantages.

b. A U.S. declaration would pave the way for taking firmer sanctions. If the Soviets continued to support a Cuban buildup, we could take the position that their actions threatened the security of the U.S. and of the hemisphere, and that we therefore considered ourselves justified in taking necessary measures to cut off the flow of arms, such as interception and turning back of Bloc shipping. (The critical point would be to establish the "nuclear threat" aspects of the Cuban buildup. There might be no clear-cut proof, in which case we would have to establish the threat by our own definition.) Needless to say if we intend to make declaratory statements at all, we will have to be prepared to back them with some sort of action or take a damaging prestige setback.

c. In many parts of the world the U.S. image would be improved by statements and action showing determination of purpose and a clear concept of vital national interest. In Latin America, reactions would probably be mixed. There would be propaganda charges by Communist and left wing extremists that the U.S. was preparing to intervene by force in Cuba. This would probably be echoed to some extent by non-Communist liberal elements, particularly in Uruguay. However, in the key countries of Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and Colombia the statement should tend to hearten anti-Communist and pro-U.S. sectors of opinion. This is especially important in Brazil, where these elements are being hard pressed by pro-Communist supporters of President Goulart; in Venezuela, where the extreme left has recently made two unsuccessful attempts to overthrow President Betancourt's Government by force and in Chile, where a left wing popular front movement is being formed for the next elections. On balance, although there would be criticism, it should be offset by the psychological lift which the opponents of Communism and of Castro could be expected to derive from the U.S. position.

d. A warning statement keyed to the nuclear threat would have the advantage also in some quarters of underscoring U.S. tolerance and patience, even to the point of permitting a Communist state on the very doorstep of the U.S. until the unacceptable condition of a nuclear threat from that state came into the picture.

5. Disadvantages

a. If it is granted that the unequivocal existence of Cuban-based nuclear weapons would be unacceptable from the standpoint of U.S. security--and that we would therefore take action to neutralize the threat--then consideration of disadvantages from a declaratory warning hinges mainly on the effects accruing from a warning made in advance of clear establishment of a nuclear threat.

b. An advance warning confined to the nuclear threat would have the disadvantage of casting U.S. policy in a rigid mold. It could be inferred that the U.S. intended to do nothing unless Cuba actually established a nuclear capability, which would tend to increase Castro's freedom of action in other matters and lower the morale of Cuban resistance elements. Unless accompanied by supporting indications of U.S. firmness and unanimity, an advance declaration would probably have a questionable deterrent effect on Soviet efforts to enlarge a military foothold in Cuba.

c. An advance declaration would give the Soviets legalistic propaganda leverage to argue that in view of U.S.-controlled nuclear bases ringing the Bloc, the U.S. was in no moral or political position to proscribe the establishment of a modest nuclear counter-force on the periphery of North America. Thus, a statement might very well have a reverse effect and help provide the justification for establishment of a nuclear capability in Cuba.

d. In the case of either an advance declaration or one made while indications of a nuclear capability were still highly uncertain, the U.S. would be vulnerable to a large-scale propaganda counter from the Communist side to the effect that Soviet aid to Cuba was only for purposes of defense against American aggression and interference in the affairs of a free and independent country.

6. Conclusions

a. The disadvantages of an advance declaration concerned with a nuclear threat only would appear to outweigh the advantages.

b. A declaration made after the existence of nuclear forces had been determined would be useful to the extent that it was followed up by action to eliminate the threat.

c. Making introduction of a nuclear capability the criterion for U.S. action has the inherent disadvantage that it allows time for further strengthening of Cuban armed forces, air defense capability, naval installations and possibly bases for submarines, so that any eventual military operations that might prove necessary against Cuba would become more difficult and costly.

d. The final conclusion which emerges is that any declaratory warning issued by the U.S. should not be confined only to the nuclear aspect of a Cuban military buildup, and should not be made at all unless the U.S. is prepared to take action to thwart the buildup.

403. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 1, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Top Secret; NoFORN; Special Handling. Copies were sent to Rusk and Kaysen.

SUBJECT

Cuba

Attached are answers prepared by the Joint Staff to a series of questions which I put to them yesterday after our telephone conversation.

By the time of your return Tuesday, /1/ Defense and the CIA will be prepared to give you an analysis of the recently acquired intelligence on Cuba, and we will also have ready for submission to you a proposal for further intelligence.

/1/September 4.

Roswell Gilpatric

Attachment

Washington, September 1, 1962.

SUBJECT

Response to Questions Pertaining to Cuba

1. In compliance with your oral request to Brigadier General Harris on 31 August 1962 for a response to specific questions concerning recent intelligence on Cuba, the attached staff paper is submitted.

2. The responses highlight the recent increase in Cuban offensive/defensive capability but obviously do not constitute a detailed analysis of the overall military threat posed by the Cuban/Soviet build-up. Current US contingency plans and force structure are capable now of meeting this new threat, however, there are additional risks involved which were not present six weeks ago. A projection of the current build-up indicates that the risks will increase in the future and that US involvement in an operation to rid Cuba of communism will become progressively more costly in terms of time, personnel and equipment.

John M. Reynolds

Major General USAF

Vice Director

Enclosure

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO CUBA IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT INTELLIGENCE

1. What was the military capability of the Cubans for attacks against the United States prior to receipt of equipment recently?
 - a. Approximately 25 operational MIG aircraft capable of carrying two 500 pound bombs, in addition to their 20 and 37 MM cannon. These MIGs could attack targets as far north as Tampa and, on a one-way mission, they could attack targets stretching between New Orleans and Savannah.
 - b. Approximately eight operational B-26 aircraft, each capable of carrying five 500 pound bombs and attacking targets on round trip missions in an arc between Mobile and Savannah and, on one-way missions, they could attack targets stretching from San Antonio in the west, Cleveland to the north and New York in the east.
 - c. Approximately 15 small craft including 12 Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) which could make nuisance raids against southeastern coastal cities and lines of communication.
2. What is the effect of the acquisition of missiles and missile carrying torpedo boats?
 - a. Extensive deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SA-2's) will make reconnaissance more hazardous. It will increase the problem and costs involved in neutralizing air defense capabilities in the event of open conflict.
 - b. Missile carrying torpedo boats greatly enhance Cuba's coastal defense. Offensively, these boats can be used against shipping, coastal cities and industrial complexes in southeastern United States consistent with the following capabilities: KOMAR class boats are capable of a sustained maximum speed of 45 knots for over 500 miles or a 1400 mile range at 22 knots. Each carries two Mach-1 missiles with a range of 10-15 NM carrying a 2000 pound warhead.
3. How much more secure are they for launching attacks against the United States?

The SA-2 is a modern, first-line anti-aircraft missile, with an engagement range of 30 miles and a high reliability at altitudes from 2,500 to 60,000 feet and with limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. The presence of these missiles in Cuba is an added hazard to our air reconnaissance and will make it more difficult for us to determine that offensive preparations are underway.

4. What was required for the United States to deal with the situation before the latest acquisition?

Contingency plans envisioned the seizure of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10-15 days after landing with the minimum of casualties to both sides. Plans are based on the premise that an adequate amount of time will be allocated for pre-assault preparations. Major units involved in the initial assault include: two Army airborne divisions, an Infantry brigade, an Armored combat command, one and one-third Marine Division/Wing Teams, a Navy Striking and Covering Force together with an amphibious task force, 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

5. How much more difficult is it for the United States to deal with the situation now?

The strengthening of Cuban military capabilities will increase the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US operations in Cuba. It may take somewhat longer to achieve the same degree of neutralization, since it will be necessary to neutralize the SA-2 installations and MTBs before major airborne and amphibious operations can begin. There also exists the possibility that the opportunity of obtaining strategic and tactical surprise may be prejudiced because of the increased period of time required for preliminary operations against these targets.

6. What added forces would be involved? This to be in terms of armaments currently known to be available to the Cubans.

None. Those US forces committed in current US contingency plans are considered sufficient.

7. What damage can the torpedo boats do to the United States?

These boats can be used effectively in high speed day or night hit-and-run raids against shipping and against coastal cities and industrial complexes in southeastern United States consistent with the following capabilities: KOMAR class boats are capable of a speed of 45 knots for a 500 nautical mile range or a 1400 NM range at the economical speed of 22 knots; each carries two Mach-1 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 10-15 NM carrying a 2000 pound warhead, as well as four 25 MM AA guns. The missile warheads have a reported CEP of 100 feet.

8. What damage can aircraft do to the United States?

a. Approximately 25 operational MIG aircraft capable of carrying two 500 pound bombs, in addition to their 20 and 37 MM cannon. These MIGs could attack targets as far north as Tampa and, on a one-way mission, they could attack targets stretching between New Orleans and Savannah.

b. Approximately eight operational B-26 aircraft, each capable of carrying five 500 pound bombs and attacking targets on round trip missions from the tip of Florida in an arc between Mobile and Savannah and, on one-way missions, they could attack targets stretching from San Antonio in the west, Cleveland to the north and New York in the east.

9. Added Comment

In addition to the foregoing, the military, psychological and political impact on other countries of the Caribbean littoral should not be overlooked. The recently acquired missile carrying torpedo boats could be used effectively in offensive operations against Latin American countries in the support of communist-oriented insurgency. Also, attacks could be made on industrial complexes such as the vulnerable oil refineries of Venezuela. The MTB's would be particularly effective in the harassment of shipping in the Windward Passage or in an attack on the Panama Canal.

404. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, September 1, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Secret; Noform.

SUBJECT

The Meaning of Increased Soviet Aid to Cuba

This paper attempts to analyze both the Soviet and Cuban motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba.

Conclusions

1. The recent increased Soviet economic and military commitment to Cuba is new and significant evidence of the value Moscow places on the Castro regime as a serious threat to US prestige and position in this Hemisphere.
2. Cuban leaders have sought this assistance eagerly, believing that it will enable them to improve internal and external security and restore forward momentum to their revolution.
3. The Soviet decision to give more help came at a time when economic deterioration and growing popular discontent raised fears of failure, and of invasion, among Castro supporters.
4. In addition to training and arming Castro's force, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba. But we believe that at present such activities are likely to be limited to the setting up of unacknowledged intelligence collection and defensive facilities. They will attempt to derive propaganda advantage by comparing their "peaceful" presence in Cuba with US bases in Turkey and Iran.
5. Current Soviet moves in Cuba do not appear to be synchronized with Soviet moves in Berlin, but they have a common root in Moscow's growing sense of power, and Moscow may hope that increased tensions in one area will lead to Western concessions in the other.
6. It is not likely that this assistance presages a direct military move against Guantanamo.

I. Cuban Needs and Soviet Involvement

The present Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba are probably the outcome of Soviet-Cuban agreements made last Spring. At that time there were two compelling factors favoring such agreements:

- (1) The Cuban economy was in deepening trouble with no breakthrough in sight. The pervasive disruption which had been evident earlier in industry and transportation showed up in the agricultural sector as well, most conspicuously in the sugar industry, the very heart of the economy. Food shortages produced rising discontent. These circumstances apparently produced a crisis of confidence during which regime leaders probably calculated that the inter-related threats of internal revolt and external attack were increasing to a dangerous degree. The regime increasingly warned the people of the danger of US-supported invasion. Cuban demands for Soviet economic and military assistance probably became insistent at this time.
- (2) The Soviet interest in, and commitment to, the Cuban regime had significantly increased by last March. The Soviet leaders had always valued the Castro regime as a symbol in strategically important Latin America of anti-US forces they have been encouraging throughout the world. Moscow's commitment to Cuba increased considerably when it acquiesced (with some reluctance) in Castro's attempt to push into full membership in the communist fraternity by proclaiming his affiliation with international communism last December and forcefully putting himself at the head of the Cuban communists last March. The Soviet Union thus became more susceptible to Cuban demands for economic and military assistance.

While these two factors laid the groundwork for concluding the agreements for the present Soviet shipments to Cuba, the agreements were very likely not achieved without Soviet-Cuban friction. In exchange for their increased economic assistance, the Soviets probably insisted on a greater role in direction of the Cuban economy than the Cubans wanted to give them. The risks involved for the Soviets in a military buildup in Cuba probably

made them reluctant to meet Cuban demands for military assistance, although Moscow probably calculates that the risk of a direct US intervention in Cuba is not high.

II. The Soviet Game in Cuba

General Outlook and Policy

Moscow's policy toward Cuba must be considered within the context of its view of Latin America. It is clear that for at least the last half decade the post-Stalin leaders have viewed Latin America--with its unstable military dictatorship, depressed standards of living, economic difficulties, social malaise, and widespread resentment (real or imagined) against overlordship of the "big brother" to the North--as a most promising area in which to pursue their policies of exploiting grievances to the detriment of the West, and especially the US. In addition, the Soviets are undoubtedly eager to penetrate Latin America because of that region's great strategic significance vis-a-vis the US. The major difficulty was that the Soviets had almost no entree to the area. The communist parties were small and weak and diplomatic relations were confined to a handful of the Latin American countries.

Developments in Cuba significantly changed this situation. The Castro regime provided the Soviets with a beachhead in Latin America, and a pro-Soviet, anti-US example which Moscow hoped other Latin American countries would emulate. The Soviets responded to developments in Cuba with approval and support.

However, the Castro regime's claims to communist status raised problems for Moscow. The Soviets originally did not want a full-blown communist regime in Cuba. They wanted a regime with a nationalist facade, but tolerant of and amenable to local communist influence. They invented a special name for such a regime in their Marxist eschatology: "national democracy." Moscow's hope was that this regime would be almost as amenable to Soviet influence as a purely communist one, while its nationalist facade would enhance its attractiveness to other Latin American countries. Soviet recognition of Castro's claim to communist affiliation meant modification of these plans and, more significantly, a deeper Soviet involvement with the highly volatile and impulsive Castro. Moscow nevertheless recognized Castro's claims to communist status, probably because a new communist regime is always welcome as a sign of the onward march of world communism, and partly from a feeling that there was little choice. The Soviet leaders now refer to Castro as "Comrade." The Soviet commitment to sustain him has deepened accordingly.

A further Soviet objective in Cuba is the development of an economically and politically viable internal system that will provide an example of militant, dynamic progress for other Latin American countries. Although the Soviet Union has made a sizeable contribution to keeping the Castro regime afloat economically, until quite recently it has been conspicuously niggardly about providing economic development assistance that would turn the Castro regime into the attractive example we think the Soviets want it to be. This is probably due to a variety of reasons, which include traditional Soviet caution about expending resources abroad, Cuba's deteriorating economic situation, and Soviet-Cuban disagreement over what to do about it.

On the latter point, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the departure from Cuba last spring of Soviet Ambassador S. Kudryav-tsev was directly connected with, and probably a result of, Soviet-Cuban disagreements over management of the Cuban economy. Reliable reports indicate that Soviet-Cuban frictions also arose as a result of Cuban resentment at Moscow's effort to dictate policies, and Soviet resentment of Cuban assistance demands which Moscow thought exorbitant.

However, developments since the Spring of this year suggest that Soviet-Cuban agreement has been reached on Moscow's role in Cuba, and that the USSR is implementing policies designed to ensure the security and domestic development of its Latin American beachhead.

On May 14, after one-and-a-half month's negotiations in Moscow, a Soviet-Cuban supplementary trade protocol for 1962 was signed which provided for increased Soviet economic deliveries, including consumer goods, to

Cuba. In early June a Soviet delegation headed by Uzbek Party leader Rashidov made an on-the-spot investigation of the Cuban economic situation which may have cleared away Soviet-Cuban disagreements over Cuban domestic problems and indicated an enhanced Soviet role in Cuban developments. Finally, Raul Castro during his visit to Moscow the first half of July also was reported to have taken up economic-military assistance with the Soviets, although the visit could hardly have planned the increased Soviet military-economic shipments to Cuba that took place shortly thereafter in late July and August. Cuban leader Che Guevara is presently in Moscow, reportedly to discuss Soviet construction in Cuba of a steel mill with an annual capacity of 1.3 million tons, which would give Cuba the largest steel producing capacity of any Latin American country.

There are very definite limits to any Soviet effort to build up Cuba as a "showcase" for other Latin American countries. To build Cuba into a truly prosperous country with a high standard of living would contrast it starkly with most countries of the communist bloc, including the Soviet Union itself. Furthermore, the communist system appears to have built-in obstacles of a political and economic nature to the establishment of a society with widespread prosperity. Within these limitations, however, the Soviet Union may hope to contribute to an economic progress and viability in Cuba that will serve to impress visitors from less fortunate Latin American areas.

In summary, we believe the current heavy Soviet shipments of military and economic material to Cuba are basically the culmination of a logical sequence of developments which took place within the framework of Soviet outlook and policy toward Cuba and Latin America, specific Cuban developments, and growing Soviet-Cuban interdependence despite friction between the two countries.

Secondary Objectives

Apart from the specific objective of strengthening the Cuban regime, Moscow undoubtedly looks for more general benefits from its activities.

Discredit Monroe Doctrine. One of the collateral purposes of Soviet penetration in Cuba, and particularly the military build-up even though the latter is not publicly acknowledged, has been to discredit the Monroe Doctrine and to assert Moscow's right to intervene anywhere on the globe where it feels Soviet interests are involved, including Latin America. The Soviets have taken direct issue with US reassertion of the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine with specific relation to Cuban developments. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko issued a statement on August 30, 1960, in answer to Secretary Herter's August 25, 1960, speech to the OAS Conference^{/1/} which referred to the "rotten corpse of the Monroe Doctrine" and contested the allegedly claimed US right to do what it wants in Latin America "while others have no right to fulfill their direct duty as members of the United Nations with regard to the Western Hemisphere, even if events are taking place there which touch upon the interests of insuring peace over the whole of our planet." To the extent that Moscow establishes a recognized presence, particularly of a military nature, in Cuba, the effectiveness and validity of the Monroe Doctrine appears called in question.

^{/1/}For text of Secretary Herter's speech at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, at San Jose, Costa Rica on August 24, 1960, see Department of State Bulletin, September 12, 1960, pp. 395-400.

Establishment of Military Installations under Purely Soviet Control. Cuba's strategic location and its proximity to the US have undoubtedly led the Soviets to consider the desirability of setting up various kinds of military installations there. In weighing the pros and cons, the chief disadvantage of a major, identifiable Soviet installation is its ultimate vulnerability to US attack and Soviet inability to reinforce or otherwise support such an installation rapidly.

The advantages of a Soviet-manned base or other form of overt military presence would be that it (1) would in their view thoroughly discredit the Monroe Doctrine, and put into serious question US resolve, prestige and

capabilities in the eyes of the Latin Americans and the world generally, and (2) would be useful in efforts to intimidate adjacent countries including, conceivably, the US. In this latter connection Moscow might seek to use its military presence in Cuba as a bargaining counter for liquidating the US military presence in countries around the Soviet periphery--a long sought Soviet objective.

Weighing the risks and advantages of a military presence, Moscow is probably now prepared, in addition to training activities and installing military facilities for the Cubans, to install covertly various kinds of Soviet-manned intelligence collection facilities and defensive installations (such as anti-aircraft artillery and missiles and coastal defense systems). Moscow would feel that such installations, which might eventually be turned over to the Cubans, could be plausibly justified in any case because of alleged aggressive US plans and would be difficult for the US to attack without provocation.

More risky, and politically less justifiable, would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries. We believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence for the foreseeable future.

In sum, we think there is some possibility that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time.

It should be noted in this connection that presently available information makes it extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder estimate must await more clearcut evidence.

USSR in Cuba vs. US in Turkey. The Soviets are also attempting to derive propaganda advantage by comparing their "peaceful" presence in Cuba with US military bases on the Soviet periphery. In his September 1961 interview with *New York Times* correspondent Sulzberger, Khrushchev compared the US-backed invasion of Cuba the previous April with a Soviet right to intervene in Turkey or Greece, whose regimes are allied with the US and "unfriendly" toward the Soviet Union. This theme has reappeared in Soviet propaganda in connection with the current Cuban invasion scare. It is not likely that the Soviets hope, or would be willing, to trade their presence in Cuba for US withdrawal from areas on the Soviet periphery; but they obviously hope to make propaganda mileage out of the situation.

Relationship to Berlin. The mounting Soviet involvement in Cuba has no doubt served in the Soviet view to underscore the change in the world "correlation of forces" which, the Soviets argue, makes an end of the "abnormal" situation in Berlin overdue. In this general sense there is a relationship between Soviet conduct and objectives in this hemisphere (and, indeed, throughout the world) and in Berlin. Moreover, the Soviets presumably feel that to the extent that tensions and anxieties are stimulated over Cuba (up to a point, at least), pressures for new efforts at conciliation, including over the Berlin issue, will be generated in the West.

In view of the relatively long lead time involved in planning the current Soviet deliveries to Cuba, it is extremely unlikely that there could have been a close synchronization of Soviet moves in Cuba and Berlin. Nonetheless, even though fortuitous, the coincidence of recent events in Berlin and Cuba is almost certainly judged by the Soviets to be advantageous as long as present levels of tension are not greatly exceeded. Moscow probably does recognize that at some point a brazen challenge of Western interests and prestige will lead to a reaction which could start a chain of events involving uncontrollable, or hard-to-control risks.

As already indicated, the Soviets view their advances in Cuba and their efforts to make advances in Berlin as the logical concomitant of fundamental forces at work in the world. They probably believe that barring a rash act (either by the US or by Castro) the Soviet position in Cuba and the stability of the regime there is bound to gain in strength. Likewise, the Soviets appear to be confident that over time the Western position in Berlin will inevitably undergo diminution. Based on these expectations it would appear to be unlikely that Moscow would consider offering some sort of quid-pro-quo gambit whereby the USSR would halt or drastically curtail its role in

Cuba in exchange for a Western withdrawal from Berlin. This is not to say that if some arrangement deemed advantageous by the USSR were worked out in Berlin, Moscow might not be willing, tacitly, to dampen down its more brazen involvement in Cuba. Indeed, Moscow might calculate that politically it would be feasible for the US to accept a new Berlin arrangement only under conditions of relative communist quiescence elsewhere in the world where Western interests are directly involved. But Soviet restraint based on such calculations would be likely to be transitory and in Cuba, at any rate, the momentum of Soviet involvement could be expected to be resumed in short order.

III. The Cuban Role

Motivations and Intentions

The increased Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba is undoubtedly being received with relief and satisfaction by the regime's leaders who in recent months have made little effort to hide Cuba's increasing economic, administrative and political problems. Cuba's sugar crop, still the mainstay of the Cuban economy, dropped drastically in 1962. With respect to other agricultural products Cuba has clearly not achieved the much needed expansion called for under the regime's plans. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector the deterioration of plants, equipment shortages, poor quality of raw materials, and gross mismanagement continued. Because of the US embargo and the shortage of foreign exchange, the Cubans have not been able to find adequate sources for the machinery and parts formerly imported from the US. The selection of management personnel chiefly on the basis of political reliability rather than technical qualifications continued to be the rule.

The leaders calculated that they needed expanded Soviet assistance both in a material and psychological sense to revive the economy, to overawe internal opposition, discourage any external invasion, stiffen the backs of supporters in and out of the armed forces, and restore Cuba's waning prestige in the Hemisphere. The prospect of sizeable numbers of Soviet military technicians and more sophisticated armament was probably welcomed as a demonstration of Soviet involvement, a possible deterrent to an invasion, a potential forerunner of an all-purpose Soviet defense commitment, and an addition to the fighting capability of the Cuban forces. There is little reason to doubt that Castro's intentions are to arm in such a way as to (in Castro's own words) "be in a position to repulse any imperialistic attack."

The Castro armed forces are primarily organized around missions of internal security and external defense, although it is doubtful that the regime draws much of a distinction between the two requirements. The internal oppositionists draw encouragement--when not material aid--from the fact of US power near at hand. Similarly, the likelihood of that power's being used is affected by the degree of internal unrest in Cuba. Finally, coastal incursions by Cuban exiles pose a challenge to both external defense and internal security forces.

It has always been difficult to discern how much of the regime's invasion talk stems from serious fears of attack and how much is a cynical tool for whipping up nationalistic fervor. It is likely that regime leaders themselves have reached the point where they cannot separate out their own motives. As Caribbeans, the Cubans have undoubtedly feared retaliation from the United States for their behavior since 1959. At the same time, they have acknowledged privately that invasion scares are most useful in maintaining support for the revolution. Scare talk also sets the stage for popular acceptance of greatly expanded numbers of Soviet military personnel.

In considering a new military buildup with the Soviets, Cuban leaders must have been aware of the adverse reaction it would cause in some sectors of Latin American opinion and perhaps in the OAS itself. However, when confronted with similar decisions in the past, the regime has opted for closer involvement with the bloc, preferring the course which would offer tangible support for its security and enhance its reputation for dynamism and defiance. It is probable that Castro, despite his independent nature and pride in Cuba's "unique revolution" has had little trouble concluding that the increased Soviet assistance will serve to strengthen his position and control of the situation.

In dealing with the bloc for arms since 1960 the Cubans have probably displayed almost open-ended desires. While financial considerations were probably important in the earliest deals (financial details on bloc arms remain a mystery but under current circumstances almost certainly are credit or grant), it was probably Soviet, rather than Cuban, desires which determined the final composition of military assistance to Cuba. It is probable that in the latest round of negotiations, in late spring or early summer, the Cubans again expressed an open-ended desire for hardware and tried to push the Soviets into a firm commitment to come to their defense in all contingencies.

The regime's leaders are expected to say little about the Soviet military contribution in public pronouncements. This behavior will probably stem not so much from the fear of provoking the United States as from a desire to emphasize for the internal public the Cuban-ness of the military effort. Effusive praise for bloc economic aid by regime spokesmen has always contrasted sharply with near silence on bloc military aid, although the latter has in fact been more prompt and extensive.

Because of a sensitivity to acknowledging dependence on the Soviets for the actual territorial defense of Cuba, the regime has probably not desired the establishment of full-fledged Soviet military base on Cuban soil. In future, if the leaders believe their security again in imminent danger, they could come to welcome such a base, although they would still prefer a promise of thermonuclear retaliation. In the meantime, their attitude will not preclude acceptance of specialized Soviet units in such fields as intelligence and communications, nor will it limit their desire for growing numbers of Soviet technicians and advisors.

Possible Moves Against Guantanamo. It continues to be unlikely that the Castro regime, fearing US retaliation, will make any direct military move against the Guantanamo Base. However, they may well adopt a more belligerent posture toward the United States presence there. Since the beginning of July the Cuban press and other propaganda media have been giving new and extensive coverage to government allegations (over 150) of US air and sea incursions into Cuban territory and to alleged provocations by the US naval base at Guantanamo. The harassment of marine sentries at the base has increased in the same period.

There is a possibility that the regime intends this publicity as part of an overall campaign to impress world opinion with alleged US disregard for Cuban sovereignty. In addition to providing justification for the new Soviet aid and the further militarization of the island it may also be the principal point of attack in a combined Cuban-Bloc move aimed at Guantanamo at the next session of the UN General Assembly.

405. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy

Washington, September 1, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Top Secret; Sensitive. A covering note from Kaysen to Clifton reads: "The attached is a partial response to some questions the President asked Gilpatric, Shepard and me before leaving yesterday." Kaysen added a handwritten postscript indicating he was also attaching a copy of CINCLANT telegram 10152Z to JCS, September 1, which confirmed that CINCLANTFLT had issued instructions to conform with the new rules of engagement. (Ibid.)

Mr. President:

1. Attached is a memorandum on Rules of Engagement for Aircraft in the area of Cuba. It comes from the Joint Staff via Max Taylor's office.
2. The other review you asked for of all our reconnaissance operations in the neighborhood of Cuba is proceeding. Ros Gilpatric will see that we don't do anything this weekend that might lead to another incident. The whole schedule will be available to you for review on Tuesday./1/ The salient facts are these. All the aircraft we run on regular reconnaissance missions are unarmed. The nature of their equipment and the kind of aircraft

involved makes it useless to arm them. However, they are all carefully watched by radar. Fighters are on the alert at Key West and Guantanamo ready to be scrambled if there is any indication of hostile fighter action against the reconnaissance planes. All the flights are well without the range of anti-aircraft capability. One mission is possibly within the range of Cuban based missiles. This is now operating at the margin of its capability. If it is moved further out, the mission, an electronic intelligence one, might as well be abandoned. The next flights are scheduled on September 4th. They have both been carefully reviewed and neither of them presents any hazard.

/1/September 4.

3. In addition to these flights, which are directed by the Joint Chiefs, there are the routine patrol missions run by commands subordinate to CINCLANT. The flight that was shot at Thursday/2/ was one of those. From everything we have been able to find out the pilot behaved properly and according to his orders. A low level reconnaissance of shipping is a routine part of antisubmarine operations, and does not contravene accepted international law. We have been looking over Russian trawlers in this way for some time without any shooting incidents. We are now in process of examining the orders under which such flights operate in considering the extent to which they are useful and should be run in similar aircraft.

/2/August 30.

Carl

Attachment

Memorandum for President Kennedy

SUBJECT

Rules of Engagement

In General Taylor's absence and at Mr. Bundy's request, I am forwarding a paper on Rules of Engagement, particularly in the vicinity of Cuba, which has been furnished to us by the Joint Staff./3/

/3/Not found.

The paper, which is quite clear, can be summarized as follows:

- a. Reconnaissance or other flights near Cuba will be conducted in a non-provocative manner, which is interpreted as generally flying parallel to the coast. In the event that it is necessary to close in on a ship or aircraft to effect identification, this will be done carefully. Such ships or aircraft will not be harassed.
- b. In the event that one of our craft is harassed or attacked, unarmed U.S. craft will take evasive action. Armed craft may counter attack if they have actually been fired upon.
- c. Hot pursuit into Cuban air space is authorized, but it may not be prolonged. (This is clearly authorized by international law.) However, commanders will not organize a pursuing force.
- d. In the event of harassment by Cuban aircraft, U.S. armed craft will attempt to shoulder them off and shepherd them back into Cuban air space or waters.

These Rules of Engagement, which were extracted from an NSC paper,/4/ seem to be quite carefully balanced while still reserving the fundamental right of self-defense.

/4/The reference is unclear.

Julian J. Ewell

Colonel, USA

Executive Assistant to the

Military Representative of the President

[end of document]



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1961-1963
Volume X
Cuba, 1961-1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington

Cuba, 1961-1962

421. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Executive Director

Washington, September 10, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. No classification marking. Prepared on February 28, 1963.

SUBJECT

Genesis of White House Meeting on 10 September/1/

/1/The only other record of this September 10 meeting which has been found is a brief, one-paragraph summary prepared by General Carter on September 10. Carter noted that the meeting was generated by Secretary Rusk's concern over Cuban overflights and his desire to avoid any incidents. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

1. Mr. McGeorge Bundy called a meeting in his office at approximately 5:45 on 10 September to allow the Secretary of State to express his concern over the Agency's overflight program for Cuba. Attending were Secretary Rusk, the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, General Carter, General Lansdale, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Reber, and Mr. Cunningham.

2. Mr. Bundy opened the meeting by turning to the Secretary and saying, "Dean has some points he wants to raise because of the incidents" (the 30 August SAC-U2 overflight of Sakhalin Island, which the USSR protested on 4 September, and the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist China). Secretary Rusk, nodding toward General Carter, half joshingly said, "Pat, don't you ever let me up? How do you expect me to negotiate on Berlin with all these incidents?" The Attorney General's riposte: "What's the matter, Dean, no guts!"

3. Secretary Rusk quickly went into the risk standpoint of the Agency's proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5 September missions. He asserted that although we need this information we must minimize the risk element and avoid a third incident. He insisted that photographic coverage should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program was divided into four flights--two overflights and two peripheral--all geared for maximum safety.

4. General Carter cautioned that this program, while satisfactory for the moment, was not enough and added, "I want to put you people on notice that it remains our intention to fly right up over those SAMs to see what is there." To this, there was no response--positive or negative. With adjournment of the meeting implied and with the attendees starting for the doors, General Carter is reported to have said, "There they all go again and no decisions."

5. The above information was provided by Messrs. Reber and Cunningham and to some extent the Lehman report. Dr. Scoville, who was on the Coast, was not reached.

Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

422. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

OCI No. 3196/62

Washington, September 12, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret.

SUBJECT

Soviet Statement on Cuba

1. Moscow's statement of 11 September on Cuba/1/ appears to be designed to further a variety of Soviet objectives, foremost among them being to deter the US from active intervention in Cuba.

/1/In a statement issued on September 11 through the Soviet news agency TASS, the Soviet Union warned that any attack by the United States on Cuba or upon Soviet ships bound for Cuba would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The statement accused President Kennedy of preparing for "an act of aggression" against Cuba when he asked Congress on September 7 for stand-by authority to order 150,000 military reservists to active duty. The statement cited Soviet nuclear capability and warned that no aggressor could expect to be "free from punishment." The text of the Soviet statement was reprinted in *The New York Times*, September 12, p. 16.

2. The statement does not significantly alter the nature of the USSR's commitment to defend the Castro regime. The Soviets have once again used deliberately vague and ambiguous language to avoid a clear cut obligation of military support for Cuba in the event of an American invasion. They carefully refrain from spelling out their precise reactions to any attack on Cuba. In some respects, the statement is less specific than previous Soviet warnings, such as that contained in Khrushchev's letter of 18 April 1961 to President Kennedy./2/ As before, however, Moscow attempts to create the impression that Cuba is under the protection of the full range of Soviet nuclear and missile power. The statement is also calculated to enable the USSR to claim full credit for having protected Cuba if no US invasion or interference with Soviet shipping materializes.

/2/See Document 117.

3. The statement displays great sensitivity to the implications of the President's request for authorization to call up reserves. The Soviets probably felt that they had no choice but to respond with a strong statement of their support for Castro. Thus, while avoiding a definite commitment to defend Cuba, Moscow has further engaged its prestige in ensuring the survival of the Cuban Government.

4. In addition to its deterrent effect, the Soviet statement is intended to check growing alarm in the US and Latin America over Soviet intentions in Cuba. It stresses the defensive nature of Soviet military equipment being furnished the Cubans and implicitly denies any Soviet intention to establish military bases in Cuba. The statement, moreover, conveys an indirect assurance that Moscow will not confront the US with simultaneous challenges in

both Cuba and Berlin.

5. At the same time, however, Moscow strongly advances the argument that the USSR has a right to provide military assistance to Cuba, citing the existence of US military alliances and bases on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the presence of American fleets in the Mediterranean and the Taiwan Strait. The statement reflects the Soviet leaders' long-standing desire to "settle old accounts" with the US by establishing a military and political presence close to the US in an area which traditionally has been an American sphere of influence. Moscow's policy toward Cuba has been strongly influenced by this desire to establish the USSR's claim to great power equality with the US.

6. The statement can be characterized as brusque and strong regarding Cuba but moderate on Berlin. We anticipate that the Soviets will launch a strong attack on US policy at the UN, and we think that they recognize that these tactics will rule out any progress in the Berlin talks for the time being. The statement tacitly acknowledges this by noting that a "pause now has been reached" in these talks and by observing that it is "difficult" for the US to negotiate during an election campaign. It reiterates the usual line that the USSR favors the "earliest conclusion" of a German peace treaty and a Berlin settlement.

7. The Soviet leaders probably do not wish to break off diplomatic contacts altogether and envisage a resumption of high level talks on Berlin late this year or early next year. They may feel that, in the meantime, propaganda denunciations of US "aggressive actions" will enable them to further delay a separate peace treaty with East Germany without appearing to retreat. Such a delay would permit them to assess the impact on the West's negotiating position of this offensive as well as of probable maneuvers on their part to involve the UN in a Berlin settlement.

423. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, September 12, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62. Top Secret; NoFORN; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that six copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, and Bundy.

SUBJECT

Phase II, Operation Mongoose

At the Special Group meeting of 6 September, /1/ several activities listed in the 31 August projection of Phase II/2/ were noted for further clarification. Appropriate changes are reflected in the attached addendum to the 31 August projection.

/1/See Document 417.

/2/Document 399.

Request your approval for the Mongoose Operation team to proceed with Phase II as indicated.

Attachment

ADDENDUM, PHASE II

OPERATION MONGOOSE

As noted by the Special Group, clarifications are given below on numbered activities listed in the 31 August projection of Phase II:

10. (Broadcasts). USIA was asked to take a further hard look at the capabilities for radio and TV broadcasts to Cuba. USIA has done so, with the help of State and CIA. The study is attached./3/ USIA concludes that improvement would result by raising Key West station WKWF to 50 kw, that medium wave and TV operations must be tied to short term tactical operations, and that it does not favor the U.S. engaging in all-out electronic warfare with Cuba at this time.

/3/The attachment was an eight-page USIA memorandum from Wilson to Lansdale entitled "Broadcasting to Cuba." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62)

20. (Balloons). CIA plans to present details of this proposal, including content of material to be delivered by balloon, to the Special Group for the 20 September meeting. Suggest that consideration of this item be deferred until then.

21. Note change, as underscored:/4/ "Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA and USIA)."

/4/Printed here as italics.

25. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

28. (Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba, as targets of opportunity.) Note change of purpose: "To cripple harass Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime security forces."

32. (Sabotage agriculture.) Delete the suggestive details in the "Considerations." If and when specific proposals are developed, appropriate policy approval will be requested.

47. (Actions against Bloc personnel.) As a means of emphasizing such activity, as desired, delete item 47c and add a new item (numbered 57) to read:

Activity: Cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA)

Purpose: To make the mission of Bloc personnel in Cuba as difficult as possible.

Considerations: In addition to aggressive propaganda fostering Cuban action against Bloc personnel, exile groups will be encouraged to exploit their internal contacts to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel. Minor acts of sabotage by Cubans against Bloc equipment and facilities will be encouraged. Consideration will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel.

48. Note change: "Stimulate, support, and guide covertly the propaganda and political activities of all selected Cuban exile groups and individuals offering useful impact inside Cuba and upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and USIA support.)"

424. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, September 12, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Task 54/1/--Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups

/1/See Document 399.

Post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups must emerge from the dynamics of exile politics and internal developments in Cuba. We do not intend to impose concepts, select leaders or form political groups.

The broad limits of political concepts acceptable to the United States have already been provided. As to leaders, Dr. Miro Cardona has, as you know, considerable backing from the United States. Other leaders may emerge who, in our judgment, merit support as well. We do not intend to create them, however. To the extent we support them, we shall have contributed to their development. I believe we should compile a list of the more qualified anti-Castro Cubans both in exile and inside Cuba, together with their biographic data.

We are considering the advisability of a high level United States statement at the appropriate time regarding "not turning back the clock in Cuba" post-Castro.

We are giving more thought to the subject. The items listed in the "Considerations" of this task are highly pertinent.

425. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch)

Washington, September 13, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase II. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Activity 54, Phase II

Your 12 September memorandum/1/ regarding Activity 54 (post-Castro) suggests some further development of information and planning without loss of time.

/1/Document 424.

The idea of listing qualified anti-Castro Cubans and of compiling all available data for assessing their leadership potential is very much to the point. Request that you take the necessary steps to do this, in conjunction with CIA and the FBI, and keep me advised on a continuing basis.

The proposal concerning a high-level statement regarding a post-Castro era is one for priority attention, but should not be restricted to the single theme of "not turning back the clock." This is an actionable idea and follows our earlier discussions on developing a sound frame of reference for anti-regime activities by Cubans and their friends.

Incidentally, your statement that we develop leadership to the extent that we support them leads me to request that you prepare a paper for me indicating the "who and why" of such support.

426. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy

Washington, September 13, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret.

This memorandum is in response to your request for a report on the program to enlist Cubans in the US Armed Forces,/1/ which terminated last June, and on my reaction and the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the formation of a Cuban Brigade at the present time.

/1/See Document 418.

Under the previous program, only 142 Cuban nationals joined the US Armed Forces between 29 July 1961 and 31 July 1962, and of these, 30 have already been discharged for the convenience of the government. Of some 4,000 who expressed interest in the program, only 1,000 were registered by the Selective Service local boards as volunteers for military service. This attrition occurred either because the men were disqualified by reason of age and number of dependents, or because they lost interest when informed that they would not serve in Cuban units. Of the remaining group, more than two-thirds were disqualified at the Armed Forces Examining Station. The largest number of disqualifications (half of the total) was based on "moral and security" grounds. Substantially all of these disqualifications occurred when the volunteers were given lie detector tests (required procedure in the absence of the usual background investigation data) and admitted histories of sexual deviation. Only 135 failed to qualify on medical grounds. Additional drop-outs along the way, particularly in the English language training phase of the program, reduced the number of inductees to 142.

At the direction of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a plan/2/ for a new Cuban volunteer program which should overcome some, if not all, of the difficulties that arose in the previous program. We are proposing to train Cuban nationals in all-Cuban units, the training to be conducted in Spanish. Volunteers would not be excluded as they were in the previous program, by reason of number of dependents or the inability to speak and understand English. Voluntary induction would be for a minimum of two years, as required by present law. After completion of 20 weeks of basic and advanced individual training, the volunteer may be discharged, transferred to reserve status, or retained on active duty and integrated into a regular military unit. Those who meet requisite standards would be permitted to enter Special Forces training, within available quotas.

/2/JCS memorandum JCSM-713-62 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, September 12, 1962. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 432.18 (31 Jan 1962))

Individuals who are placed on reserve status would be organized into separate reserve units, where residence permits. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the possibility of organizing such reserve units with a brigade or similar organization as suggested. It is their opinion that an organization of this nature may, at this time, be premature; however, should experience indicate that there are sufficient volunteers and qualified officer and non-commissioned officer personnel from among the Cuban refugees to support such an organization, further consideration may well be warranted.

The over-all plan has been discussed in some detail within the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) and with Dr. Miro-Cardona. I understand Dr. Cardona feels that it would be adequate to stimulate recruiting of qualified Cuban refugees. Because of the experience gained from last year's program, I am still somewhat skeptical as to the number of Cubans who will volunteer and qualify. The prospective establishment of all-Cuban reserve units should assist in attracting additional volunteers for the program. Further, it could also provide means of long-term control over personnel who have received at least 20 weeks of active duty training.

On the other hand, I do not believe that the possible additional recruiting value of an active duty Cuban brigade would offset the numerous additional problems of a political and administrative nature that such an organization might produce.

We expect to put the plan into operation in the very near future, after we have reached agreement with the Department of State on the timing and nature of a public announcement.

As indicated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted in the preparation of this reply.

Robert S. McNamara/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

427. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch)

Washington, September 13, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase II. Top Secret. Also sent to Harvey, Wilson, and James Symington.

SUBJECT

Contingency Facilities

As noted in our meeting Tuesday, 11 September, with Mr. McGeorge Bundy and General Lemnitzer on contingency planning, each of you was to inform me of what facilities you will require in the Joint Staff area to permit your organization to be closely linked in with U.S. operations in case of a contingency. Let me know by 17 September.

Your information on this should include the number of persons you would expect to position in the Joint Staff area, either full or part time, your need for secure communications, and your need for secure filing space.

While this will help to ready the physical accommodations in proximity to the Joint War Room, it is noted further that your own readiness should include planning for contingency operations within your own organization, so that they can be undertaken without loss of time or security. Let me know also by 17 September the status of such internal planning./1/

/1/On September 17 Hurwitch responded in a memorandum to Lansdale that present planning called for the continuous presence, if required, of one Department of State officer in the Joint Staff area, with secure communications to the area of the Operations Center in the Department of State, which had been "earmarked for work on Mongoose when the need arises." (Ibid.)

To assure necessary security clearances of personnel for this highly sensitive area, it is desired that you indicate by name officials to undertake this assignment.

428. Current Intelligence Memorandum

SC-09347/62

Washington, September 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

Analysis of the Suspect Missile Site at Banes, Cuba

1. A review of all available evidence leads us to conclude it is highly likely that the suspect missile site near Banes, Cuba is a facility for launching cruise missiles against ship targets at fairly close ranges.
 2. The site, which is located about 300 feet above sea level and 3.5 nm from the sea is oriented in a general easterly (seaward) direction. It consists of two 30 foot rail launchers in revetments, each connected by cable to a Soviet Whiff tracking radar. Ground support equipment consists of eight canvas-covered, missile-type trailers, two probable generators and electronic vans, and other general purpose vehicles. The area is being fenced, and the personnel are housed in tents. The site configuration and the equipment observed are compatible with a cruise missile system and not compatible with surface-to-air or ballistic systems.
 3. Although our knowledge of Soviet cruise missiles is incomplete, we know of three systems which could fit those facilities observed at Banes. We have eliminated other operational Soviet cruise missile systems, with ranges from 1000 to 4000 nm, because their missiles probably would be too large for the Banes facility. A 600 nm cruise missile has had a test range firing in the USSR, but it too would be too large for the Banes site.
 4. The three remaining possibilities are:
 - a. SS-N-1--a destroyer-launched cruise anti-ship homing missile launched from 30 foot inclined rails. With destroyer radar, the effective system range is 20 to 30 nm. With the assistance of an air controller, the system range can be extended to 130 nm. This system could be installed at a shore site.
 - b. SS-N-2--a Komar class patrol craft-launched cruise anti-ship homing missile, launched from inclined rails 25 to 30 feet long. With the Komar radar, the effective system range is 10 to 15 nm. This system could also be installed at a shore site. Eight Komars have been transferred to Cuba.
 - c. SS-C-1--the "missile-in-a-bottle", first shown in the 1961 Moscow 7 November parade. This missile is launched from an inclined ramp within a tube mounted on a large four axle truck. We know nothing of its guidance system. The missile probably has a range of about 150 nm, but possibly it could be as much as 300 nm. This system could be installed at a fixed site.
 5. Although none of the known Soviet cruise missile systems precisely fit the facility at Banes, we believe it is more likely that the site is for a short range 25-30 nm missile system. The Whiff radar seen at the site has not been noted with known cruise missile systems but could be used for target acquisition in this installation. If the missile has an inertial guidance system and a means of target acquisition, the range of the missile at the Banes site could be extended to a range of about 130 nm.
 6. There are several items of circumstantial evidence which tend to support the conclusion that the Banes site is for relatively short range coastal defense cruise missiles. The fact that the site is near the coast suggests that the range of its missile is short; otherwise it could be located inland in a less vulnerable area. It is located where short-range missiles could defend against seaborne assault on deep water ports in Nipe Bay south of Banes./1/ Thus far, the Soviets apparently have not given Cuba any weapons which provide them a long range striking capability, suggesting that their policy is to provide for Cuba's defense only. Because neither the SS-N-1 nor the SS-C-1 has sufficient range to hit any target in the United States, such missiles would fit this policy pattern.
- /1/Cuba's two nickel plants are in this general area. Their output is being sent to the Soviet Bloc and is equivalent

to 20 percent of Soviet production. The more important of these two plants is on the bay protected by the Banes site. [Footnote in the source text.]

7. If the analysis that the Banes missile site is a coastal defense installation is correct, it would follow that similar facilities may be set up at a number of other locations favorable for protecting beaches against amphibious attack.

8. We doubt that Cubans have been given sufficient training in the use of such missiles to allow them to have operational control over the sites. It seems likely that Soviet technical training personnel would be needed for some time to come and would be available for operating the installation in time of crisis.

429. Editorial Note

At a press conference at the Department of State on September 13, 1962, President Kennedy made a statement concerning the situation in Cuba. He noted that there had been a good deal of speculation, prompted by statements made in Moscow and Havana, concerning the possibility of an imminent invasion of Cuba by United States forces. The President dismissed the speculation as a "frantic effort" by Castro to bolster a troubled regime. Military action by the United States against Cuba would be triggered, Kennedy stated, only if Cuba posed a threat to any other nation in the hemisphere, or if Cuba became an offensive military base for the Soviet Union. The President noted that, despite the increasing flow of Soviet arms and military personnel to Cuba, conditions had not reached the point that would justify military action against Cuba. He made it clear, however, that the United States would not hesitate to act if threatening conditions developed:

"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

He added, with respect to the military build-up occurring in Cuba:

"If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962*, pages 674-675)

430. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, September 14, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 60, September 27, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only.
Prepared by Parrott.

SUBJECT

Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 14 Sept. 1962

PRESENT

Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, General Carter

The Attorney General was present for Item 1.

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 through 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 4 and 5.

1. Reconnaissance, Cuba

Colonel Steakley outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense does not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area are available. Further consideration was thus deferred until next week's meeting.

General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations the nature of which is not clear at present.

Colonel Steakley distributed charts for the monthly book,^{/1/} on supplementary ELINT coverage of Cuba, which has begun today. The Group had no objection to these missions.

^{/1/}Not found.

It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military flights in the Cuban area.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott^{/2/}

^{/2/}Printed from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

431. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, September 14, 1962.

//Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Elder.

MONGOOSE MEETING OF 14 SEPTEMBER 1962

The Acting DCI informed the meeting of our firmer identification of the site at Banes.^{/1/}

^{/1/}According to another record of the meeting, prepared by Carter, the missile site at Banes had been tentatively, rather than conclusively, identified as a cruise missile site. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

The 12 September addendum to the Phase Two Mongoose Operation^{/2/} was discussed and the entire Phase Two was approved in principle as a platform from which to proceed. Activities which may be especially sensitive are to be brought before the Group, and this body wishes to be kept generally advised on progress.

^{/2/}See Document 423.

General Lansdale indicated that papers on a "blockade" are being generated outside Mongoose channels. (Elder talked to George Carroll on Saturday who identified such papers as part of the DOD contingency planning exercise and indicated that there is very little interest or steam in them.)

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries. (Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.)

There was some discussion of a State-JCS meeting with McGeorge Bundy on contingency plans for Cuba.

Bruce Cheever attended for the Agency. He reports that no decisions were made, no new ideas were brought up, and nothing useful emerged from the meeting.

It was generally agreed that we should make an effort to get Pan American to continue some flights to Cuba. We are not to accept PAA prices, but to continue negotiations, try to get a lower figure, and to make no commitments at this time. A status report is to be furnished to the Special Group (Augmented) on this subject.

The Attorney General expressed concern that activities by certain Cuban exiles are reaching the point where the Government may be forced to take action against them rather than to simply state that "we are investigating." The Agency is requested to see what it can do to help reduce the noise level of these activities.

Walter Elder/3/

/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

432. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Washington, September 19, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Policy--1959, 1961, 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch.

SUBJECT

Policy Recommendation with respect to Cuba

The coming 18 months are likely to prove the most gruelling that the Cuban people will have to endure. The nadir of the Cuban economy will probably be reached during this period. The western equipped sectors of the economy will continue to deteriorate for lack of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts and equipment, while the Soviet capital equipment will not have begun to produce. Managerial and administrative personnel trained in the complexity of running a state controlled economy will continue to be lacking. At the same time, the Castro regime, under heavy Soviet pressure and with Soviet assistance, will probably undertake harsh measures to keep the economy from floundering. Experience in other Communist countries would indicate that there is approaching one of the most dangerous periods (from the Communist standpoint) in the process of transition toward a complete "socialist" state. This process will probably be accompanied by severe regimentation and perhaps terror.

We can, therefore, reasonably look for the highest point of Cuban popular dissatisfaction toward the Castro regime during this period. Three factors favor the Castro regime's ability to survive this critical period: (1) the charisma of Fidel Castro; (2) the State security apparatus supported by Soviet involvement; (3) the absence of organized resistance with a political base in Cuba confident of United States support during the Castro regime and afterward. The presence of the third of these factors together with the absence of the first, could place in doubt the survival of Cuban-Marxist-Leninist government.

While we have been moderately successful in infiltrating some Cubans, we have been singularly unsuccessful in creating a political base of internal opposition. Our failure stems primarily from our practice of "controlling" or "managing" the Cuban exiles as individuals. We have not taken advantage of them as groups--as political entities with assets in Cuba. In effect, we have sought to make this a "U.S. show" using Cubans. To this extent, we are probably repeating past mistakes.

To create an opposition with a political base in Cuba, we should adopt a policy of giving assistance to Cuban groups without establishing rigid rules of planning or controlling. Our criteria for assistance (which should consist primarily of sabotage materiel, arms, radio equipment and transport) should be:

1. that the groups have assets in Cuba (cf., NIE August 1, 1962)./1/

/1/Document 363.

2. that the groups will undertake only those actions against the Castro regime which can be reasonably believed to have been accomplished from inside Cuba.

3. that the groups agree to maintain a high degree of security.

This program would be supplemental to rather than a replacement for existing programs using refugees. The United States role would be primarily that of purveyor of materiel, financial assistance and technical know-how. Under this policy, we should be prepared for a number of failures and probably a fair amount of publicity. On the other hand, the student or other groups will probably continue to embarrass the U.S. with their improvised schemes for attracting attention to the Cuban cause. We would hope, although we cannot be certain, that by providing exile groups that have assets inside Cuba the wherewithal for an internal struggle against Cuba, political opposition would be created and nurtured and that a minimum of external attacks on Cuba by refugees would recur.

Recommendation/2/

That you advance the foregoing view for policy approval at the next Special Group meeting. (We would prefer to by-pass the Lansdale group this time for the sake of speed.)

/2/No indication of Johnson's approval appears on the source text.

433. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 85-3-62

Washington, September 19, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on September 19, except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

The Problem

To assess the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of additional military capabilities there.

Conclusions

A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. (Paras. 1-11)

B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September/1/ they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home, it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18-21)

/1/See Document 422.

C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more "offensive" character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22-28)

D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations. (Paras. 29-33)

E. The Latin American reaction will be the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an "offensive" base in Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras. 34-37)

Discussion

I. Considerations Underlying Soviet Policy in Cuba

1. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or

another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.

2. The Soviets consider that the Cuban Revolution and their association with it have severely damaged the prestige of the US and greatly enhanced that of the USSR, throughout the world. They see in the case of Cuba an effective demonstration that, anywhere in the world, a "colonial" people can throw off the "imperialist yoke" and, with the indispensable aid and protection of the USSR, successfully maintain its independence against "imperialist" counteraction. They especially value the effect of this demonstration in Latin America and also value Cuba as an advanced base for the support of radical revolutionary elements in Latin America.

3. Although initially the Soviets were guarded in their relations with the Castro regime, in the past year both they and Castro have undertaken moves which make their ties much closer. Thus Moscow's commitment to the survival and success of the Cuban Revolution is deepening. The Soviets have apparently concluded that they must invest more heavily to protect their stake in Cuba.

4. Because of heightening Soviet concern over the state of the Cuban economy, Moscow last spring agreed substantially to expand and liberalize its economic assistance program to Cuba. Indeed, Soviet economic aid to Cuba now involves an extensive program planned to sustain and gradually to develop the economy. The Soviets have thus clearly demonstrated their belief that Cuba, with Soviet support, can achieve sufficient progress to serve as a stimulus for revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America.

5. During roughly the same period (last spring), the Soviets also apparently concluded that the Castro regime would have to be provided with accelerated military aid. Castro almost certainly had long demanded a much more substantial Soviet program. More important, however, we believe the decision reflected Soviet concern that its expanding role in Cuba might be terminated by a US move to overthrow the Castro regime. The rapid military buildup in Cuba was thus intended in large part to impress the US with the increased costs and risks of any attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime by force.

6. In line with this objective, the Soviet statement of 11 September was in part designed to dissuade the US from making any decision to intervene in Cuba. By stressing the "defensive" nature of the Cuban buildup, it sought to convince the US (and the world at large) that the military buildup in Cuba does not constitute a threat. At the same time, however, by raising the spectre of general war, it stressed the gravity of the risks involved in US intervention. The statement as a whole is probably a substitute for the guarantees which the Castro regime almost certainly has demanded. While it carefully avoids an explicit commitment to defend Cuba in the event of US attack, it does further engage Soviet prestige to ensuring the survival of the Castro regime.

7. The absence of such an explicit commitment reflects the Soviets' basic disinclination to hazard their own safety for the sake of Cuba. They are willing, indeed anxious, to deflate US prestige and power in Latin American opinion and to provide the Cubans with the economic instruments of survival and progress, but they remain wary of provoking the US--or of allowing Castro to provoke the US--by going too far and too fast with a military buildup. In their 11 September statement they sought to undercut speculation about Soviet missile bases in Cuba for possible use against the US by, inter alia, stressing the defensive nature of armaments supplied Cuba and by denying any military need for such bases in view of their capability to attack the US from their own territory.

8. While Soviet policies in Cuba may have initially been devised almost entirely in terms of Cuba and Latin America, Moscow now also views the situation in terms of the broader East-West struggle. They relish the demonstration that Soviet power can be extended to an area adjacent to the US, and are using the strong US reaction to justify their own resentment of the "offensive" US bases on the Soviet periphery. Further, in their 11 September statement, the Soviets implied that US action against Cuba would be countered by Bloc moves elsewhere in the world and for the first time publicly linked the Berlin and Cuban crises. The Soviets are also

aware that a drastic heightening of tension over Cuba is an important factor in their general relations with the US and has an impact on various other issues. Thus developments in the Cuban situation probably influenced the recent Soviet decision to let the Berlin situation simmer, rather than boil, for the time being.

9. The current Soviet buildup marks a dramatic change of pace in Soviet operations, probably occasioned by a reappraisal of policies and increased determination to insure the survival of the Castro regime. However, we believe that the military buildup which began in July does not reflect a radically new Soviet policy toward Cuba, either in terms of military commitments or of the role of Cuba in overall Soviet strategy. Without changing the essentially defensive character of the military buildup in Cuba and without making an open pledge to protect Cuba under all circumstances, the Soviets have enhanced Cuban military capabilities, repeated in stronger terms their warnings to the US, and tied the Cuban situation to the general question of the East-West confrontation.

10. The Soviets themselves are probably still uncertain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed, they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they proceed. At the same time they are obliged to tailor their policy to minimize risks of confrontation with the US, avoid friction with Castro, and maintain the best possible propaganda stance in the eyes of Latin America and the world in general.

11. The analysis of Soviet policy toward Cuba given here is based on an overall evaluation of Soviet interests and intentions and on evidence of Soviet actions in and with respect to Cuba to date. While it is our judgment that, even in the light of recent developments, Soviet policy remains fundamentally unaltered, we cannot exclude the possibility that Moscow is at least considering a change in this policy. Consequently, in the sections which follow, we examine in some detail not only the Soviet military buildup in Cuba to date and possible developments in that buildup which might follow, but also the nature and implications of military assistance which the Soviets could provide Cuba in the event of a major change of policy.

II. The Buildup To Date

12. In the first phase of the provision of military supplies, from 1960 to early 1962, the Soviets concentrated on substantial amounts of conventional combat weapons for the ground forces. A number of Bloc technicians were supplied and a training program for Cuban military personnel was inaugurated. The buildup proceeded at a deliberate pace and eventually, after some training of Cuban pilots, about 60 jet fighter aircraft were supplied to Cuba. In addition, some submarine-chasers and motor torpedo boats were delivered. This phase was largely completed by February 1962 with the result that Cuban forces were much better prepared to handle incursions upon their territory.

13. In July the Soviets began a rapid effort to strengthen Cuban defenses against air attack and major seaborne invasion. Between mid-July and early September some 70 ships have delivered various types of military supplies and construction equipment, and more ships are en route. These new shipments have consisted in part of further deliveries of types of weapons already available to Cuban forces. More tanks, self-propelled guns and other ground force equipment have been supplied. But the bulk of the material delivered is related to the establishment of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which will form the basis for a new air defense system.

14. Thus far, 12 SA-2 SAM sites have been installed in the western half of the island. It is likely that similar coverage will be provided in the eastern half. Some missile sites could now be operational. The Soviets are also providing a number of more advanced jet interceptors; about a dozen MIG-21's may have been delivered. The standard armament for this type of aircraft includes two infrared homing air-to-air missiles (AAMs). It is likely that such missiles have accompanied the MIG-21's to Cuba.

15. The current buildup also reflects an effort to improve Cuba's coastal defenses. For this purpose, the Soviets have provided the "Komar" class guided-missile patrol boats which carry two short-range (10-15 n.m.) cruise-type missiles, primarily for use against shipping. This boat has a range of about 650 n.m., but is designed primarily for use in coastal waters. Eight "Komar" class boats have already been delivered and other similar craft

may be on the way. In addition, a land-based cruise-type missile installation has been observed near Banes. [2 lines of source text not declassified] its range is likely to be limited to 20-35 n.m. by its radar horizon. This range might be extended by installing the radar on a height, or by employing ships or aircraft for forward observation. We believe that this will prove to be a coast defense installation and that others of this type will be deployed, but we cannot estimate at present the ultimate size of this program.

16. Equally important, particularly in terms of overall Soviet involvement, is the substantial increase in the number of Soviet military specialists in Cuba, from about 350 early this year to the current level of about 4,000. We anticipate that a large proportion of this group will remain in Cuba for some time. Six months to a year would be required before the SA-2 and other sites could be operated solely by Cuban personnel.

17. Because of the extent and rapidity of current deliveries and limitations in our intelligence coverage, we cannot yet identify all of the new equipment which has been introduced. Recent shipments include a great deal of electronic gear, with many vans, crates, and large boxes which could contain various types of this equipment. There is tenuous evidence of the presence of air defense ECM equipment. Although we have no specific evidence of it, we cannot exclude the possibility that COMINT and ELINT equipment is also now present in Cuba.

Implications of the Current Buildup

18. In terms of their military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving capabilities in Cuba for air and coastal defense and defensive surface naval operations. When operational, the SAMs will assure that interception can be attempted under any weather condition, at altitudes up to 60,000 feet, with more limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. The system is probably not effective below about 3,000 feet. The MIG-21 has generally better performance characteristics than the earlier MIG models, and will considerably augment defenses against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes./2/

/2/[Footnote in the source text (5 lines) not declassified]

19. The large number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba will provide the technical assistance and training necessary to bring the newer weapons to operational readiness in the near future. If necessary, Soviet personnel could be employed to operate them before Cuban personnel are fully prepared to do so. It is likely that training and experience have already raised the proficiency of Cuban Air Force personnel somewhat above the low level noted in NIE 85-2-62,/3/ "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 1 August 1962 (paragraph 24). Soviet guidance and training will continue to raise the combat effectiveness of all branches of the Cuban military establishment.

/3/Document 363.

20. Some of the new weapons in Cuba could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. MIG fighters can be equipped for ground attack operations and antiship missiles can be employed against well-defined land targets. Indirectly, the presence of SAMs could release some fighter aircraft for ground attack missions. Nevertheless, the pattern of Soviet military aid to date appears clearly designed to strengthen the defenses of the island, thereby protecting the Communist political beachhead in the Western Hemisphere and raising the price the US would have to pay to eliminate it by military action. The overall composition of the Cuban military establishment remains essentially defensive in character; it has not yet been provided with a significant strike capability. Moreover, the Cuban armed forces still lack the air and sealift necessary for military operations on any significant scale in neighboring territories.

21. Limited as the offensive capabilities of the forces in Cuba are, an increased sense of security instilled by Soviet public statements and by the presence of new weapons may encourage the Cuban regime to engage in small scale filibustering expeditions. It might also encourage them to make new demands on the US regarding the naval base at Guantanamo and to engage in a program of harassment of the base.

III. Possibilities for Expansion of the Buildup

22. The Soviets could expand the present buildup to include additional types of weapons. However, they are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue. Their recent statement indicates that they believe a strong political case can be sustained for supplying "defensive" weapons in Cuba. Conversely they seem to realize that to provide certain other types of weapons to Cuba would pose a challenge to which the US might forcefully respond.

23. Among the weapons which the Soviets might believe they could add to the Cuban arsenal without creating the appearance of an open defiance of US warnings on offensive weapons, are a low altitude SAM defense system and jet interceptors more advanced than the MIG-21's. However, both of these are believed to be in short supply within the USSR itself, where they are in the early stages of deployment. Moreover, the military potential of these weapons can be fully realized only in conjunction with the USSR's closely integrated system of air defense warning, communications, and control.

24. Apart from such examples, however, the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons is ambiguous. The Soviets might consider supplying Beagle (IL-28) light bombers, for example, which they have already provided to several non-Bloc states. These aircraft can be represented by the Soviets as "defensive" weapons, particularly if present only in small numbers. On the other hand, the IL-28 could reach targets in the southeastern part of the US and could carry nuclear weapons. If these aircraft appeared in Cuba, the US would have to decide whether or not they were to be taken as representing a serious "offensive" capability. On the whole we believe the Soviets might calculate that a modest number of IL-28's could be supplied to Cuba without serious risk of US counteraction.

25. Badger (TU-16) medium bombers might also be supplied to Cuba, ostensibly for such "defensive" uses as armed reconnaissance against invasion shipping, but the offensive capabilities of these aircraft are considerably more obvious than in the case of IL-28's. We believe the Soviets would not supply them to Cuba.

26. It is possible that the Soviets would consider placing other short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) in Cuba. The SS-1, a ballistic missile with a range of 150 n.m., would not threaten US territory other than Key West, but the 350 n.m. range of the SS-2 ballistic missile would extend to Cape Canaveral. The Soviets also have a 350 n.m. cruise-type missile available. These weapons could employ conventional or nuclear warheads. It is possible that the Soviets would believe that some SS-2's would be tolerated by the US. On the other hand, any real military usefulness they might have to the Cuban defense establishment would be marginal, and the Soviets could not exclude that the US would react very strongly to their presence.

27. Another possibility is the provision of submarines and destroyers. We believe this may eventually be done. Some conventional submarines have already been supplied to non-Bloc countries, but the Soviets certainly realize that such action in Cuba could be interpreted by the US as violating their stated intention of limiting supplies to defensive purposes. However, the level of Soviet naval supply to Cuba will probably remain relatively high in coming months. Soviet merchant ships and trawlers will continue their frequent calls. The Soviets could test the US reaction to visits by Soviet naval ships to Cuban ports. Depending on US reactions over a period of time, the Soviets might then consider whether to turn over some destroyers and submarines to Cuba.

28. Thus the Soviets may experiment with a number of further steps in the military buildup. They may feel that some of these are necessary, if only to demonstrate their continuing support to Castro and refusal to be deterred by the US. The SA-2 defense system will provide a new degree of protection and secrecy for masking additional supplies. But the Soviets would be proceeding over uncertain ground and could not be sure of US knowledge of or reaction to each new move, or that the gains of each further step would be commensurate with the risks. They would also have to consider that Bloc personnel would be required to operate many of the additional weapons. Thus a decision to provide such weapons as bombers, submarines, or additional types of short-range missiles

depends greatly on whether the Soviets estimate that these weapons can be introduced without precipitating a US intervention. They will realize that the nature of the US reaction will depend not only on types and numbers of weapons, but also on the offensive capability of the total military establishment in Cuba.

Use of Cuba as a Soviet Strategic Missile Base

29. The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which could be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and this would have important policy implications in other areas. However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy.

30. Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles. Cuban-based MRBMs with a range of 1,100 n.m. could reach targets as far north as Philadelphia and Cleveland and as far west as Oklahoma City; the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could reach all US targets except some points in the Pacific Northwest. All of these targets can now be covered by ICBMs launched from the USSR. However, MRBMs or IRBMs deployed in Cuba would permit nuclear blows at an increased number of targets and would increase the total weight of the attack which could be delivered against the US in the event of general war.

31. The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory. Serious problems of command and control would arise. There would also have to be a conspicuously larger number of Soviet personnel in Cuba, which, at least initially, would be a political liability in Latin America. The Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by stationing Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it. However, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction.

32. A Soviet submarine base in Cuba could be of considerable military value to the USSR. Submarines operating from a Cuban base could be maintained on station off the US coast for much longer periods than can now be sustained in operations from Northern Fleet bases. Such a forward base would permit Soviet missile and torpedo attack submarines, both conventional and nuclear-powered, more readily to conduct routine patrols off the US coast. It is possible that the Soviets might seek to establish such a base in connection with the provision of some submarines to the Cubans. They might reason that even when Soviet use became apparent, the US, with naval bases at Holy Loch and Guantanamo, would be in a poor position to protest. In terms of both feasibility and utility, the establishment of a Soviet submarine base appears more likely than the deployment of Soviet nuclear-armed missile forces to Cuban soil. Even so, the Soviets would probably calculate the risk of US intervention as too great for such an undertaking at the present time.

33. Although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action which will build a mass following for Communist or Communist-allied leaders who would then be capable of replacing existing governments.

IV. Latin American Reaction and Its Implications

34. Much of the Latin American public will react to the military buildup in Cuba and to evidences of Soviet intent to protect Castro without taking account of the particular weapons involved or of their capabilities and without

reading between the lines of Soviet statements. Most of these Latin Americans will consider this intrusion of an extra-continental power to be a bad thing in itself, but at the same time will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. Any disposition on the part of the Latin American governments to do something about it would depend greatly upon the lead given by the US, and this disposition would tend to fade if the US failed to come up with feasible courses of action. Some Latin Americans, of course, will be quick to note that the Soviets had intruded into the Hemisphere and will infer that the US had failed to rebuff this intrusion because it lacked the power or the will to do so.

35. In the Caribbean states there will be a much more pronounced tendency than elsewhere to interpret the military buildup in Cuba as a direct threat. They are not likely to expect that missiles will be fired at them, but that Soviet weapons and Soviet support will encourage Castro to intervene in their countries on behalf of radical revolutionists.

36. Among Latin American governments there are wide differences of opinion as to the role they as individual governments and as members of the OAS should play in the current situation. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the two-thirds majority in the OAS required for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the Soviets were establishing an offensive base in Cuba most Latin American governments would expect the US to intervene and eliminate it, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement.

37. In the longer run, if the Castro regime remains securely in power and the Cuban economy is developed substantially with Soviet help, the cohesion of the inter-American system will probably weaken further. Several countries would probably assume an "independent" position like that of Brazil. They would thereby position themselves for a closer accommodation with the Soviet Bloc, if and when desired, and would attempt to obtain assistance from both sides, in the manner of India and Indonesia.

434. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara

Washington, September 21, 1962.

//Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, 22 Oct-27 Oct 1962. Top Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates McNamara saw the memorandum.

At the meeting with you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 14 September,/1/ there seemed to be lack of unanimity between General LeMay and Admiral Anderson as to losses our aircraft would incur in attacking an SA2 missile site.

The President held an off-the-record meeting with the Joint Chiefs and McGeorge Bundy at 11:40 a.m. on September 14. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

Would it be useful to build a model of such a site for exercises to be observed by an objective and disinterested party? Judgement as to losses to be incurred should include those that would result from the addition of anti-aircraft guns to protect the site. If you believe such a program would be useful, would you provide me with an estimate as to its cost.

Would you assure that contingency plans with relation to Cuba are kept up-to-date, taking into account the additions to their armaments resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians.

John Kennedy

435. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet

Norfolk, September 21, 1962, 4:36 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 9/9/62-9/21/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to COMJTF 122, COMANTDEFCON, and CINCSSTRIKE. Repeated for information to JCS, CNO, AJCC Ft. Richie, COM 19th AF, COMCARIBSEAFRON, and ALTCOMLANT.

212136Z. Planning Directive CINCLANT No. 118-62./1/

/1/None of the references in this telegram has been found. For brief summaries of CINCLANT Operations Plans 314-61, 316-61, and 312-62, see Document 439.

A. COMJTF 122 OPLAN 314-62

B. COMJTF 122 OPLAN 316-61

C. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61

D. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61

1. Situation:

A. General: A blockade of Cuba could bring Cuban economy to standstill in relatively short time. Effect on Cuban economy would be particularly disastrous with respect to POL. CINCLANT forces will be prepared to conduct a naval and air blockade of Cuba in accordance with provisions of this planning directive and other guidance received by higher authority. When this plan is executed, steps must be taken to ensure rapid execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312-61, or 312-62. All commands should be alert to execute plans ordered in event action escalates to involve Soviet bloc military forces.

B. Friendly forces: Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command:

(1) Provides USSTRICOM forces as directed by JCS.

(2) Designates, or assures designation of, commander to serve as JTF 122 Air Force Task Force Commander for planning and execution of this directive.

(3) Provides, or arranges for provision of, Air Force personnel to augment the staff of JTF 122 upon execution of this directive.

2. Mission: CINCLANT will, when directed, conduct a naval and air blockade of Cuba in order to bring about a collapse of the Communist economy of Cuba.

3. Execution and operations: If blockade of Cuba is declared, operations will be conducted as presently provided for in Annexes I to references A and B.

A. Joint Task Force, JTF 122

(1) When directed, assume operational control of assigned forces, establish and conduct a naval and air blockade of Cuba. Provide for defense of blockading forces from enemy air, surface, and subsurface forces.

B. CINCLANTFLT

(1) Provide a Commander Naval Task Force and naval forces with their logistic support, as directed, to COMJTF 122.

C. COMANTDEFCON

(1) Direct defense of the naval base at GTMO, when blockade is declared.

Coordinating instructions: This directive is effective for planning upon receipt. It will be effective for operations when directed. Annexes I to references A and B are considered to be sufficient to support this directive. Additional plans are not required from subordinates.

4. Logistics: In accordance with CINCLANT OPORDER 1-61 and appropriate portions of Annexes J to references C and D.

5. Command and signal: Command relations are in accordance with appropriate portions of Annexes C of references C and D. Communications in accordance Annex K of reference C.

436. Editorial Note

According to a chronology prepared on February 18, 1963, by the Defense Intelligence Agency for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor, a report of the arrival of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba was received on September 21, 1962. The report involved a first-hand sighting on September 12 of a convoy of 20 objects 65 to 70 feet long which resembled large missiles. The objects were carried on long trailers, and the convoy turned into an airport on the southwest edge of Havana. The report was subsequently accepted as the first definite report of MRBMs in Cuba. In view of the fact that many other ostensibly tangible reports of a similar nature had been received and pursued with negative results, however, the September 21 report was assessed by intelligence analysts on September 22 as "potentially significant," and was earmarked for special analytical attention.

The chronology indicates that during the period September 23-September 28, "available photography was checked, reports collated with previous and incoming information, new information was plotted on maps, reports received were analyzed and discussed with other analysts and the pattern formed by confirmed SA-2 sites was examined. This led to the development of a hypothesis that MRBM sites were under preparation in Pinar del Rio province."

On September 28 the Vice Director of the Joint Staff was advised of the emerging hypothesis concerning the Soviet MRBMs. He made arrangements to include the hypothesis and supporting data in a projected briefing on Cuba during the scheduled meeting between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Monday, October 1. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 16, Cuba, Congressional Testimony, Misc. Back-up)

437. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)

Washington, September 24, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. No classification marking.

SUBJECT

Cuban Documents

On reflection, I began to think less well of Memorandum #2 (Caribbean Security Arrangements).^{1/} This memorandum calls for (1) the establishment of a system of air-sea surveillance around Cuba; (2) control of travel, funds and propaganda to and from Cuba; and (3) issuance of a joint declaration by governments of the Caribbean area to take all necessary measures to prevent both Cuban aggression and the development of a military capability to endanger Caribbean security.

^{1/}There is no indication which series of memoranda Schlesinger is referring to. The memorandum on Caribbean Security Arrangements was apparently an advance copy of the memorandum sent to the White House on September 25, under cover of a note from Executive Secretary Brubeck. See Document 438.

The first obvious point is that these measures are addressed to the threat of aggressive action by Castro in the Caribbean. Since this is a remote threat, unless the Cubans take leave of their senses, and since Castro has engaged in very little aggressive action since 1960, the measures proposed (with an exception noted below) are essentially symbolic. The relevant question then is the effects of this symbolism.

Within the United States, the effect will no doubt be excellent. In Latin America it will be mixed--very favorable in Central America (except for Mexico) and northern South America; less favorable perhaps elsewhere. In Europe it will confirm the impression that we are far too excited about Cuba; the predominant view there, as you know, is what are we so scared about and why don't we learn to live with Castro as Khrushchev has learned to live with American bases in Turkey. The Soviet Union will doubtless understand that the measures are symbolic and will be unmoved by them, except as they lend themselves to propaganda exploitation.

The exception is the suggestion that the joint declaration should pledge action "to prevent in Cuba the creation . . . of an externally-supported military capability endangering the security of countries in the area." Do we really mean this? How do we determine the peril point? Are we prepared to follow through when the peril point is reached? I would think that this provision would require the closest possible consideration before we tie ourselves to it.

There is, however, a substantial point in this memorandum--that is, the effort to distinguish the Caribbean problem from the hemisphere problem and to confer special responsibilities for defense on the states closest to Cuba. In a sense, this will represent a movement toward weakening the OAS. But the OAS has demonstrated its ineffectiveness anyway; and the regional arrangement can certainly be rationalized as a means of strengthening the OAS and giving effect to the Rio Treaty.

My own present recommendation would be along the following lines: an announcement that the MFM, after appropriate citations of the Castro threat and appropriate warnings to Havana and Moscow, proposes the establishment within the OAS of a Caribbean Security Organization composed of all states near the Caribbean which feel themselves menaced by the extra-continental penetration of Cuba. These nations have a special interest in adopting defensive measures to prevent the clandestine shipment of men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes. The other Latin American republics can then hail the Caribbean Security Organization as a legitimate action of self-defense within the Rio Treaty and as a source of strength for the OAS. President Betancourt will invite the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the interested countries to a meeting in Venezuela in mid-October to consider the special measures to be taken.

I would favor a simple and strong statement of this sort, uncluttered by detail about air-sea surveillance, etc. Such detail, beside answering a threat which does not exist, may unnecessarily alarm all-out anti-interventionists in Latin America, as it will excite a certain amount of derision in Europe. A two-stage approach--i.e., announcement of detail after the October meeting--would suggest a greater degree of Latin American initiative and a steady crystallization of hemisphere purpose.

The question remains: what can be done to stop the real threat involved in Cuba--which is not the threat of aggression against the hemisphere, but the threat of international political defeat involved in the extension of

Soviet power (even for defensive purposes) into the western hemisphere.

The answer to this question lies in my judgment in pressures directed against the Soviet Union rather than against Cuba. I continue to think that the Secretary should make a tough and cold statement to the Soviet Ambassador saying that Soviet persistence in the arming of Cuba will (a) cause a surge of indignation in the United States which will color every other issue between ourselves and the USSR and preclude the resolution of any outstanding disagreement, (b) require us to increase our defense budget, and (c) may in the end force us to take action to eliminate Castro and his regime. This having been said, the Soviet Ambassador should be brusquely dismissed.

If NATO shipping constitutes a real, and not a symbolic, problem, similar representations should be made privately to the offending countries.

Let us not deceive ourselves about the measures proposed in the memorandum: they constitute a partial answer to the problem of domestic politics but a most inadequate answer to the real problem.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr./2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

438. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)

Washington, September 25, 1962.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2562. Confidential. Drafted in ARA/RPA by W. G. Bowdler. Also sent to Ralph Dungan. Sent through McGeorge Bundy.

SUBJECT

Caribbean Security Arrangements

At the request of Assistant Secretary Martin I am enclosing a copy of a paper containing suggested courses of action which the countries bordering on the Caribbean could take to demonstrate their determination to work collectively to resist any attempt of direct or indirect aggression by the Castro regime.

This paper has been prepared pursuant to a request made by the President at a meeting with Secretary Rusk and Mr. Martin on September 19./1/ The paper has been discussed with Mr. Sloan of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have raised no substantive objection to the courses of action outlined.

/1/The President met off-the-record with Rusk, Martin, Hurwitch, and McGeorge Bundy at 6:03 p.m. on September 19. (Kennedy Library, President's Appointment Book)

E. S. Little/2/

/2/Little signed for Brubeck above Brubeck's typed signature.

Enclosure

CARIBBEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

There are three courses of action which the countries bordering on the Caribbean can take to demonstrate their

determination to work collectively to resist any attempts at direct or indirect aggression by the Castro regime. These courses of action are:

1. Establishment of a system of air-sea surveillance around Cuba and along the coasts of the Caribbean countries. This surveillance would serve to inhibit the Castro regime from trying to send clandestine shipments of arms and men to other countries of the area and would strengthen the capabilities of those countries to intercept any such shipments. We would assume primary responsibility for the Cuban patrol, while the other countries would join with us in coverage of their own coasts. Our conducting the Cuban patrol would not rule out, however, contributions by other Caribbean countries. These contributions would probably take the form of naval units or support facilities for such units (e.g., refueling and provisioning facilities in the Dominican Republic for Venezuelan or Colombian frigates).
2. Intensification of efforts to counter Castro-communist subversion. This would include control of travel to and from Cuba, shipment of subversive propaganda material from Cuba, and transfer of funds from Cuban sources for subversive purposes. The governments could also agree on a system for exchanging information on Castro-communist subversive activities. This exchange would probably best be handled through bilateral channels, although consideration might be given to establishing a centralized system.
3. Issuance by governments of the Caribbean area, including the United States, of a joint declaration that the extension by the Castro regime of its Marxist-Leninist system by force or threat of force to any part of the Caribbean area or the creation or use of a Soviet-supported offensive military capability endangering the security of any country in the area, will call for the taking of any necessary measures to protect the security of the countries concerned. This declaration would be accompanied by an announcement that discussions will be held at a military level to plan for defensive measures for meeting these contingencies.

With regard to the timing and forum for adopting these courses of action, the following steps are recommended:

1. At the informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers we would seek to have several of the Caribbean countries propose inclusion in the final communique of a paragraph recognizing that the Caribbean is the area most immediately vulnerable to aggression or subversion from Cuba and that consequently governments of the area, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth MFM,^{/3/} have a special interest in adopting defensive measures to prevent the clandestine shipment of men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes. Such a paragraph would give a hemispheric blessing to the Caribbean countries taking special defense measures and thus serve to minimize criticism that the Rio Treaty is being bypassed, or that the inter-American system is being fractionized.

^{/3/}In paragraph 3 of Resolution II adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Punta del Este on January 31, 1962, the Ministers resolved:

"3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance." (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, p. 323)

2. Based on this paragraph, we would seek to have President Betancourt (President Valencia or President Orlich are other possibilities) invite the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the Caribbean countries to a meeting during the second or third week of October to consider the special measures which should be taken. The courses of action outlined above could constitute the program to be approved. The inclusion of Interior Ministers (which in Latin America generally have jurisdiction over police and intelligence forces) would emphasize that the problem of dealing with the Castro-communist threat is not purely external, but one in which internal measures are equally

important.

The foregoing plan presents certain problems. One is the participation of Haiti and Mexico, which for different reasons may refuse to join in the action contemplated. Another is that the agreement on patrol activities will probably give rise to requests for assistance in servicing the surface craft used in the Cuban patrol, and in those cases where a country does not have any, or inadequate, capabilities to patrol its own coast, we can expect requests to furnish patrol boats. Neither of these problems is believed to present insurmountable difficulties.

439. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)

Washington, September 25, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. Top Secret.

SUBJECT

Cuban Blockade Contingency Planning

Planning Directive CINCLANT No. 118-62/1/ contains no new authorizations or directives beyond those contained in the basic Cuban Contingency Plans, all of which have been approved by the JCS. These plans are summarized in the attachment.

/1/See Document 435.

This planning directive was issued to:

- (1) focus subordinate commanders' attention on this contingency and the applicable portions of existing OPLANS.
- (2) inform coordinate commanders of the possibility of their having to provide forces to support such an operation.
- (3) tie together the paperwork and provide a basis for issuing a specific operation order for a Cuban blockade, if one should be ordered./2/

/2/Wiesner added a handwritten note at the end that reads: "Capt. Shepard has read and concurs with this information."

Gerry

Attachment

CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANS

I. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 is the basic contingency plan for operations in Cuba. It provides for (1) simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault in the vicinity of Havana; (2) reinforcement of Guantanamo; (3) mop-up operations in eastern Cuba. The time schedule for this plan calls for the first U.S. landings on the 18th day after receipt of the order to execute.

II. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61 is the quick reaction plan for operations against Cuba. It uses the same forces as OPLAN 314-61 but commits them in increments. The airborne assault occurs 5 days after receipt of the order to

execute; the amphibious assault occurs 3 days thereafter. Reaction time can be reduced to 2 days if advance warning permits pre-positioning of forces.

III. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 provides for the fast application of U.S. air power to Cuba in time increments of 6, 12, and 24 hours from a no warning condition. Target priorities are: (1) aircraft, anti-aircraft and radar installations, and air fields; (2) selective disruption of communication and transportation facilities; (3) troops and armor concentration, artillery, and naval vessels.

440. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

New York, September 26, 1962, midnight.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2662. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Sent to the Department with instructions to repeat to all Latin American posts, except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLADs CINCLANT and CINCARIB. The Secretary and the Latin American Foreign Ministers were in New York for the opening of the Seventeenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Secto 21. Informal MFM. Following based on uncleared memcon:/1/

/1/A memorandum of this conversation is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Secy met Sept 25 informally with FonMins Bolivia, CR, Dom Rep, Guat, Nic and Panama for discussion Cuban problem in preparation informal MFM next week. He briefly reviewed situation, pointing out while recent Sov shipments supplied at Castro's urging have neither increased power of Cuba as offensive military threat nor increased Castro's ability control own people, do represent increased Sov involvement. Secy repeated unequivocal assurances US will under no circumstances permit any raids or attacks of any kind by Cuba on LA countries and stated so far Castro acting cautiously in this area. Recent Sov bluster still gives no indication Soviets contemplating actions of type President warned against in press statement.

Secy made clear US not prepared to accept Cuban situation as permanent. Although military action remains eventual possibility, we must think of ways to solve problem without recourse to arms. Objective should be actions which increasingly isolate Cuba so as make abundantly clear to Soviets Cuba is unprofitable enterprise for them, either in itself or as basis Communist penetration other ARs.

Such steps, which worthy discussion informal MFM, would include review of minimal trade relationships with and shipping to Cuba (this matter we also discussing with our NATO Allies); measures to control flow of small arms, propaganda, money, agents from Cuba and movement of groups of Latin nationals to Cuba for training in subversion; measures of increased surveillance Carib area; and measures control Commies in each country.

In making clear our determination isolate Cuba, we naturally hope for complete hemisphere solidarity, at least on general approach. In addition we prepared move on more intensive steps tightened surveillance and controls with those ARs willing do so, particularly Caribbean nations whose special right take extra measures was recognized at Punta del Este (para 3 res 11)./2/

/2/See footnote 3, Document 438.

In ensuing discussion (Bolivia and El Salvador silent) Central Americans expressed agreement Secy's approach; showed real interest in moving forward in Carib concert, but did not suggest any radical or belligerent action. They showed general concern (to which Secy agreed) that one serious impact in their countries of recent Cuban buildup has been to increase confidence and insolence local Commie groups who intensifying their subversive nibbling tactics. Guatemalan suggested all should urge those ARs still maintaining relations with Cuba to break them. Considerable emphasis placed by Latins on importance of intensive combined efforts educate peoples

OARs on actual conditions Cuban people to counteract heavy Castro propaganda.

Separate meeting of Central American and Caribbean FonMins (excluding Mexico) held 3 pm September 26 with Martin for more concrete exploration possible steps. Secy met 5 pm same day with FonMins South American Reps present for similar initial review of situation./3/

Rusk

/3/See Document 441.

441. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State

New York, September 27, 1962, 7 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2762. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro for the immediate attention of the Ambassador. Sent to the Department with instructions to repeat to all Latin American posts, except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLADs CINCLANT and CINCARIB.

Secto 28. I. Secretary met September 26 with Foreign Ministers Chile, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela and ex-Foreign Minister Arinos of Brazil. Reviewed Cuban situation along lines reported Secto 21./1/ amplifying following points:/2/

/1/Document 440.

/2/A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

1. Re Soviet military build-up. If it should be necessary US take military action, only 3-4 hours preparation would be required reduce effectiveness of material so far received since July. If should be necessary use force, US would employ maximum, non-nuclear violence order minimize time and casualties, but we most anxious avoid this course since would leave long-lasting wounds in Cuba and elsewhere.
2. This is why we pursuing objective of making Soviet involvement in Cuba as expensive and unprofitable as possible for USSR by measures which will further isolate Cuba and exert maximum pressure on USSR.
3. Made clear US not objecting to whatever type social or economic system Cuban people may freely choose, but only to Soviet intervention there and Soviet-Cuban intervention OARs. Stressed US unwilling negotiate Cuban problem with USSR. Due special IA relationships and agreement, Cuban situation no way comparable to or linkable with situations elsewhere, i.e., Berlin or US MAP relations with other free world countries such as Turkey. Stressed US not seeking import cold war into hemisphere or drag OARs into problems not their responsibilities. Cold war direct result Soviet efforts subvert true independence national states. It they who have now brought cold war to hemisphere through Cuba.
4. Also pointed out intense preoccupation American people with Cuban problem is political fact that must be taken into account--as must public opinion situation OARs as well.

II. Venezuelan Foreign Minister, agreeing Secretary's approach, pointed out fight against Castro-Communist gangsterism OARs closely related promotion democracy. In Venezuelan own experience Communists gained strength under dictatorships. Peruvian Foreign Minister, though agreeing desirability meeting on Cuban problem, opposed distracting attention by reference other issues and stated if any their problems (i.e., coups d'etat) discussed, Peru would not attend.

Secretary responded by stressing informal nature meeting outside institutional framework OAS. US thought has been take advantage presence Foreign Ministers in US (originally preferring New York as locus) to talk about problems hemisphere interest, foremost among which, in US view, is Cuba. All realize are various problems within family, such as US-Panama differences re Canal to which Panamanian Foreign Minister referred in GA, and US-Mexican border problem. One country not participating OAS meetings due differences with another. Upcoming Brazilian elections may complicate Brazilian discussion certain matters. However, view our common interests, obligations and objectives, US strongly hopes will be possible Foreign Ministers can gather to talk without regard for various problems within hemisphere and without raising the difficult and divisive question of what we must formally discuss.

While in situation of complete informality it not possible impose conditions on what any Foreign Minister might mention or call any one to order, this should not pose real problem if we all relatively relaxed and not try give institutional effect to an agenda when there is no agenda.

Chilean and Brazilian made mildly helpful statements re general desirability of meeting. Arinos stated Brazilian information confirms Secretary's description Soviet build-up, but little evidence indicate Castro-directed efforts infiltrate Brazil. Indicated some concern re how reach and express conclusions of meeting, referring to possible press communique. Secretary gave impression probably will be communique but stated at moment US has no flat suggestions re content.

III. We intend follow up this and previous meeting with further talks New York and Washington, exploring more concretely ideas contained Department Circular telegram 508./3/

/3/Not found.

View absence or late arrival in US Foreign Ministers of Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay Embassies those countries requested consult Foreign Ministers soonest, drawing on background presentation of problem by Secretary reported above and in Secto 21 and stressing US desire discuss at meeting steps indicated paragraph three Secto 21. Unless Department perceives objection recommend Department author-ize other addressees utilize information both telegrams for discussion Foreign Offices as appropriate.

Rusk

442. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, September 27, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Kaysen.

1. The Attorney General and Mr. McCone met with the President twice on matters related to Cuba: Tuesday at 4 PM and Wednesday at 6:15./1/ On Tuesday Mr. McCone presented the Donovan situation and indicated that it was his recommendation that we go ahead with emphasis on medicines and that we give Donovan whatever support he needed. After some discussion the President agreed and suggested that Mr. McCone discuss the matter with General Eisenhower preparatory to briefing the appropriate Members of Congress.

/1/September 25 and 26.

2. *[3 lines of source text not declassified]*

3. In the second meeting Mr. McCone reported General Eisenhower's views which were broadly favorable. The President suggested that we do the best we can to avoid a clear turn-down now if we didn't get immediate

favorable response.

4. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

5. The Attorney General and Mr. McCone had a private conversation with the President for ten or fifteen minutes.

CK/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

443. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

Moscow, September 28, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Subjects, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-B, 9/15/62-10/24/62. No classification marking. The letter was delivered through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The full text of this letter is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. VI, pp. 152-161.

[Here follow the first 10 pages of the letter, which deal with topics unrelated to Cuba.]

Recently I had a talk with your Secretary of the Interior Mr. S. Udall. He made a good impression on me. Our conversation was friendly. And I never expected that at the time I talked with him you would take a decision to request from the Congress an authority to call up 150.000 reservists.^{/1/} Motivating that step of yours you referred to the red-hot state of international atmosphere and to a necessity for you in that connection to react promptly to the dangers that may arise in any part of "the free world". Everybody understands that when the President of the U.S. demands an increase in armed forces and explains that demand by an aggravation of the situation, it means that he considers that the situation is aggravated by the other side, that is by us, the Soviet Union. But we haven't done anything that could give a pretext for that. We did not carry out any mobilization, and did not make any threats.

/1/See footnote 1, Document 422.

I must tell you straightforwardly, Mr. President, that your statement with threats against Cuba^{/2/} is just an inconceivable step. Under present circumstances, when there exist thermonuclear weapons, your request to the Congress for an authority to call up 150.000 reservists is not only a step making the atmosphere red-hot, it is already a dangerous sign that you want to pour oil in the flame, to extinguish that red-hot glow by mobilizing new military contingents. And that, naturally, forces the other side to respond in kind. What could it lead to, all the more that you consider that the U.S. has right to attack Cuba whenever it wishes? But nowadays is not the Middle Ages, though even at the time it was considered brigandage, and measures were taken against such actions. And in our time such actions are absolutely unthinkable. That is what made us to come out with the TASS statement^{/3/} and later at the session of the UN General Assembly to qualify your act, to remind of the norms of international law and to say about West Berlin.

/2/An apparent reference to the statement made by President Kennedy on September 13; see Document 429.

/3/See Document 422.

If there were not statement by you on Cuba, we, naturally, as Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Udall were told, would not say anything on West Berlin. Your statement forced us to do so.

We regret that this dangerous line is being continued in the United States now. What is going on, for example, in the U.S. Congress. How can one, for example, fail to notice the decision of the House of Representatives to stop giving U.S. aid to any country that trades with Cuba or whose ships are used for trading with Cuba. Isn't that an act of an unpermissible arbitrariness against freedom of international trade, an act of crude interference into domestic affairs of other countries?

Very serious consequences may have the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate on the Cuban question. The contents of that resolution gives ground to draw a conclusion that the U.S. is evidently ready to assume responsibility for unleashing thermonuclear war. We consider that if what is written in that resolution were actually carried out it would mean the beginning of war because no country can agree with such interpretation of rights, with such arbitrariness. Then there would be no UN, everything would collapse and roll into abyss as it happened once when the League of Nations collapsed. Who wrecked it then? Japan and Hitler, who quit the League of Nations to untie their hands and start war. And they did start it. Could it be that the US wants to embark on such road?

We would greatly regret if it were so. We still do not lose hope that we will be able to normalize our relations. But this can be achieved only when the United States and its allies will strictly adhere to the generally recognized norms of international law and will not interfere into the domestic affairs of other states, will not threaten other countries. This is the main thing. And this is the coexistence of which we spoke more than once. You spoke of it too. But what kind of coexistence is this if the United States would attack countries whose government or socio-political system are not to its liking? In our time the world has split into two camps--capitalist and socialist: you have neighbours whom, as you say, you do not like while we have neighbours whom we do not like, but they are your friends and allies. How can one, especially under these circumstances, consider it to be one's right to attack another country merely because its government and internal order are not to your liking? If we conduct such a policy, where this will lead to--to world war.

[Here follow the concluding 4 pages of the 17-page letter. There was one other brief reference to Cuba in the concluding section of the letter. It reads as follows: "It has just become known that the Puerto-Rican but actually American authorities detained a British ship and arrested the Soviet cargo aboard that ship--sugar that we have bought in Cuba. If such arbitrariness is not stopped, you yourself realize what it can lead to."]